United States v. Pearson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 24-7672
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-7672 D.C. No. Appellee, 2:21-cr-00065-FLA-4 v. MEMORANDUM* TERRANCE PEARSON,

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 15, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, BUMATAY, and TUNG, Circuit Judges.

Terrance Pearson appeals his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 18

U.S.C. § 924(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

1. Pearson first challenges the district court’s decision to deny a sentence

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), which allows

a district court to decrease a defendant’s sentence by two levels when he “clearly

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” The district court’s

findings of fact regarding Pearson’s acceptance of responsibility are reviewed for

clear error and are entitled to “great deference on review.” United States v.

Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2004) (simplified).

The district court did not clearly err in denying Pearson a sentence reduction

because it found he did not accept responsibility for his crimes. Courts focus on

whether the defendant shows genuine contrition—not whether he merely exercised

his constitutional rights by proceeding to trial. United States v. McKinney, 15 F.3d

849, 853 (9th Cir. 1994). A district court can deny a reduction when the defendant

makes pretrial admissions, and need not grant it when a defendant “exhibit[s] only a

minimal acceptance of responsibility after trial” and contests whether the

“prosecution” offers “sufficient proof.” United States v. Sotelo, 109 F.3d 1446, 1450

(9th Cir. 1997). In deciding whether to grant a sentence reduction, the district court

may consider whether a defendant falsely denies any relevant conduct, voluntarily

surrenders “to authorities promptly after commission of the offense,” or is timely in

manifesting acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 1. While Pearson

conceded that he would likely be found guilty for one robbery, he also contested the

scope of the conspiracy and the foreseeability of the use of firearms, did not

2 24-7672 voluntarily surrender, and was arrested during the commission of an additional

crime. Given these factors, the district court did not clearly err when it held that

Pearson’s post-trial letter, courses completed while in custody, and in-court

statement during sentencing do not overcome the rest of the record.

2. Pearson next asserts that the district court erred when it applied a two-level

physical-restraint enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), which applies “if

any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense.” The

district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed de novo; its

application of the guidelines to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion; and its

factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Kahre, 737 F.3d 554,

565 (9th Cir. 2013) (simplified).

The sentencing guideline commentary defines physical restraint as actions

including “being tied, bound, or locked up.” That list is non-exhaustive; other

conduct may constitute physical restraint. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n. 1; United States

v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1997). While cases finding physical

restraint “involve a sustained focus,” United States v. Parker¸ 241 F.3d 1114, 1118

(9th Cir. 2001), short-term restraint can constitute physical restraint. United States

v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 1444, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1993). And this court has held that a

defendant was liable for physical restraint when a co-conspirator “grabbed a teller

by her hair and pulled her up from the floor.” Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118. The district

3 24-7672 court properly found that, at minimum, one of the Party City employees was

physically grabbed by her shirt and forced to the ground and that this constituted

physical restraint. And Pearson is liable for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and

omissions of others in furtherance of a jointly undertaken criminal activity.” Id. We

thus affirm the physical-restraint enhancement.

3. Pearson also argues that the district court erred when it instructed the jury

that a Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a “crime of violence.” Because Pearson

forfeited this question below, it is subject to plain-error review. United States v.

Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2026). Predicate crimes of violence for

§ 924(c) charges must have violence as a necessary element under § 924(c)(3)(A).

See United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 448 (2019). While an attempted Hobbs

Act robbery is not a crime of violence, United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 851

(2022), this court has held that a completed Hobbs Act robbery has an element that

requires proof of “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force” and is a crime

of violence. Johnson v. United States, 139 F.4th 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2025). Thus, the

district court did not err when it instructed the jury that a Hobbs Act robbery is a

crime of violence.

4. Finally, Pearson argues that the district court erred when it instructed the

jury that Pinkerton liability applied to the § 924(c) conviction. Whether a jury

instruction misstated the elements of an offense is reviewed de novo. United States

4 24-7672 v. Begay, 33 F.4th 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (simplified). This court has

held that Pinkerton liability applies to § 924(c) counts. United States v. Henry, 984

F.3d 1343, 1355 (9th Cir. 2021). And Hobbs Act robbery convictions support a

§ 924(c) conviction under Pinkerton liability when the government proves at least

one conspirator committed all the elements of the offense, including mens rea and

use of force. Johnson, 139 F.4th at 838–39. Here, the jury found that at least one

conspirator committed all the elements of the Hobbs Act robbery charge. Thus, the

district court did not err in instructing the jury that Pinkerton liability applied to the

§ 924(c) charge.

Because we find no error, we do not consider whether the cumulative effect

of the errors warrants reversal.

AFFIRMED.

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