United States v. Pedrito Moreta

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: January 30, 2025
• Docket: 24-1541
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________

No. 24-1541 ______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

PEDRITO SANTIAGO MORETA, also known as TRU, Appellant ______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:06-cr-00096-001) U.S. District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle III ______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 27, 2025 ______________

Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 30, 2025) ______________

OPINION * ______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Pedrito Santiago Moreta appeals his sentence for his Hobbs Act and firearms

convictions. Because the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will

affirm.

I

In August 2005, Moreta and co-conspirators robbed a Brinks truck. Moreta

sprayed mace in the truck driver’s face while another co-conspirator pointed a gun at the

driver. United States v. Moreta, 310 F. App’x 534, 537 (3d Cir. 2009). The pair stole

$781,000 but dropped the money after the driver fired at them with his own gun. Moreta

and his co-conspirators then sought to rob a check cashing store. Moreta entered the

premises with a gun, shots were fired, and one of the co-conspirators and the storeowner

were hit. The storeowner shot Moreta, foiling the robbery attempt.

In 2006, a jury found Moreta guilty of (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act

robberies; (2) Hobbs Act robbery of the truck; and (3) attempted Hobbs Act robbery of

the store, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The jury also convicted Moreta of

carrying, or aiding and abetting in the carrying of, a firearm during the robbery and

attempted robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Moreta was sentenced to 421

months’ imprisonment with five years of supervised release. 1

This prison sentence was comprised of (1) 37 months’ imprisonment for each of 1

the Hobbs Act convictions, all to run concurrently, (2) a consecutive 84 months’ imprisonment for the § 924(c) conviction stemming from the truck robbery, and (3) 300 months’ imprisonment for the § 924(c) conviction stemming from the attempted check cashing robbery, to run consecutively to all other counts. 2 In 2022, the United States Supreme Court held that an attempted Hobbs Act

robbery was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of § 924(c). United States v.

Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 851-52 (2022). Accordingly, the District Court vacated Moreta’s

§ 924(c) conviction based on the attempted robbery and resentenced him. On

resentencing, the Presentence Report calculated the Guidelines range for Moreta’s Hobbs

Act convictions as 151 to 188 months and for his § 924(c) conviction associated with the

truck robbery as 84 months to run consecutive to his Hobbs Act sentence, for a total

range of 235 to 272 months.

Each party sought a variance. The United States sought 300 months’

imprisonment based on the violent nature of the offenses, while Moreta sought 204

months’ imprisonment based on his successful rehabilitation during his seventeen years

in prison. After calculating the advisory Guidelines range and considering the § 3553(a)

factors, the District Court imposed 288-months’ imprisonment—a sixteen-month upward

variance. The Court found the sentence was justified by (1) the seriousness of the crimes,

(2) the fear and injuries experienced by the victims, (3) the use of firearms, (4) the need

for just punishment and general deterrence, and (5) Moreta’s criminal history. 2 The

Court acknowledged Moreta’s rehabilitation, noting that it seemed unlikely that Moreta

would reoffend, but found this mitigating factor was outweighed by the need for general

deterrence.

2 When Moreta’s counsel asked the District Court its reasons for the variance, the Court stated that, even though one of Moreta’s crimes was only an attempted robbery, it was “serious nonetheless.” App. 30. 3 Moreta appeals.

II 3

On appeal, Moreta argues that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively

unreasonable, but his arguments fail.

A

In reviewing a sentence’s procedural reasonableness, we focus on whether the

district court (1) correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range, (2) considered any

departure motions, and (3) meaningfully considered all relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors, including any variance requests. United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d

Cir. 2010).

Moreta claims that the District Court erred in parts of its § 3553(a) analysis. The

record, however, shows that the District Court meaningfully considered (1) Moreta’s

rehabilitation and whether the sentence imposed was needed to provide him education or

training, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), (2) specific deterrence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C),

and (3) his variance request. After Moreta informed the Court about his improvement in

prison and asserted that he did not need “more time for education or training,” App. 19,

the Court noted his rehabilitation and low risk of recidivism, but nonetheless concluded

that the “totality of the circumstances” warranted a sentence that (1) deters others, (2)

3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Where, as here, the defendant challenges a sentence’s procedural and substantive reasonableness, we review the District Court’s reasoning for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 4 protects the interests of society and victims, and (3) accounts for the seriousness of the

crimes, App. 28. The District Court thus considered Moreta’s rehabilitation and his

claimed lack of a need of additional education but found them outweighed by other

§ 3553(a) factors. 4 See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 569 & n.8 (holding that a district court

adequately considered deterrence when, after argument on the issue, it issued a sentence

which it stated met the “goals of punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation”).

The District Court also justified its sixteen-month upward variance. When

varying from the advisory Guidelines range, a district court must make “an

individualized determination” that a sentence within the Guidelines range is insufficient

to serve the goals of punishment outlined in § 3553. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 570. The

District Court here considered (1) the crime’s severity and harm to the victims; (2) the

fact that firearms were involved; (3) the need for just punishment; (4) general and

specific deterrence; and (5) Moreta’s rehabilitation. 5 Because the District Court

correctly calculated the Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and provided

its individualized reasons for the variance, its sentence is procedurally reasonable. 6

4 To the extent Moreta takes issue with how the Court weighed those factors, he challenges the sentence’s substantive reasonableness, which is discussed later in this opinion. See United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2015). 5 The Court also acknowledged the change in law that precipitated the resentencing—namely, the Supreme Court’s holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a “crime of violence” under the categorical approach, Taylor, 596 U.S. at 851- 52—but concluded that the crimes here were “serious nonetheless,” and specifically noted a victim was shot. App. 30. 6 Moreta argues that the District Court erred because the factors it cited in justifying its variance “were already contemplated in the calculation of the [G]uideline[s] range sentence.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. Moreta is mistaken. A sentencing court may base a variance on factors that played a role in generating the Guidelines range. See 5 B

Having concluded that the sentence “is procedurally sound, we will affirm it

unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that

particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.

“Our substantive review requires us not to focus on one or two factors, but on the totality

of the circumstances.” Id. at 567 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).

Moreta asserts that no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed an above-

Guidelines sentence for the reasons the District Court provided. We disagree. Courts

have varied upward for similar reasons, including the seriousness of the crime, injury to

victims, and use of firearms. See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619 (11th

Cir. 2015) (holding fifteen-month upward variance for armed robbery was substantively

reasonable given the nature of the crime, defendant’s use of firearms in other robberies,

and to ensure just punishment); United States v. Nelson, 793 F.3d 202, 207 (1st Cir.

2015) (upholding forty-seven-month upward variance for two Hobbs Act violations,

where the district court justified the variance by stating that it “balance[d] [] the severity

of the crimes with [the defendant’s] stated desire to reform his behavior”). Considering

the totality of the circumstances, including Moreta’s rehabilitation, the violent nature of

the offenses, the impact on the victims, the role of firearms in the crimes, and the need for

Tomko, 562 F.3d at 571 (considering defendant’s “negligible criminal history” despite the fact that such history was already factored into Guidelines range); cf. United States v. Philiposian, 267 F.3d 214, 217, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did not commit procedural error by departing upward based on extreme pain suffered by the victim, even though the Guidelines range already accounted for the victim’s pain). 6 just punishment and general deterrence, we cannot say that no reasonable sentencing

court would have imposed the same sentence on Moreta. Thus, Moreta’s substantive

reasonableness challenge fails.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.