United States v. Parkinson
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in United States v. Parkinson. Read the opinion of the Court — 44 F.3d 6 →
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1229
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
KEITH JAMES PARKINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges, ______________
and Zobel,* District Judge. ______________
_____________________
Christopher W. Dilworth, by Appointment of the Court, for ________________________
appellant.
Michael M. DuBose, Assistant United States Attorney, with __________________
whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, Paula D. Silsby, _________________ ________________
Assistant United States Attorney, and Margaret D. McGaughey, ______________________
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
____________________
December 29, 1994
____________________
____________________
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
ZOBEL, District Judge. Keith Parkinson once again ZOBEL, District Judge ______________
appeals his sentence. After a one-day jury trial, defendant was
convicted of robbing a bank in Portland, Maine, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 2113(a) (1991). He subsequently was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of 240 months, to run consecutively to the
remainder of a ten-to-twenty year sentence imposed by a
Massachusetts state court for the robbery of a bank in Boston,
Massachusetts. On appeal, we affirmed the conviction, but
vacated the sentence because the district court had not followed
the directive of 5G1.3(c) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines") when it
imposed an entirely consecutive federal sentence. United States _____________
v. Parkinson, No. 91-2233, 1993 WL 89801, at *6 (1st Cir. Mar. _________
30, 1993). After remand, the district court again sentenced
defendant to a period of incarceration of 240 months, now to be
served concurrently with the remainder of his state sentence.1
At the time of the resentencing defendant had served either
forty-six or forty-eight months of that Massachusetts sentence.2
He now argues that the sentence, by not taking account of the
state time already served, represents an upward departure from
the applicable guideline range of 210 to 262 months, which on the
____________________
1 At resentencing, the court, without dissent from either party,
applied the 1993 Sentencing Guidelines. We do likewise.
2 Defendant had served forty-eight months from the date of his
arrest on the state charge and forty-six months from the date of
sentencing on that offense.
-2-
facts of this case, he says, was improper.3
The parties disagree as to the issues on appeal.
Defendant, ignoring the first part of the district judge's
exegesis, presumes that the judge departed upwardly, and suggests
that the issue before us is whether such departure was justified.
The government presents a more complete, and in our view correct,
statement of the issues; namely, is time served in state custody
before the imposition of the federal sentence included in the
calculus under 5G1.3(c) when deciding whether the sentence is
outside the applicable guideline range; and, only if so, was an
upward departure in the instant case appropriate. Because we
answer the former inquiry in the negative, we need not reach the
latter. Nonetheless, a review of the record shows that an upward
departure would be appropriate.
Standard of Review __________________
We consider de novo the legal meaning and scope of __ ____
5G1.3(c) (Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an
Undischarged Term of Imprisonment). See United States v. ___ ______________
Thompson, 32 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994). The district court's ________
fact-finding, however, we review for clear error, with due
deference given its application of 5G1.3(c) to the facts of the
case. SeeUnited Statesv. St. Cyr,977 F.2d698, 701(1st Cir. 1992). ________________ _______
____________________
3 This range represents, coincidentally, both what the total
punishment would have been, in accordance with 5G1.2, had
defendant been sentenced on the federal and state bank robbery
convictions at the same time in federal court as well as the
punishment for the single federal conviction. Both calculations
are based upon a criminal history category of VI and total
offense level of 32. Defendant does not dispute either.
-3-
Was there a departure? ______________________
A perusal of 5G1.3 leads us to conclude that in order
to determine whether a sentence imposed pursuant to 5G1.3(c)
represents a departure from the guidelines, we do not consider
time served in state custody. To hold otherwise would equate
"sentence" with "total punishment" and leave meaningless much of
the language of 5G1.3, which we are bound to follow. Like the
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