KRUPANSKY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RYAN, J., joined. COLE, J. (pp. 453-56), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge.
The defendants-appellants Patrick Carney (“Patrick”) and Sean Carney (“Sean”), father and son respectively (collectively “the Carneys” or “the defendants”), both federally-licensed firearms dealers, have assailed their correlative jury convictions for multiple counts of (1) aiding and abetting the felonious utterance of knowingly false statements by customers in the defendants’ firearms transfer records (18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A)),1 and (2) the felonious creation or maintenance of willful omissions and/or falsehoods in their firearms transaction records regarding the name, age, and place of residence of firearms purchasers (18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5)).2 [442]*442The defendants have framed five separate assignments of error, each of which they have alleged to be individually sufficient to invalidate some or all of their convictions.
During all times pertinent to the subject prosecutions, the Carneys operated “Carney’s Hunting and Shooter’s Supply,” a gun shop located in Warren, Michigan. Between February 17, 2000, and June 29, 2000, on at least nine distinct occasions, the Carneys sold automatic or semi-automatic handguns and rifles to David Johnson (a/k/a “Tone”) (“Johnson”), who, as a previously-convicted felon, was a person legally prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms having an interstate or foreign commercial nexus. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). However, each sale had ostensibly been made instead to a female companion of Johnson’s, which unlawful weapons transfers were aided and abetted by the defendants via their willful acceptance and retention of fraudulent supporting documentation. During the course of his weapons-acquisition scam, Johnson used at least six different women as putative purchasers of firearms from the Carneys. Each of the “straw woman” purchasers had an unblemished criminal record and hence confronted no extraordinary legal restriction(s) on her liberty to purchase and/or possess firearms.
In each evidenced episode, Johnson adhered to an identical modus operandi Initially, he would drive his selected female co-conspirator to the Detroit Police headquarters to enable her submission of a written application for the required arms permit. Johnson would assist the woman with the completion of that form. After securing the weapons permit in the woman’s name, Johnson would transport her to the Carneys’ gun store, where he would select one or more firearms for purchase in the absence of any participation by his feminine cohort. Instead, his accomplice would idly pass the time by, for example, playing with the store owners’ pets, or smoking cigarettes while standing outside the storefront. After Johnson had selected his desired pieces, he would assist his companion with the completion of the legally-requisite ATF Form 4473.3 In each instance, that document falsely identified the woman, over her signature, as the ultimate buyer of the firearm(s). However, Johnson negotiated the purchase price of each firearm; paid, in cash, for each of the weapons purchased; and personally carried each purchased specimen out of the defendants’ store.
On November 29, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a thirty-nine count indictment against the Carney defendants, Johnson, and eight women; thirteen of those charges named the Carneys as alleged aiders and abettors in the making of false statements, violative of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A), by Johnson and his accomplices. The Carneys moved for dismissal of all charges against them, on the rationale that, as licensed firearms traders, they could not be charged under § 924(a)(1)(A), for alleged reasons examined below. The district court denied that [443]*443motion. See United States v. Johnson, 210 F.Supp.2d 889 (E.D.Mich.2002). Subsequently, on July 18, 2002, the grand jury issued a superseding indictment which restated the thirteen § 924(a)(1)(A) counts against the Carneys, but which also supe-rinduced six counts which alleged record-keeping offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5) against Sean plus four similar counts against Patrick.
Following a jury trial which, on November 4, 2002, resulted in the defense-friendly disposition of ten of the twenty-three counts stated against the Carneys via either “not guilty” verdicts or dismissals of counts by the district court as a matter of law for the insufficiency of supporting trial evidence, the Carneys proceeded to their second jury trial on the thirteen remaining counts against them (each of which had been the subject of a mistrial ruling in the initial trial forum). On March 6, 2008, the second jury convicted Sean on three counts which had alleged violations of § 924(a)(1)(A), and three additional counts which had stated offenses under § 922(b)(5);4 and it convicted Patrick on four charges of § 924(a)(1)(A) violations plus four counts undergirded by § 922(b)(5).5 Ultimately, the trial court [444]*444sentenced Sean to six concurrent twenty-seven-month terms of imprisonment, and imposed eight concurrent eighteen-month incarceration periods against Patrick. Following release from penal confinement, each defendant shall be supervised for two years.
As their initial alleged rationale for reversal of their convictions, the defendants have protested that the government erred, as a matter of law, by proceeding against them under section 924(a)(1)(A), a felony statute which, according to the defendants, should apply only against the maker(s) of knowingly false material statements to a firearms seller for inclusion within the seller’s legally-required transaction records but which, allegedly by the negative implication of its facial terms, cannot apply against the seller himself.6 See note 1 above. Instead, the defendants have argued that, because they were licensed arms dealers, the United States should have instead prosecuted them under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(3)(A), a misdemean- or rule which provides:
(a)(3) Any licensed dealer, licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed collector who knowingly—
(A) makes any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by the provisions of this chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this subchapter
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(3)(A). (Emphases added).
However, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the interplay of § 924(a)(1)(A) and § 924(a)(3)(A), respectively, does not pose an instance whereby general statutory language is entirely superseded by specific statutory terms which address a precise matter. Cf. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 657, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997). Although countless instances undoubtedly exist wherein a defendant legitimately could be charged only under one section in controversy or the other, but not either in the alternative nor both, such a circumstance is not presently framed herein. Accordingly, this appellate court need not resolve the full and/or exclusive reach of either statutory section in controversy. Rather, the defendants’ conduct alleged in the § 924(a)(1)(A) counts of conviction could have sustained convictions under either, or both, referenced sections.7
[445]*445However, the government elected to proceed under § 924(a)(1)(A), to the exclusion of § 924(a)(3)(A). See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (instructing that where a defendant’s conduct offended more than one statute, federal authorities may prosecute him under any or all such enactments); United States v. Schaffner, 715 F.2d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1983) (explaining that, where a defendant’s alleged conduct satisfied the elements of both a misdemeanor and a felony offense, the United States Attorney was “free to prosecute under any applicable statute without regard to which statute is more specifically tailored to the facts alleged.... There is .no general rule of lenity which requires the government to fore-go a felony prosecution simply because a misdemeanor statute may also be applicable.”) (citations omitted). In the case instanter, record proof supportive of each pertinent § 924(a)(1)(A) count of conviction revealed that Johnson and his named female accomplice had made material misrepresentations of fact on the official Form 4473, which the defendant seller knew to be false, and which false data was willfully retained in the Carneys’ legally required transaction records.
Accordingly, the trial proof supported the jury’s finding that, as charged [446]*446in the superseding indictment, the Carneys had “aided and abetted” Johnson and his feminine cohorts in their section 924(a)(l)(A)-proscribed plot to purchase firearms by submitting fraudulent data on the Forms 4473. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”) (Emphasis added). The record evidence compellingly demonstrated that the defendant gun dealers knowingly, willfully, actively, and repeatedly collaborated with a convicted felon’s ongoing unlawful conspiratorial scheme, by means including their willful acceptance of fraudulent official documentation, which exposed them to “accomplice ” felony liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 924(a)(1)(a); hence, the government clearly was not constrained to instead prosecute the Carneys only under the section 924(a)(3)(A) misdemeanor rule, even if § 924(a)(1)(A) does not independently apply to fabrications of material misinformation by firearms dealers on official transfer documents.
Thus, the district court correctly rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 924(a)(1)(A) counts, because those counts properly charged the Carneys with having aided and abetted the felonious frauds committed by Johnson and his accomplices in the completion of legally required firearms transfer records.
Next, the Carneys have argued that if they were properly convicted as “aiders and abettors” of their customers’ fraudulent representations under § 924(a)(1)(A), then their associated convictions under § 922(b)(5) were invalid, either (1) because an alleged fatal inconsistency inhered in the jury verdicts in that the defendants purportedly could not be simultaneously guilty of both aiding and abetting the creation of false records, and of not maintaining the legally required records relative to the same transactions; or (2) because the evidence supporting their § 922(b)(5) convictions was averredly insufficient in that the record reflected that ATF Forms 4473 memorialized each subject transaction (albeit with falsified data regarding the buyer’s identity), whereas § 922(b)(5) allegedly requires the absence of any record of the buyer’s name, age, and residence. However, because the defendants have misconstrued the meaning of § 922(b)(5), neither assault withstands critical examination.
The defendants’ attack against their § 922(b)(5) felony convictions was anchored in United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837 (6th Cir.2000), wherein the Sixth Circuit distinguished § 924(a)(3)(A) (the statute which assigned misdemeanor liability to a licensed firearms dealer who knowingly made a false representation in his transaction records) from § 922(b)(5) (the basic statute which created liability for a licensed armaments trader who failed to maintain a record of the name, age, and place of residence of the buyer of firearms, which the Choice court further found to be punishable as a felony under § 924(a)(1)(D) where that transgression had been “willful”). See Choice, 201 F.3d at 840 (“The plain language of this statute indicates that § 924(a)(1)(D) governs Choice’s offense, and therefore the district court correctly found that Choice had pleaded guilty to a felony. By its terms, § 924(a)(3)(A) clearly applies only to licensed dealers who make false statements in connection with firearms sales, and not to those who fail to keep any records at all. Furthermore, § 924(a)(3)(A) refers only to knowing offenses and therefore implicitly excludes Choice’s willful violation from its scope.”). (Citations omitted).
Choice had failed to maintain any record of the sale of a charged firearm, although [447]*447he knew that he was required by law to maintain a record. Id. at 838. Following his guilty plea to a § 922(b)(5) count, Choice unsuccessfully argued that the § 924(a)(3)(A) misdemeanor proviso should be construed to control the punishment of all record-keeping offenses by a licensed firearms distributor, including offenses under § 922(b)(5). Id. at 839-42. However, because Choice had admitted in his plea agreement to a “willful” violation of § 922(b)(5)’s proscription against failing to keep records of the name, age, and address of a buyer, which in turn triggered the felony penalty provision of § 924(a)(1)(D), the Sixth Circuit sustained Choice’s felony conviction under § 922(b)(5).
Accordingly, the Choice court resolved that felony liability will be available against a licensed firearms dealer who willfully fails to maintain the records required by § 922(b)(5); whereas only misdemeanor liability can burden a licensed firearms dealer who has merely knowingly maintained sales records containing false information per § 924(a)(3)(A). Significantly, the issue whether a licensed firearms dealer’s willful neglect to record on a completed ATF Form 4473 the correct name, age, and residential address of the buyer — that is, his willful recordation and retention of false material information as opposed to no information at all — can qualify as a § 922(b)(5) violation for failure to maintain a record of that information, as opposed to a § 924(a)(3)(A) offense for merely knowingly maintaining a false record of sales information, was not directly posed before the Choice court. Accordingly, any language contained in Choice which might be construed to support either possible construction of the interplay of the two statutes must be regarded as mere noncontrolling dictum.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit squarely addressed the issue in controversy in United States v. Rietzke, 279 F.3d 541 (7th Cir.2002). In that prosecution, defendant Rietzke, a federally licensed firearms dealer, had sold a firearm to a convicted felon through a female straw purchaser. Those customers completed the required transaction form by, among other things, falsely listing the straw buyer’s name, age, and address as that of the purchaser. The defendant willfully retained that false document in his business records. Id. at 542-43. The defense argued (unsuccessfully) that Rietzke could be prosecuted only under § 924(a)(3) for the misdemeanor of knowingly maintaining a false transaction record, but not for the § 922(b)(5) felony of willfully failing to record the name, age, and address of the buyer. See id. at 543. The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, resolving, among other things, “that when multiple criminal statutes apply to the same conduct, the prosecutor has the discretion to choose under which statute to proceed.” Id. at 545 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)). “In this case, the prosecution in the exercise of her prosecu-torial discretion chose to charge Rietzke under the felony provision of the statute and not the misdemeanor provision, and it was within her discretion to do so.” Id. at 546.
The Rietzke court further pronounced that “[n]othing in § 924(a)(3) suggests that it is the sole provision under which a licensed firearms dealer could be charged.” Id. at 546. Rather, a fair reading of §§ 924(a)(3) and 922(b)(5) in tandem revealed a Congressional intent to permit prosecutors the option of prosecuting licensed firearms dealers who have willfully failed to record the correct name, age, and address (either by complete omission or by the substitution of false information) under §§ 922(b)(5) and 924(a)(1)(D) (the felony [448]*448provisions), or for knowingly retaining false records under § 924(a)(3)(A) (the misdemeanor statute). Id. at 546.
The instant reviewing court concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s analysis and ruling in Rietzke were persuasive, and thus this court hereby adopts it. Whereas, as regarding the relationship between §§ 924(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(3)(A) evolved above, situations undoubtedly will exist wherein a defendant could only be properly prosecuted under either § 924(a)(3)(A) or § 922(b)(5), but not either in the alternative nor both, such a circumstance was not posed in the cause sub judice. Rather, the instant proof of record could have supported convictions under either, or both, statutes. At bottom, the mere fact that the Carneys willfully accepted, and maintained in their records, incorrect information regarding the name, age, and address of the buyer of certain firearms, as opposed to simply failing to record any information on those subjects in their transaction records, is an immaterial distinction. The plain language of § 922(b)(5) covers both scenarios, in that a licensed dealer’s willful recordation of false data, instead of the accurate data, is both the moral and the functional equivalent of the willful re-cordation of no information at all regarding the legally required matters. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5).
Accordingly, the record evidence supporting the Carneys’ § 922(b)(5) convictions was sufficient, because, as developed above, the prosecution was not restricted on the subject record to proceeding against the defendants only under § 924(a)(3)(A) for their willful record-keeping failures. Likewise, no fatal inconsistency was manifested by the jury verdicts which found the defendants liable for the § 922(b)(5) felonies of willfully failing to transcribe complete, accurate, and truthful information about the name, age, and address of the buyer of certain firearms; and which concomitantly found them guilty of aiding and abetting their customer’s § 924(a)(1)(A) felonious provision of knowingly false information for inclusion in the defendants’ sales transaction records.
Thirdly, the defendants have assailed the trial court’s “deliberate ignorance” jury instruction, which had tracked nearly verbatim the Sixth Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instruction 2.09 (“Deliberate Ignorance”).8 The Sixth Circuit has endorsed Pattern Jury Instruction 2.09 as a correct summation of the governing law, which forecloses the risk that a jury might convict on the basis of negligent failure to know rather than virtual knowledge. See United States v. Mari, 47 F.3d 782, 785 (6th Cir.1995). Nonetheless, although a jury charge might be a correct statement of the law, a trial court’s election to give that instruction is examined by a reviewing [449]*449court for abuse of discretion,9 because even a facially correct instruction may, in the light of record proof, the totality of the jury charges, or other circumstances of the case, be incomplete, misleading, confusing, or otherwise prejudicial. See United States v. Beaty, 245 F.3d 617, 621-22 (6th Cir.2001) (directing that the trial court’s recitation of a legally-correct “deliberate ignorance” charge which was not supported by the case evidence constituted an abuse of discretion; however, that error was ultimately harmless) (citing Mari, supra ); Innes v. Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702, 714 (6th Cir.1996).
Conversely, even a legally-erroneous jury charge will not justify reversal of a conviction if its probable effect on the verdict was inconsequential. Barnes v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 822 (6th Cir.2000) (“We will not reverse a decision on the basis of an erroneous jury instruction where the error is harmless.”). No trial error, including an erroneous jury instruction, will compel reversal of a conviction unless the defendants) can prove “either that the alleged misconduct [or error] was inherently prejudicial or that it caused actual prejudice.” United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 371 (6th Cir.1991). “Absent proof or documentation of prejudice, we do not assume that prejudice occurred.” United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071, 1077 (6th Cir. 1998). When assessing a trial error’s potential prejudicial impact, the appellate court “must take account of what the error meant to them [the jurors], not singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). See also United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir.1993) (instructing that the defendant must prove that “it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict.”).
The Carneys have protested that the presiding lower court judge had abused her discretion to their prejudice by instructing the jury on “deliberate ignorance” because no direct proof had been admitted of either defendant’s actual knowledge that Johnson was the actual buyer of the charged firearms. That assignment of error was facially ill-formulated. The plain language of the pattern instruction authorizes a jury to find “knowledge” based upon circumstantial proof which compels the conclusion that the defendant(s) must have known the fact at issue because it was “obvious” — as opposed to having merely been negligent by failing to discover or realize the subject fact which they should have known.
By contrast, if direct proof existed that the defendants had known that Johnson was the actual buyer of the weapons, no need for any “deliberate ignorance” instruction would have arisen. In all events, the defendants have furnished no proof, other than speculation, conjecture, empty hypothesizing, creative guesswork, and wishful thinking, to conclude that the jurors did not follow the clear letter of the “deliberate ignorance” charge, or were in any way confused or misled. See Barnes, 201 F.3d at 822 (“Federal courts generally presume the jury will follow the instructions correctly as given.”); Mari, 47 F.3d at 785-86 (expounding that courts will not assume that jurors neglected to follow the legally-correct instructions read to them).
[450]*450Furthermore, even assuming ar-guendo that some possibility of juror confusion or misunderstanding inhered in the faulted charge, no actual prejudice to the Carneys resulted. The record proof reflected beyond contradiction that the Carneys knew precisely what Johnson was doing. The jury unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Patrick had consummated at least four transactions with Johnson and four different women between March 2 and June 2, 2000; and that Sean had closed at least three deals with Johnson and three different women between February 25 and March 10, 2000. Johnson followed the identical, highly incriminating modus operandi on each occasion, including assuming exclusive control over selecting, paying for, and carrying out the firearms he wanted, and aiding his female confederate in the fraudulent completion of the ATF declaration.
In light of those facts, the conclusion was inescapable that any rational person, let alone an experienced licensed firearms merchant, would have known that Johnson was the true buyer of the weapons. Patently, the defendants would have been convicted with or without the “deliberate ignorance” instruction. Moreover, any rational and lucid jury would have found, on the subject record, that the Carneys either knew that Johnson was the actual buyer of the guns or had been deliberately ignorant of that fact, even if the jury at issue had erroneously misunderstood the instruction by concluding that they needed only to find that the Carneys had negligently failed to understand what they “should have known” about Johnson’s ruse.10 Accordingly, any unwarranted adverse impact which the “deliberate ignorance” instruction may have had on the defense case was ultimately harmless.
Fourthly, the defendants have contended that the trial court prejudiced their defense by allowing the United States, over their opposition, to introduce Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) evidence of similar transactions between the Carneys and Johnson which had been the subjects of dismissed counts or counts of acquittal at the defendants’ initial trial. The prosecution had proffered that evidence as proof that the Carneys knew that Johnson was the actual purchaser of the charged firearms, and as proof of a common plan or scheme and consistent modus operandi executed by the defendants and Johnson.11
[451]*451A district judge’s allowance of Rule 404(b) evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir.2001) (citing General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-3, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997); Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir.1999)). The trial jurist’s admissibility assessment of proffered Rule 404(b) evidence should proceed as follows:
First, the trial court must ascertain whether the proffered evidence is relevant and admissible for a proper purpose. United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 98 (6th Cir.1988). To be relevant, “the evidence must relate to a matter which is ‘in issue,’ and must deal with conduct substantially similar and reasonably near in time to the offenses for which the defendant is being tried.” United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir.1985) (citations omitted). To determine whether the proffered evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, the trial court must decide, “whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988).
Finally, the court must determine . whether the probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R.Evid. 403; Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687, 108 S.Ct. at 1500. The district court has broad discretion in balancing probative value against potential prejudicial impact. United States v. Dabish, 708 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir.1983). We review a district judge’s balancing of prejudicial impact and probative value under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1377 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 440, 83 L.Ed.2d 366 (1984).
United States v. Feinman, 930 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.1991).
The Carneys have assailed the lower court’s evidentiary ruling at its final analytic stage, to wit, that the faulted evidence’s probative value substantially outweighed its potential unfair prejudicial impact upon the defense. “A district court is granted ‘very broad’ discretion in determining whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir.1989) (citation omitted). “If judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 [prejudicial effect] analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.” United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 390 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). In conducting review of a rejected “undue prejudice” objection, the Sixth Circuit “look[s] at the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
The trial adjudicator’s judgment that the probative worth of the evidence in controversy substantially outweighed any possible risk of unfair prejudice to the Carneys, when examined under prevailing deferential review standards, was patently sustainable. Contrary to the defendants’ posture, the Rule 404(b) proof was not merely repetitive and cumulative of evidence already in the record concerning transactions between them and Johnson; rather, it supplied valuable probative instances of additional similar transactions, which were crucial to the government’s proof that the Carneys actually knew that Johnson was [452]*452the true purchaser of the charged firearms.
The Carneys’ averment that the admission of the faulted evidence may have exposed them to double jeopardy regarding transactions which had been the subjects of counts of dismissal or acquittal at their initial trial was sheer speculation, as they have offered no proof that any juror was motivated to convict by a desire to punish the defendants for an uncharged transaction. In all events, the government need not prove probative “other acts” beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, that proof must merely be sufficiently compelling such that “the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). Consequently, evidence of an act which had been the subject of a count of acquittal in a prior criminal trial is admissible in a subsequent prosecution as Rule 404(b) evidence if, as in the case sub judice, that evidence passes the Dowling “factual reliability” test. Id. at 349, 110 S.Ct. 668.
Sean Carney has complained that evidence of June 2000 transactions with Johnson unduly prejudiced him because his final crime of conviction occurred on March 10, 2000; thus, he has claimed, the June 2000 events could not have been probative of his pre-March 10, 2000 knowledge. However, Rule 404(b) expressly permits the admission of relevant “other acts,” not merely “prior acts.” The Carneys’ post-March 10, 2000 commerce with Johnson was material and probative of their shared modus operandi and common plan or scheme, in that proof that the parties continued to adhere to the identical pattern after March 10, 2000 as that which they had followed prior to that date tended to prove that that pattern had been implicitly or explicitly agreed upon at some point prior to March 10, 2000.
Furthermore, Sean has not claimed that he had requested any limiting jury instruction whereby the trial bench might have charged the jurors to restrict the Rule 404(b) evidence as against him. In all events, even if the trial judge had abused her discretion by admitting any or all of the Rule 404(b) evidence (which she did not), that error would have been ultimately harmless, in light of the independent overwhelming proof of record supportive of the defendants’ convictions. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).
Fifthly, and finally, the Carneys have claimed, for the first time on review, that the trial court erred to their prejudice by failing sua sponte to exclude evidence allegedly tainted by a suggestive “photographic identification” procedure. Prior to trial, ATF investigators displayed photographs of the Carneys to each woman employed by Johnson as a “straw purchaser.” Those images were not part of any larger photo array or “photographic lineup,” but rather were presented in standalone “photographic show-up” fashion. Each witness identified one or the other of the Carneys as the seller of guns to Johnson on a particular occasion. At trial, each of those women identified one the Carneys as the seller of various charged firearms. During cross-examination, each of those female witnesses described the pre-trial photo display.
Normally, a reviewing court scrutinizes a contested evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). However, the Carneys failed to preserve any opposition in the [453]*453trial court to the admission of the women’s identifications of them as the gun sellers by reason of any purported taint caused by an unduly suggestive procedure. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02, 87-S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). When a defendant neglects to mount an objection to evidence at trial, he is precluded from arguing on appeal that its admission was flawed unless, its allowance constituted plain error.12 See, e.g.,. United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 938 (6th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). “Plain error is defined as an egregious error, one that directly leads to a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Krimsky, 230 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir.2000) (citation omitted),. . cert. denied, —- U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1422, 158 L.Ed.2d 92 (2004). The “plain error” doctrine “is to be used sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances and solely to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Hook, 781 F.2d 1166, 1172 (6th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). A reviewing court should apply the “plain error” doctrine to “reverse only if errors were so rank that they should have been apparent to the trial judge without objection, or that strike at fundamental fairness, honesty, or public reputation of the trial.” United States v. Evans, 883 F.2d 496, ’ 499 (6th Cir.1989).
Manifestly, the Carneys cannot satisfy that exacting standard of proof in the instant appeal. No possibility of misidentifi-cation existed. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) (“reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identifieation testimony!)]”); Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir.1986). Each transaction charged in a count of conviction was memorialized by an ATF Form 4473 which identified either Sean or Patrick Carney as the seller of the implicated weapon(s). Moreover, every in-court eyewitness identification harmonized with the ATF Form as to the identity of the pertinent salesman. In addition, the eyewitness identifications were inherently reliable, even standing alone, by reason of the extended opportunity that each woman had to observe the firearms seller; the “high-impact” nature of the event; and the relative temporal proximity of the events to the testimony (approximately two and one-half years). See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Thigpen, 804 F.2d at 895; United States v. Hamilton, 684 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir.1982).
Hence, the district judge did not plainly err by failing sua sponte to disallow identification testimony by any eyewitness. Furthermore, even if the defendants had properly preserved an opposition to that evidence, the admission thereof would not have constituted an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, each of the defendants’ five assignments of trial error was misconceived. The convictions of the defendants are AFFIRMED.