United States v. Pasciuti

803 F. Supp. 563, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14511, 1992 WL 234928
District Court, D. New Hampshire·Decided August 24, 1992·No. 1:91-mj-00001·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

FUSTE, District Judge, Sitting by Designation.

This case is a multi-count criminal prosecution against sixteen remaining defendants, for a continuing criminal enterprise and drug conspiracy. Several firearms violations are also charged. The indictment mentions that defendants, some of which allegedly belong to the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club, influenced other motorcycle groups and together distributed large quantities of methamphetamine, marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and mescaline, Schedule I or II controlled substances, in New Hampshire and other places. The government claims that the drug business generated substantial profits laundered through legitimate businesses and that drugs were supplied as a reward to loyal conspirators and denied to those failing to perform as expected. The indictment mentions the use of threats, intimidation, beatings, and other forms of violence in defense of and to protect the drug business, the thwarting of investigative efforts by law enforcement, the threatening of witnesses and jurors, and the possession of weapons to accomplish the above.

I.

We have before us codefendant Charles T. Pasciuti’s motion to continue the September 14, 1992 trial for not less than six months and to disqualify Assistant U.S. Attorney David A. Vicinanzo from further participation in the prosecution of this case. The motion, Docket Document No. 741, dated July 29, 1992, was followed by the government’s opposition, filed August 13, 1992, Docket Document No. 788. Pasciuti’s motion relates to a July 1,1992 newspaper account prepared by an Associated Press reporter and published in several newspapers in the state of New Hampshire and in parts of Massachusetts. The Associated Press article attributes certain statements to Assistant U.S. Attorney Vicinanzo which Pasciuti understands violates a stipulation entered by the parties at the status conferences held on June 17 and 18, 1992. Specifically, the parties agreed with the *565 court that there would be no need for us to impose a formal gag order on attorney-to-press disclosures. The government and defense counsel would voluntarily comply with the American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (Rule 3.6) and with the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 8-1.1, Extrajudicial Statements by Attorneys (Standard 8-1.1).

The first defendant to take issue about the articles and some television accounts of the newspaper story was John Courtois. 1 See Motion to Vacate Order in Reference to Anonymous Jury, filed July 2,1992, Docket Document No. 636, and the government’s verified opposition, filed July 8,1992, Docket Document No. 652. Mr. Courtois requested that the court sanction the government by vacating its previous order granting the impanelling of an anonymous jury, consider the dismissal of the indictment or disqualify Assistant U.S. Attorney Vicinanzo from further participation. The court carefully studied the newspaper articles, as well as the affidavit of Assistant U.S. Attorney Vicinanzo and Mr. Courtois’ filings. On July 13, 1992, we entered an order denying Mr. Courtois’ motions and in very clear terms expressed our frustration and discontent with the fact that the publications took place and that reference was made to the government as a source. We found no technical violation on the part of the government’s attorneys and, as a preventive measure, fashioned a gag order forbidding counsel on both sides of this case to give or authorize, directly or indirectly, any extrajudicial statement, press release or interview with respect to the trial, the parties, witnesses, or factual issues in the case. No evidentiary hearing was held. First, we had the parties’ written motions and the verified version of the prosecutor. Second, we had all the newspaper articles, and, third, we decided not to implicate the Associated Press reporter. We saw no point in confronting the prosecutor and the press. First-amendment considerations and our assessment of the situation favored our decision to rule on documents.

Anticipating that others would attempt to capitalize from Mr. Courtois’ motion and the court’s ruling, we attempted to discourage those who wished to obtain secondary gain based on alleged pretrial publicity. However, additional motions, such as the one now under consideration, followed.

II.

Our view today is the one expressed before. The incident does not merit either a continuance or the disqualification of Assistant U.S. Attorney Vicinanzo. See Affidavit of Vicinanzo, part of the government’s objection to Courtois’ motion, Docket Document No. 788.

The U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, has squarely placed the discretion as to whether to grant a continuance on the basis of trial publicity in the hands of the trial court. The case law dictates that to prove that trial publicity has adversely impacted on his rights, a defendant must show that ‘.‘(1) the trial itself was conducted in a ‘circus like’ atmosphere; (2) the actual jurors who sat on the ease possessed fixed opinions that prevented them from judging impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendants; or (3) the community was so saturated with inflammatory publicity as to call into question the jurors’ assertions.” U.S. v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.1987). 2 As to the first condition, we have not yet reached the trial, but we assure counsel that we will curtail any efforts by either side to make this trial anything other than an orderly dignified proceeding. Next, we bring to defendant’s attention the fact that adequate precautions are being taken to ensure the impar *566 tiality of the jury. 3 Finally, we find that the articles in question were neither inflammatory nor sensational. When deciding whether to grant a change of venue or continuance, the court must consider if prejudice exists. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 21(a); Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). Prejudice exists when “(a) inflammatory publicity about a case has so saturated a community that it is almost impossible to draw an impartial jury from that community, or (b) so many jurors admit to a disqualifying prejudice that the trial court may legitimately doubt the avowals of impartiality made by the remaining jurors.” U.S. v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir.1991) (citing U.S. v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.1990). Defendant argues that because of the small size of the community, the amount of information needed to saturate the community is small.

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United States v. Pasciuti, 803 F. Supp. 563, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14511, 1992 WL 234928 (D.N.H. 1992).

803 F. Supp. 563 (United States v. Pasciuti) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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