United States v. Parra

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJuly 31, 2007
Docket06-61015
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Parra (United States v. Parra) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Parra, (5th Cir. 2007).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 31, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 06-61015 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CINTHEIA DENISE PARRA,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi USDC No. 2:05-CR-127-1 --------------------

Before DeMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Cintheia Denisa Parra appeals her 235-month sentence

following her guilty plea conviction for possession with intent

to distribute in excess of 500 grams of a mixture and substance

containing methamphetamine. We review the district court’s

interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de

novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.

Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 202, 203 & n.9 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 268 (2005).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 06-61015 -2-

Parra argues that the district court erred when it refused

to grant her a two-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§§ 2D1.1(b)(7) and 5C1.2(a)(5) based on its finding that she did

not truthfully provide the Government with all the information

and evidence she had concerning her offense. At sentencing Parra

declined to put on any proof that she had provided complete and

truthful information and she merely asserted that she had given

all information she had about her role in the offense. She did

not meet her burden of showing that she had. See United States

v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1996). In the light

of the testimony at sentencing, the district court’s finding that

Parra did not provide complete and truthful information regarding

her offense is plausible and, thus, not clearly erroneous. See

Villanueva, 408 F.3d at 203.

She also argues that the district court erred by not

reducing her offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 based on

her mitigating role in the offense. Her assertion that she

merely stored the methamphetamine in her apartment is refuted by

the record. Her role was not “‘peripheral to the advancement of

the illicit activity,’” Villanueva, 408 F.3d at 204 (citation

omitted); it was “critical to the offense.” United States v.

Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 1995). The district

court’s refusal to award a mitigating role adjustment was not

clearly erroneous. No. 06-61015 -3-

Parra argues that she should have been granted a three-point

reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) based on her

acceptance of responsibility for her role in the charges against

her. Parra did not argue below, and does not argue now, that

hers is an extraordinary case in which both acceptance of

responsibility and obstruction of justice adjustments should

apply. See § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4). Parra’s conduct, including

smoking marijuana while in jail and absconding before sentencing,

was inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility and outweighed

any evidence of her acceptance of responsibility. See § 3E1.1,

comment. (n.3). Thus, the district court did not clearly err in

finding that she had not accepted responsibility.

Parra has not briefed adequately any argument that the

district court erred when it enhanced her sentence pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on her obstruction of justice. See United

States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir.

1991).

Parra argues that the 235-month sentence is unreasonable.

Her sentence was at the bottom of the properly calculated

advisory guideline range. A sentence within such a range is

entitled to “great deference.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d

511, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2005). Giving great deference to such a

sentence, and recognizing that the sentencing court considered

all the factors for a fair sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we No. 06-61015 -4-

conclude that Parra has failed to show that her sentence was

unreasonable. See id.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

United States v. Mares
402 F.3d 511 (Fifth Circuit, 2005)
United States v. Villanueva
408 F.3d 193 (Fifth Circuit, 2005)
United States v. Phillip Duane Tremelling
43 F.3d 148 (Fifth Circuit, 1995)
United States v. George Woodrow Flanagan
80 F.3d 143 (Fifth Circuit, 1996)

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