United States v. Personal Finance Co.

13 F.R.D. 306, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3646
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 13, 1952
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 13 F.R.D. 306 (United States v. Personal Finance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Personal Finance Co., 13 F.R.D. 306, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3646 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

Opinion

WEINFELD, District Judge.

The defendant, named in a 1,018 count information, moved to dismiss various counts upon the ground that they failed to charge a crime and that all but seven were duplicitous. While this motion was sub judice, the prosecution, atlhough disputing the alleged invalidity of the counts so attacked, made the present motion for leave to serve an amended information. The stated purpose is for “amplification and clarification” and “to make more definite and certain the particular offenses” charged in the original information. It is conceded that no impediment exists to the filing of a superseding information. The sole reason assigned for not doing so is “in order to save a great deal of typing and clerical work.”

The original information charges violations of Section 601 of the Defense Production Act1 and Regulation W,2 promulgated thereunder by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

I

The defendant’s motion to dismiss was directed towards counts 1 to 95, hereafter referred to as Group I, counts 307-987, hereafter referred to as Group VI, and counts 998-1018, hereafter referred to as Group VII. The counts in each of the three groups are preceded by a charging paragraph. It is these paragraphs which the prosecution now seeks to amend pursuant to Rule 7(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., which provides:

“The court may permit an information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.”

The Government’s application raises the issue whether or not the proposed amended information charges offenses additional to, or different from, those charged in the original information.

The charging paragraph of Group I of the original information alleges that defendant

“did not preserve true and correct books of account, records and other papers, and * * * falsified, kept and maintained false records to conceal the true purposes of loans made to borrowers, as prohibited by the regulation.” (Citing Section 8(a) of Regulation W.)

The proposed amendment to Group I would delete the foregoing and substitute therefor a charge that defendant

“did * * * fail and omit to perform a duty required of it under [Regulation W], in that the said defendant did not preserve for the life of the obligations to which they relate * * * such books of account, records and other papers, including statements and agreements or photographic reproductions thereof, required by and obtained pursuant to said Regulation, as were relevant to establishing whether or not the credits qualified for exemption under Section 7 of said Regulation and whether or not they were otherwise in conformity with the requirements of said Regulation.” (Citing Sections 7 (i) and 8(a) of Regulation W.)

Thus, the basic question is whether the proposed accusation of failure to preserve “for the life of the obligations to which they relate * * * such books of account, [308]*308records and other papers * * * as were relevant to establishing whether or not the credits qualified for exemption under Section 7 * * * ” is different from the original charge of failure to preserve true records and the falsification of records to conceal the true purposes of loans.

The proposed amendment is substantially in the language of Section 8(a), which is entitled “Preservation of Records; Inspection.” 3 Section 8(a) imposes upon a registrant no duty to make and keep any particular books of account, records and papers 4 (other than statements or agreements under the regulation). Thus, each registrant may keep such books of account and records as conform to his own requirements. The only affirmative duty imposed is that he preserve such records as are maintained and such statements as are relevant to establishing whether or not a credit qualifies for exemption under Section 7, or is otherwise in conformity with the requirements of the regulation. These were to be available for inspection as provided for under paragraph 2 of Section 8(a),5 and in the event the inspection proved unsatisfactory, the registrant was to furnish such information to the Board “under oath or otherwise” as it deemed necessary. In this way the Board was in a position to ascertain the facts surrounding a given loan.

This careful and precise regulatory scheme is singularly silent on the subject of keeping true and accurate books of account. It must be presumed that ethical business men will keep such books and will not falsify their records and that the Administrator did not contemplate otherwise. But the question here is whether the Administrator manifested an intention to bring such falsification within the scope of the criminal prohibitions of the Act.

We are here dealing with a criminal statute imposing substantial penalties for violations.6 Statutes or regulations creating crimes are to be strictly construed.7 Even though falsification of records, the offense originally charged, may be more reprehensible than the proposed amended offense of failure to preserve records, the regulation may not be construed to include the more reprehensible conduct unless its language expressly or by fair implication warrants such a construction.8 “There are no constructive offenses; and, before one can be punished, it must be shown that his case is plainly within the statute.”9 If it were intended that the falsification of records required to be kept [309]*309under the credit control section of the Defense Production Act were to be punished criminally, it would have been a simple thing to have proscribed it, as indeed, has been done many times by Congress10 and administrative agencies.11

In M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 66 S.Ct. 705, 707, 90 L.Ed. 894, the Court discussed the scope of a regulation prohibiting evasion of price limitations whether “by direct or indirect methods, in connection with any * * * sale * * * of * * * the commodities prices of which are herein regulated, alone or in conjunction with any other commodity * * The 'Court held that a sale of one commodity upon the condition that another commodity of some value also be bought was not an offense within the meaning of the regulation. In the course of his opinion, Justice Murphy said,

“ * * * patent omissions and uncertainties cannot be disregarded when dealing with a criminal prosecution. A prosecutor in framing an indictment, a court in interpreting the Administrator’s regulations or a jury in judging guilt cannot supply that which the Administrator failed to do by express iword or fair implication. Not even the Administrator’s interpretations of his own regulations can cure an omission or add certainty and definiteness to otherwise vague language. The prohibited conduct must, for criminal purposes, be set forth with clarity * * *.

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Bluebook (online)
13 F.R.D. 306, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3646, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-personal-finance-co-nysd-1952.