United States v. Perez Santana

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided June 10, 1994·No. 93-2273·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


June 9, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-2273

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

RAFAEL PEREZ-SANTANA,

Defendant, Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Torruella, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
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Edward P. Manning, Jr., on brief for appellant.
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Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, Margaret E.
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Curran and Charles A Tamuleviz, Assistant United States
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Attorneys, on brief for appellee.

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Per Curiam. Appellant, Rafael Perez-Santana, pled
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guilty to reentry after deportation following an aggravated

felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2).

The district court sentenced him under the sentencing

guidelines to 52 months in prison. Appellant challenges his

sentence on the ground that the district court was estopped

from imposing a prison sentence in excess of two years

because the government advised him in Spanish at the time of

his deportation that the maximum prison sentence for illegal

reentry was two years. We affirm the sentence.

Background
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Appellant, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was

convicted on December 4, 1991, in Rhode Island state court of

two felony counts related to the delivery of cocaine. On

March 6, 1992, following a hearing before the Immigration and

Naturalization Service ("INS"), appellant was ordered

deported from the United States.

It is undisputed that at the time of appellant's

deportation hearing, the INS provided him with Form I-294.

That form warned appellant, in English and Spanish, that

reentry within five years without permission would constitute

a felony, punishable by imprisonment of not more that two

years. The form, dated March 6, 1992, was signed by

appellant to indicate receipt. At the same time, appellant

also received and signed an "Attachment to Form I-294" which

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notified appellant that illegal entry by a person deported

following conviction of an aggravated felony would be

punishable by imprisonment for "not more than 15 years,"

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2). The "Attachment to Form

I-294" was not translated into Spanish. Appellant claims

that he cannot read English.

On January 13, 1993, appellant was arrested in

Providence, Rhode Island, and eventually indicted by a

Federal Grand Jury for illegal reentry by an alien deported

following conviction of an aggravated felony. Under the

terms of the plea agreement, appellant reserved his right to

challenge the imposition of a sentence in excess of the two-

year maximum of which he was advised by the Spanish

translation of Form I-294. Prior to sentencing, appellant

objected to the PSR to the extent that its recommendations

would result in a prison sentence exceeding two years.

Appellant argued that the district court was estopped from

imposing a lengthier sentence by the government's conduct in

misrepresenting at the time of his deportation that reentry

into the United States would be punished by imprisonment of

not more than two years.

The district court, adopting the PSR's findings of fact

and application of the guidelines, arrived at an imprisonment

range of 46 to 57 months. The court sentenced appellant to

52 months in prison. In rejecting appellant's estoppel

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argument, the court reasoned as follows. First, it had "a

great deal of difficulty in accepting" appellant's contention

that he had relied upon his understanding that a two-year

maximum sentence applied in deciding to illegally reenter the

United States. Second, the court found that the failure to

include a Spanish translation of the enhanced penalty

provision did not amount to the "affirmative misconduct"

required by the estoppel doctrine. Finally, the court

refused to apply the equitable estoppel doctrine to one who

had "unclean hands," because he had knowingly violated the

law by reentering the United States.

Discussion
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This appeal of the district court's sentence is based

entirely on the estoppel argument. In support thereof,

appellant argues that the elements of estoppel, as set forth

by this court in Akbarin v. Immigration and Naturalization
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Service, 669 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1982), are met by this case.
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In Akbarin, this court addressed the application of the
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doctrine of equitable estoppel against the government in

immigration cases. The court held that in determining whether

the government is estopped, the focus should be on the

following two questions. First, was the Government's action

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