United States v. Patrick Smith

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: November 27, 2023
• Docket: 22-4145
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4145 Doc: 42 Filed: 11/27/2023 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4145

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PATRICK FITZGERALD SMITH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:21-cr-00090-RJC-DSC-1)

Submitted: November 21, 2023 Decided: November 27, 2023

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: D. Baker McIntyre III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4145 Doc: 42 Filed: 11/27/2023 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Patrick Fitzgerald Smith pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a). The district court

sentenced Smith to 64 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. On

appeal, Smith challenges the district court’s application of the stolen firearm enhancement

pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) (2018). Finding no error,

we affirm.

We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-

discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We “must first ensure

that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate

(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.” Id. at 51. “In reviewing whether a

sentencing court properly calculated the Guidelines range, we review the court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Shephard, 892

F.3d 666, 670 (4th Cir. 2018). “We will conclude that the ruling of the district court is

clearly erroneous only when, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Steffen, 741 F.3d

411, 415 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e afford great deference

to a district judge’s credibility determinations and how the court may choose to weigh the

evidence.” United States v. Williamson, 953 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the district court is entitled to “give weight to any

relevant information before it . . . provided that the information has sufficient indicia of

reliability to support its accuracy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The

2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4145 Doc: 42 Filed: 11/27/2023 Pg: 3 of 3

Government bears the burden of demonstrating that a sentencing enhancement should be

applied, and the court must find that the enhancement applies by a preponderance of the

evidence. Steffen, 741 F.3d at 414-15.

Under the Guidelines, a district court should apply a two-level upward adjustment

in offense level if the defendant unlawfully possessed a stolen firearm. USSG

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). This enhancement applies “regardless of whether the defendant knew

or had reason to believe that the firearm was stolen.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.8(B); see

United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, Smith argues that there

was insufficient evidence that the guns he possessed were stolen. However, the owner of

one of the firearms testified at sentencing that her gun was indeed stolen, and the district

court found the gun owner’s testimony credible. After reviewing the materials submitted

in the joint appendix and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not err

in applying the stolen firearm enhancement.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED