United States v. Parker

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 28, 2024
• Docket: Criminal No. 2023-0186
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : : v. : Criminal Action No.: 23-186 (RC) : ANDRA PARKER, : Re Document No.: 52 : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Andra Parker is charged with three counts of wire fraud and one count of first-

degree fraud after allegedly embezzling funds from the Fraternal Order of Police’s Department

of Corrections Labor Committee. Parker moves to suppress statements he made during federal

agents’ execution of a search warrant in 2019, as well as evidence obtained from his vehicle

during that search. The Court finds that the interview Parker agreed to was not custodial and

thus denies his motion to suppress statements he made during that interview. Because the

Government does not plan to use evidence obtained from the vehicle at trial, the Court

additionally denies as moot the motion to suppress that evidence.

II. BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS OF FACT

On December 16, 2022, the Government filed a criminal complaint against Parker for

wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. See ECF No. 2. A warrant was issued, and Parker

was arrested on the following day. A grand jury later returned a four-count indictment charging

Parker with three counts of wire fraud, as well as one count of first-degree fraud in violation of 22 D.C. Code §§ 3221(a) and 3221(a)(1). See ECF No. 43. A trial on these charges is scheduled

to commence on November 4, 2024.

The parties agree on many of the material facts, and the Court held an evidentiary hearing

to shed light on the disputed points. The evidence demonstrates that in the early morning on

May 9, 2019, nine law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Parker’s apartment.

The FBI’s operation plan included six FBI agents, two agents from the Department of Labor

Office of Inspector General, and a Prince George’s County Police officer. Gov’t Ex. 1. A sign-

in sheet for the scene shows that officers were at the location from 6:00 a.m. until 10:25 a.m.

Def. Ex. 1. FBI Agent Michael Wagner testified that the officers had their weapons drawn when

they knocked on Parker’s door. Tr at 42. 1 When Parker answered the door, officers handcuffed

him behind his back and briefly pulled him out of the apartment to conduct an initial sweep for

officer safety. Id. at 8. The parties dispute whether the handcuffs were then removed, an issue

the Court addresses below. Although the parties agree that weapons were drawn as is standard

procedure for executing a search warrant, see id. at 42–43, 62, Parker recalls that the weapons

were pointed at him, id. at 90–91. The agents do not recall whether or not weapons were pointed

at Parker, id. at 41, but testified that the contemporaneous records from that day do not reveal

that there would have been any reason to do so given that Parker was not belligerent or armed

and was, instead, cooperative, see id. at 41, 84.

Parker then participated in an interview with two FBI agents in a room he used as a den.

Id. at 93–94. Agent Wagner stated that the agents selected the room because it was searched for

weapons and out of the way of the other agents. Id. at 15. The FBI Interview Report Form FD-

1 The Court refers to the current rough draft of the hearing transcript, and the page numbers may shift slightly as the court reporter prepares a final version.

2 302 states that Parker was advised the interview was “completely voluntary.” Gov’t Ex. 3.

Agent Wagner explained that these interviews usually take place when individuals ask the agents

to explain why a search warrant is being executed, and the agents then ask if the individual

would like to speak to the agents on a voluntary basis. Tr. at 20. The agents said that during this

interview, they showed Parker various documents. Id. at 21. Parker recalled being shown a

picture of a correctional officer. Id. at 94. The parties disagreed on the tone of this conversation.

Agent Wagner asserted that it was “calm and controlled” given that FBI agents usually try to

build rapport with interviewees, and that Parker was cooperative. Id. at 23. Parker instead

described the conversation as “hostile,” and claimed that the agents mocked him and told him he

could be charged with obstruction of justice for giving false answers. Id. at 95–96. After the

interview, the agents instructed Parker to sit on a couch in his apartment while the rest of the

search was conducted. Id. at 76.

The primary disputed fact is whether Parker remained handcuffed after the agents’ initial

sweep of the apartment, including during the interview. See Def.’s Mot. Suppress at 2, ECF No.

52; Gov’t’s Opp’n Mot. Suppress at 2, ECF No. 54. Parker asserted that he remained handcuffed

throughout the interview and the agents’ search, other than briefly when he was allowed to visit

the restroom. Id. at 93–94, 97. The Court does not find this plausible for the following reasons.

First, the testimony at the suppression hearing and the documentary evidence the

Government presented demonstrated no reason why Parker would have needed to remain in

handcuffs throughout execution of the search warrant. To be sure, the agents testified that they

did not specifically recall whether Parker was handcuffed during the interview, see id. at 13–14,

70, which is reasonable given that this search occurred more than five years ago. The FBI FD-

302 recounting the search, however, indicates that Parker was only “temporarily detained while

3 the residence was secured.” Gov’t Ex. 2. Agent Wagner credibly testified at the suppression

hearing that this meant Parker was handcuffed only briefly. Tr. at 18–19. The fact that the

agents both testified candidly that they could not specifically recollect whether Parker’s

handcuffs were removed adds to their credibility. The agents’ belief that Parker was not

handcuffed during the interview is also consistent with the agents’ operation plan, which

instructed that individuals encountered at the residence would be placed in handcuffs only until

the residence was secured. See Gov’t Ex. 1 at 4.

Agent Wagner credibly testified that an individual would remain in handcuffs only if he

were combative, making threats, or if weapons were present at the scene. Tr. at 16. The agents

testified that Parker was not combative and did not represent a threat to them during the search.

Id. at 16, 23, 67, 73. Parker himself does not assert that he was threatening to the agents. The

FBI FD-302s documenting the search and the interview additionally lack any indication that the

agents would have needed to keep him in handcuffs. See Gov’t Ex. 2; Gov’t Ex. 3. FBI Agent

Michael Biscardi credibly testified that it would be rather unusual for the agents to keep Parker

handcuffed during the search, and that if there had been a reason to do so, that reason would be

documented in the FD-302s. Tr. at 70. Agent Wagner also credibly testified that as a matter of

practice, and particularly in his experience executing search warrants, handcuffs would have

been removed after the initial sweep. Id. at 14.

The testimony and evidence regarding the interview itself also indicate that Parker was

not handcuffed during that time. Agent Wagner credibly testified that he has no memory of ever

interviewing any individual who was handcuffed behind his back during an interview conducted

while executing a search warrant. Id. at 22. Agent Wagner also testified that the agents showed

Parker various documents during this interview, which implies that Parker had the use of his

4 hands to review the documents. Id. at 79. The Court additionally finds relevant that Parker was

able to sign a consent-to-search form that the agents credibly testified occurred at the end of the

interview at a time Parker claims he was still handcuffed. Id. at 80, 98. The agents’ testimony of

when the document was singed is corroborated by the contemporaneous documentation. See Tr.

at 21–22. Because all agree that Parker was handcuffed behind his back, and Agent Biscardi

testified that agents are trained to always handcuff in the back, id. at 65, it is implausible that

Parker could sign this form while handcuffed.

In sum, The Court finds that Parker failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that he was handcuffed after the agents’ initial sweep of the apartment. The Court ascribes

Parker’s memory that he remained handcuffed throughout the encounter to the passage of more

than five years since those events, the frenzied nature of execution of a search warrant at his

apartment, and ongoing health concerns since that time documented in his filings. See Consent

Mot. to Continue Plea Hearing, ECF No. 24; Unopposed Mot. to Continue Plea Hearing, ECF

No. 27; Mot. to Continue Status Hearing, ECF No. 36.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Supreme Court has instructed that “a person questioned by law enforcement officers

after being ‘taken into custody . . . ’ must first ‘be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that

any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the

presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.’” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,

322 (1994) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)); see also United States v.

Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Miranda warnings are required ‘where a suspect in

custody is subjected to interrogation.’” (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300

(1980)). But a police “inquiry of persons not under restraint” does not trigger Miranda because

5 those individuals would not be in police “custody.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477–78. Moreover,

Miranda warnings are required only when the officers’ questioning rises to the level of an

“interrogation,” such that “[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling

influences” is admissible. Id. at 478. “The defendant bears the burden of proving both custody

and interrogation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Richardson, 36 F. Supp.

3d 120, 126 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing United States v. Peterson, 506 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D.D.C.

2007)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Parker moves to suppress statements he made to FBI agents during the interview he gave

while agents executed a search warrant at his residence on May 9, 2019. See Def.’s Mot.

Suppress at 3–5. His motion also seeks to suppress evidence gathered from his vehicle during

that search. See id. at 5–6. Because the Government does not intend to introduce at trial any

evidence from Parker’s vehicle, see Gov’t’s Opp’n Mot. Suppress at 1, the Court finds that issue

to be moot. It is undisputed that the agents did not issue Miranda warnings to Parker before

interviewing him. It is also undisputed that the questioning represented interrogation for the

purposes of Miranda. At issue is whether the interrogation was custodial given that federal

agents were executing a search warrant in his home at the time of the interaction.

The Circuit considered an interview during execution of a search warrant in United States

v. Cooper, 949 F.3d 744 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The court observed that the question of “custody”

turns on (1) “whether a reasonable person in the interviewee’s position would feel at liberty to

terminate the interrogation and leave,” as well as (2) whether the “environment presents the same

inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. at

748 (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09 (2012)). The court also noted that an

6 interview in a suspect’s home usually weighs against a finding of custody like the police station

interrogation in Miranda. Id. at 748. In Cooper, no weapons were brandished, and no handcuffs

were used. Id. at 749. The interview was cordial, the interviewee never asked to end the

interview, and the officers left without arresting her. Id. The court held that this interview was

not custodial, and that “to hold otherwise would be akin to suggesting that voluntary statements

uttered during the execution of a valid search warrant are inadmissible at trial absent the issuance

of a Miranda warning.” Id. at 749.

The Court also finds instructive United States v. Silvers, No. 21-cr-124, 2022 WL

3277373 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2022). In that case, the FBI executed a search warrant where the door

was not breached, and officers holstered their weapons after a protective sweep. Id. at *2. After

that sweep, the residents were allowed back into the house, at which point the agents asked the

defendant whether he would like to interview. Id. The defendant then led the agents to a room

away from his family and answered the agents’ questions. Id. The court there held the

interrogation to be non-custodial because the interview occurred in the defendant’s home, the

defendant was not handcuffed during the interview, weapons were not visible, and the defendant

chose the location of the interview. Id. at *4–*5. The court also found the officers’ execution of

the search warrant to implicate a lesser show of force than other cases in this Circuit because the

FBI did not employ a battering ram, a SWAT team, or heavier weapons like rifles and shotguns.

Id. at *5.

Although there are some factual differences, the Court finds the facts of this case to be

more similar to those in Cooper and Silver than to the cases cited by defendant in which the door

was breached by officers as part of a more confrontational encounter. The evidence shows that

the FBI agents knocked on the door rather than breaching and that Parker was handcuffed only

7 briefly. Parker was interviewed in the den of his two-bedroom apartment, see Tr. at 93, and the

apartment therefore did not contain many suitable locations to conduct an interview. The Court

has found that he was not handcuffed during the interview, and he does not suggest that he ever

asked to end the interview. In addition, the interview of Parker was generally cordial instead of

heated, and he was not arrested until two and a half years after the interview. Although Parker

testified that an officer outside the apartment did not respond to his question whether he was

under arrest, see Tr. at 91–92, the agents credibly testified that their standard practice would have

been to advise Parker before the interview that he was not under arrest and was free to leave, id.

at 14, 17. Again, the agents’ inability to recollect these details after the passage of so much time

is understandable and adds to their credibility. Parker’s recollection of many aspects of that day

is also lacking. In fact, he could not identify the agents who interviewed him. See Tr. at 92.

Courts in this Circuit have found similar interviews during execution of search warrants

to be custodial only where law enforcement officers made significantly greater shows of force.

The defendant in United States v. Peterson had been arrested just five days earlier, and a SWAT

team used a battering ram to break into the apartment with rifles and shotguns drawn. 506 F.

Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C. 2007). The defendant was found in his bedroom, handcuffed, and

interviewed almost immediately after this breach. Id. In United States v. Richardson, officers

similarly breached the door in the early morning and left the defendant handcuffed for 20

minutes while the officers conducted a search before interviewing him. 36 F. Supp. 3d 120,

130–31 (D.D.C. 2014). The interrogation in United States v. Savoy was similarly held custodial

because sixteen FBI agents broke through the defendant’s front and back doors at 6 a.m.,

handcuffed him, and had weapons visible during the interrogation. 889 F. Supp. 2d 78, 109–10

(D.D.C. 2012). The court also found the defendants to be in custody in United States v. Segovia-

8 Melgar, where—once again—the agents suddenly broke through the door in the early morning

and arrested them soon after the interview. 595 F. Supp. 753, 754–55, 758 (D.D.C. 1984).

The Court does not find that Parker experienced a similar show of force during his May

9, 2019, encounter with the FBI agents. Critically, the FBI agents here did not breach the door

and force their way into the apartment. Thus, even assuming that the agents directed Parker to

remain in one place while they conducted the search, the Court does not find that the

environment presented the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house

questioning at issue in Miranda. The Court instead finds that Parker spoke to Agent Wagner and

Agent Biscardi voluntarily and in a non-custodial setting, such that Miranda warnings were

unnecessary. The Court therefore concludes that Parker failed to meet his burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence and, thus, denies the motion to suppress statements Parker made

during the interview.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Parker’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED. An order consistent

with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: [Date] RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge