United States v. Paul Osterman

119 F.4th 1090
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedAugust 1, 2024
Docket22-2773
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 119 F.4th 1090 (United States v. Paul Osterman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Paul Osterman, 119 F.4th 1090 (7th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-2773 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

PAUL S. OSTERMAN, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, No. 1:21-cr-110 — William C. Griesbach, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 1, 2024 ____________________

Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. A detective in Oneida County, Wisconsin, applied for a warrant so he could place a GPS tracker on Paul Osterman’s truck. After monitoring the truck—a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend- ment—authorities prosecuted Osterman for sex trafficking a child. Osterman later learned that some information the de- tective included in the affidavit seeking the warrant was in- correct. To Osterman, this meant the affidavit failed to 2 No. 22-2773

establish probable cause for the search, so he asked the district court to suppress the fruits of the search. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that the affidavit established probable cause despite its inaccura- cies. The court therefore denied Osterman’s motion to sup- press, and Osterman appeals. We agree with Osterman that the detective acted recklessly when he failed to correct the af- fidavit. But we have taken an independent look at the affida- vit, as we must, and we conclude that it establishes probable cause even without the misstatements. For that reason, we are compelled to affirm. I MeetMe.com is an online-dating website. When the web- site’s administrators suspect that MeetMe users are targeting children for sexual exploitation, the administrators must file a “CyberTip” with the National Center for Missing and Ex- ploited Children. Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, https://re- port.cybertip.org/faqs (last visited July 17, 2024). The center manages a centralized system for reporting online child ex- ploitation, and when a CyberTip involves a child in immedi- ate or impending harm, it forwards the tip to law enforcement for investigation. Id. In this case, Detective Chad Wanta of the Oneida County Sheriff’s Office received eight CyberTips. The tips reported strikingly similar instances of misconduct on MeetMe.com between January 2018 and December 2019. All the users had MeetMe usernames beginning with the letter J, including var- iations of “Jared,” “Jones,” and “Jacob.” In addition, each user sent messages on the website looking for “a much younger No. 22-2773 3

girl” and offering money to meet with one for sexual encoun- ters. The CyberTips further disclosed that all but one of the messages originated from MeetMe users who used wireless internet signals hosted by companies in Rhinelander, Wiscon- sin. Specifically, two tips noted the user accessed publicly available wi-fi provided by a McDonalds at 25 S. Stevens Street. Three tips reported the user accessed public wi-fi of- fered by a laundromat called Modes, Machines & More LLC, at 2100 Lincoln Street. And two other tips explained the user accessed a private wi-fi network hosted by Northwoods Com- munications Technologies LLC (now “Northwoods Connect – High Speed Internet”), an internet provider then located at 2151 N. Chippewa Drive. In sum, seven of the eight CyberTips Detective Wanta re- ceived involved similar usernames, sexual propositions, loca- tions, and wi-fi access. The eighth tip was different, but not by much: it linked the suspect to a wi-fi hotspot not in Rhine- lander, Wisconsin, but in Hillside, Illinois. After receiving the CyberTips, Detective Wanta launched an investigation. He targeted the Rhinelander companies listed in the tips. Hoping to identify the MeetMe user who ac- cessed Northwoods Communications’ private wi-fi network, Detective Wanta interviewed the owner and operator of Northwoods Communications: Osterman. Osterman told De- tective Wanta it was impossible to identify the user by the IP address provided in the CyberTip because the IP address could have been used by any one of his company’s 400 cus- tomers. 4 No. 22-2773

Undeterred, Detective Wanta shifted his focus to a MeetMe user who called himself Brad Jones. The relevant CyberTip detailed an instant message exchange between Jones and a child that occurred on July 4, 2019. Near the be- ginning of the exchange, Jones apparently thought the person was older and offered her money to help locate a younger girl. But later, Jones realized he was talking to a twelve-year-old girl who lived in Chicago, Illinois. He told the girl he would drive from Wisconsin to Chicago that night so they could meet. Here we pause to introduce two facts not in the affidavit. First, Detective Wanta’s investigation revealed that Jones ac- cessed three publicly available wi-fi hotspots: one in Antigo, Wisconsin, a second in Gurnee, Illinois, and a third in Chi- cago. And second, authorities later learned from the child vic- tim that when Jones reached Chicago on July 4, he paid her twenty-five dollars in exchange for sex. The CyberTip noted that Jones traveled the next day, on July 5, to Hillside, Illinois, where he connected to a public wi-fi hotspot hosted by a Hol- iday Inn. Law enforcement later subpoenaed the Holiday Inn for a list of guests who stayed in the hotel on July 5. Osterman was among them. By this point in the investigation, Osterman’s profile had popped up twice: at the Hillside Holiday Inn and in relation to Northwoods Communications. But his connection to the investigation did not end there. A few months after the Jones incident, someone called the Rhinelander Police Department to report a suspicious man who allegedly had been sitting in a black pickup truck for several hours. Officers who arrived on the scene discovered Osterman sitting in the truck using two tablets and a cell phone within wi-fi range of Modes, No. 22-2773 5

Machines & More LLC—the same laundromat whose wi-fi had been accessed by a MeetMe user in the CyberTips. When the officers spoke with Osterman, he told them he owned an internet company and was testing his competitor’s internet speed. Believing these connections to be more than coincidence, Detective Wanta secured a search warrant to track Oster- man’s truck by GPS. The GPS data showed Osterman’s truck was parked for several hours on different days at the McDon- alds and laundromat described in the CyberTips. The data also showed the truck was parked around other public wi-fi locations in northern Wisconsin during the investigation. These discoveries aided the investigation, but the inaccu- racies in the affidavit Detective Wanta submitted to secure the warrant did not. In one paragraph, he wrongly suggested that Jones had messaged the underaged girl through the Hillside Holiday Inn’s wi-fi on July 4. In reality, no part of the conver- sation took place through the hotel's wi-fi; instead, Jones merely connected to it on July 5, not July 4. In another para- graph, he wrote that a suspect accessed a wi-fi hotspot owned by the Rhinelander McDonalds, even though the user ac- cessed a hotspot in Texas. Detective Wanta discovered the Texas error after he submitted the affidavit the first time, but he failed to fix the error despite having an opportunity to do so before each of the three times he renewed the warrant. These discrepancies led Osterman to file a motion to sup- press after a grand jury indicted him on three charges: one count of sex trafficking a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c); one count of using a computer to persuade and induce/entice a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

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Bluebook (online)
119 F.4th 1090, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-paul-osterman-ca7-2024.