United States v. Patterson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: July 13, 2026
• Docket: 24-2320
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-2320 United States v. Patterson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of July, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT:

PIERRE N. LEVAL, GERARD E. LYNCH, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 24-2320

JUSTIN PATTERSON,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________ For Defendant-Appellant: Robert A. Culp, Law Office of Robert A. Culp, Garrison, NY; Daniel M. Perez, Law Offices of Daniel M. Perez, Newton, NJ.

For Appellee: James Ligtenberg and Jacob R. Fiddelman, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Cathy Seibel, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the August 28, 2024 judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

Justin Patterson appeals a judgment following a jury trial in which he was

found guilty of one count of possession of a firearm after a felony conviction in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Patterson to 84

months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years’ supervised release. On

appeal, Patterson argues (i) that section 922(g)(1) is both facially unconstitutional

and unconstitutional as applied to him under the Supreme Court’s decision in New

York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022); and (ii) that his sentence is

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity

2 with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we

refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

I. Circuit Precedent Forecloses Patterson’s Section 922(g)(1) Challenge.

Patterson asserts that we should vacate his conviction because 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) is “facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and

unconstitutional as applied to him” under the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen.

Patterson Br. at 51. But as Patterson himself concedes, our precedent forecloses

this argument. See Reply Br. at 1 n.1.

In Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-269, 2026

WL 135708 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026), we held that section 922(g)(1) does not violate the

Second Amendment and is not subject to as-applied challenges, see id. at 91–96.

Since Zherka, we have consistently rejected challenges like Patterson’s, see, e.g.,

United States v. Gonzalez, No. 24-1539, 2025 WL 2327335, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 13,

2025), and Patterson has offered no justification for a different result here.

II. Patterson’s Sentence Was Procedurally and Substantively Reasonable.

Patterson alternatively challenges the reasonableness of his term of

incarceration. “We review a district court’s sentencing decision for procedural

and substantive reasonableness, using a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”

United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

3 omitted). That standard “incorporates de novo review of questions of law

(including interpretations of the Guidelines) and clear-error review of questions

of fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Procedural Reasonableness.

“A district court errs procedurally when it fails to calculate (or improperly

calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as

mandatory, fails to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence

based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen

sentence.” United States v. Alvarado, 720 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Patterson argues that the district court’s refusal to

credit him with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 constituted “a trial penalty on Patterson in violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights, rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable.”

Patterson Br. at 29 (citing United States v. Tavberidze, 769 F. Supp. 3d 264 (S.D.N.Y.

2025)). We are unpersuaded.

While it is true that Patterson requested a “downward variance” in the

district court due to a so-called trial penalty, see App’x at 30, 124, nowhere did he

assert that section 3E1.1 of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth

4 Amendment or made his sentence procedurally unreasonable, see, e.g., id. at 130

(district court: “Do any of the lawyers know of any legal reason why the sentence

I’ve described should not be imposed?”; defense counsel: “No, your Honor.”).

We therefore review only for plain error, which requires Patterson to

“demonstrate: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.”

United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

omitted). And even “[i]f all three conditions are met, we will then exercise our

discretion to rectify this forfeited error only if (4) the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

Patterson’s argument fails at the outset because we “typically will not find

[plain] error where the operative legal question is unsettled, including where there

is no binding precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court.” United States v.

Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Patterson has pointed to no authority establishing that the Sixth Amendment

entitled him to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility; indeed,

there is no such authority. “For th[is] reason alone, we find no plain error.”

United States v. Ragonese, 47 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2022).

5 Patterson’s argument also runs counter to our Circuit’s precedent, which

repeatedly recognizes the “distinction between increasing the severity of a

sentence” and “refusing to grant leniency.” United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168,

195 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). As in Whitten, the district

court below did not penalize Patterson for refusing to plead guilty – in fact, it

explained that Patterson “ha[d] every right to go to trial” and that he “d[idn’t]

have to admit a thing.” App’x at 129. The court simply refused to grant

Patterson “the same leniency as somebody who accepts responsibility,” id., since

Patterson had “put[] the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the

essential factual elements of guilt,” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.l cmt. n.2. “We have long held

that a district court may properly treat a guilty plea as a ‘recognition of fault’ and

that ‘a show of lenience to those who exhibit contrition by admitting guilt does not

carry a corollary that the [j]udge indulges a policy of penalizing those who elect to

stand trial.’” United States v. DiMassa, 117 F.4th 477, 484 (2d Cir. 2024) (alteration

adopted) (quoting United States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1976)).

Consequently, the district court did not plainly err when it declined to grant

Patterson a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

6 B. Substantive Reasonableness.

Patterson next contends that his 84-month sentence was substantively

unreasonable because it was “shockingly high,” “greater than necessary[,] and

violated [s]ection 3553(a).” Patterson Br. at 31, 47. To establish that a sentence

is substantively unreasonable, a defendant “bears a heavy burden because our

review of a sentence for substantive reasonableness is particularly deferential.”

United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012). We may not

“substitute our own judgment for the district court’s on the question of what is

sufficient to meet the [section] 3553(a) considerations in any particular case.”

United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). To the contrary,

we will set aside a district court’s substantive-reasonableness determination “only

in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the

range of permissible decisions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Patterson’s sentence does not “shock[] the conscience,” Patterson Br. at 49,

but instead falls comfortably within “the range of permissible decisions” that were

available to the sentencing judge, Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Contrary to Patterson’s assertion that the district court “did not

purport to even address why it gave a non-Guidelines sentence,” Suppl. Reply Br.

7 at 8, the court expressly “considered all the [section] 3553(a) factors,” emphasizing

Patterson’s “very serious offense,” “the need to promote respect for the law,” the

importance of “[p]rotecting the public from further crimes,” and the need for

adequate “[d]eterrence,” App’x at 128–29; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).

And though the court varied upwards from the high end of the Guidelines range

by six months, it is well-settled that the Guidelines are “truly advisory,” Cavera,

550 F.3d at 189, and that courts may “tailor the sentence in light of other statutory

concerns as well,” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490 (2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “district courts may impose sentences

within statutory limits based on appropriate consideration of all of the factors

listed in [section] 3553(a).” Id.

The district court here did just that. As the court explained, Patterson

“terrorized” the occupants of a vehicle by brandishing a loaded firearm – while an

associate also banged on the car’s windows – because he believed it contained

someone “who had taken another gun from him.” App’x at 128 (emphasis added);

see also PSR ¶¶ 13–14. After the police arrived, Patterson fled and “repeatedly

lied to the police about who he was,” including by using fake identification. PSR

¶ 18. And prior to his arrest, Patterson “us[ed] an alias and liv[ed] as a fugitive”

8 for several years, App’x at 129, during which time he demonstrated “an affinity

for weapons and the Bloods” street gang by posing for photographs with guns and

flashing gang signs “after he had been convicted of a felony,” id. at 128; see also id.

at 101–06.

Patterson concedes that his lengthy criminal history – featuring eight prior

criminal convictions – “included serious acts of violence” involving assault with

intent to cause physical injury, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of

a controlled substance. Patterson Br. at 49; see also PSR ¶¶ 37–44; App’x at 76. In

one instance, Patterson punched a woman after an argument and, when she had

fallen to the ground, “kicked her in the head[,] causing her substantial pain and a

large laceration.” PSR ¶ 40. Another time, Patterson shot a man in the arm in

front of the victim’s son. Id. ¶ 43; App’x at 59 & n.2. The district court also noted

that Patterson had a disturbing history of violating parole and receiving

“disciplinary sanctions” while he was incarcerated, App’x at 120, including for

“violent conduct” and “assault on staff,” PSR ¶ 43.

Based on the “nature and circumstances of the offense” and Patterson’s

criminal “history and characteristics,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the district court

acted well within its discretion in finding that Patterson’s status as a fugitive, “his

9 gang connections,” and “his previous violence,” App’x at 129 – coupled with the

seriousness of the offense at issue here – warranted an above-Guidelines sentence.

See Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190 (emphasizing that we do not “presume that a non-

Guidelines sentence is unreasonable, or require extraordinary circumstances to

justify a deviation from the Guidelines range” (internal quotation marks omitted));

United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the great majority of

cases, a range of sentences – frequently extending well beyond the narrow ranges

prescribed by the Guidelines – must be considered reasonable.”).

Finally, Patterson contends that the district court “overlooked” certain

mitigating factors at sentencing, Patterson Br. at 50, including “the severity of [his]

house arrest” prior to sentencing, Suppl. Reply Br. at 4. But the district court

expressly “acknowledge[d]” that Patterson had “complied with a long period of

home confinement and pretrial supervision” and imposed a lower sentence as a

result. App’x at 128–29. The court also “t[ook] into account that serving time at

[the Metropolitan Detention Center] is harder than serving time in other places,”

noted that Patterson had, “to his credit,” received his GED, and remarked that he

was “a good father.” Id. at 128. It was largely for these reasons that the district

10 court decided “not . . . to impose a sentence approaching [the 120-month sentence

that] the government ha[d] asked for.” Id. at 129.

In the end, however, the court found that the mitigating factors did not

“offset” the aggravating circumstances, id., particularly because “the instant

offense” was “serious,” “similar to [Patterson’s] previous convictions,” and

occurred as recently as 2019, demonstrating that it was not “ancient stuff” from

Patterson’s past, id. at 128. While Patterson disagrees with the district court’s

weighing of these factors, such disagreement does not make for an abuse of

discretion. See Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289 (underscoring that “[t]he particular

weight to be afforded aggravating and mitigating factors is a matter firmly

committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

* * *

We have considered Patterson’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court