United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 22-1950 UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
JOSE PADILLA-GALARZA, a/k/a "Joey",
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Silvia L. Carreño-Coll, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Aframe, Hamilton,* and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant. Ann O'Connell Adams, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, Ricardo A. Imbert-Fernández, Assistant United States Attorney, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, Senior Appellate Counsel, were on brief, for appellee.
May 6, 2026
* Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. AFRAME, Circuit Judge. Following a bench trial, the
district court convicted Jose Padilla-Galarza ("Padilla") of
several counts related to a scheme to steal firearms from a Puerto
Rico police compound.1 The court sentenced Padilla to twenty-five
years in prison. On appeal, Padilla argues that two of his
convictions were time-barred and that several unjustified
discretionary rulings prejudicially tainted the remaining
convictions. We affirm.
I.
Padilla's convictions arose from an October 2010 robbery
of a shooting range located within a Puerto Rico police compound.
During the robbery, two police officers were taken hostage, and
125 firearms were stolen. On October 15, 2015, shortly before the
expiration of the statute of limitations, a grand jury indicted
Padilla for masterminding the robbery and committing several
related crimes. The original indictment charged five counts:
(1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; (2) brandishing and
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence;
(3) stealing firearms; (4) unlicensed dealing in firearms; and
1 The counts of conviction are conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 ("Hobbs Act conspiracy"); interference with commerce by robbery, id. ("Hobbs Act robbery"); carrying a firearm during and in relation to the Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 2; stealing firearms, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(1), 924(a)(2), 2; and being a convicted felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- 2 - (5) being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The
indictment also charged three co-defendants, all of whom pleaded
guilty before Padilla's trial.
Although the grand jury indicted Padilla in October
2015, he did not face trial until almost seven years later, in
April 2022. The proceedings were initially delayed because of
multiple changes in Padilla's representation between 2015 and
2018. A second delay occurred after the district court allowed a
March 2020 motion for a continuance to an unspecified future date.
During this period, Padilla filed numerous motions and discovery
requests. Eventually, the court set a December 1, 2021, trial date.
The last major delay, until February 2022, occurred when a new
trial judge inherited the case. After Padilla obtained a few more
short continuances, trial was set for April 21, 2022.
Two weeks before trial, the government filed a
superseding indictment based on a change in the law. Count Two of
the original indictment charged Padilla with possessing and
brandishing a firearm to further a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and named the predicate offense as Count One,
the Hobbs Act conspiracy. In 2019, United States v. Davis, 588
U.S. 445, 450-51, 470 (2019), held that Hobbs Act conspiracy could
no longer serve as a predicate offense for a charge under § 924(c).
As a result, the superseding indictment updated Count Two and added
Count Six. Count Six charged Padilla with Hobbs Act robbery under
- 3 - an aiding and abetting theory and Count Two named Count Six as the
new predicate offense. The superseding indictment also changed the
conduct at issue in Count Two from brandishing a firearm to
carrying a firearm, which reduced the applicable mandatory minimum
sentence for Count Two from seven years to five. Counts One,
Three, Four, and Five remained the same.
Padilla was tried on the superseding indictment in a
ten-day bench trial that began on April 21, 2022. The government
claimed that Padilla masterminded the robbery while his
co-defendants carried it out by impersonating police officers to
gain entry to the police station. The evidence tended to show that
Padilla familiarized himself with the location of the robbery over
time. He also befriended one of the security guards who worked
the night shift at the police station. This individual brought
Padilla to the shooting range and other non-public areas, giving
Padilla a sense of the layout necessary to plan the crime. The
government also presented testimonial evidence from cooperating
witnesses and physical evidence, such as cell phone records,
showing Padilla's extensive contacts with his co-defendants during
the robbery. Padilla's defense largely consisted of attempting to
impeach and undermine the government's witnesses.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court
acquitted Padilla on Count Four but convicted him on the remaining
counts. Because no party asked it to do so, the court did not make
- 4 - specific findings of fact in support of its verdicts. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 23(c) ("In a case tried without a jury, the court must
find the defendant guilty, or not guilty. If a party requests
before the finding of guilty or not guilty, the court must state
its specific findings of fact in open court or in a written
decision or opinion."). Padilla timely appealed.
II.
A. Statute of Limitations
Padilla argues that the district court wrongly denied
his motion to dismiss Counts Two and Six of the superseding
indictment as time-barred. The government responds that Padilla
has waived this argument and that, in any event, he is wrong on
the merits. Because the argument fails on the merits, we choose to
bypass the government's waiver claim.
"[A] superseding indictment which supplants a
timely-filed indictment, still pending, is itself to be regarded
as timely vis-a-vis a given defendant so long as it neither
materially broadens nor substantially amends the charges against
the defendant." United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 23 (1st
Cir. 1993). The key aspect of the inquiry is whether the original
indictment gave the defendant fair notice of the charged conduct
for which he should prepare a defense. Id. at 24. So, the addition
of a new charge in a superseding indictment after the expiration
- 5 - of the statute of limitations is acceptable unless it meaningfully
alters the activities alleged in the original indictment. Id.
Here, Counts Two and Six of the superseding indictment
neither broadened nor substantially amended the original
indictment. The new Count Two had only two changes. First, it
reduced the charge in the original Count Two from "brandish and
possess" to "carry and use of" a firearm in furtherance of a crime
of violence. "Brandishing" a firearm requires a minimum sentence
of seven years, § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), while "carrying" a firearm
requires a minimum sentence of only five years, § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
This change is the very opposite of broadening the charge.
Second, because of the change in law worked by Davis,
Count Two altered the predicate crime of violence from the Hobbs
Act conspiracy charged in the original Count One to the Hobbs Act
robbery charged in the new Count Six. 588 U.S. at 470. Thus, for
purposes of Padilla's statute of limitations argument, the issue
is whether the substantive Hobbs Act robbery charged in the new
Count Six broadened or substantially amended the charges in the
original indictment. It did not. The new Count Six employed
identical language to Count One of the original indictment to
charge Padilla with:
[U]nlawfully [taking] one hundred and twenty-five (125) firearms . . . from the POPR Shooting Range at Isla de Cabra, in the presence of duty police officers, against their will by means of actual and threatened
- 6 - force, violence, and fear of injury, immediate and future to their person, that is, assaulting and threatening the employees with firearms in order to commit the robbery.
Thus, the original indictment fully apprised Padilla that he would
be called to account for the activities charged in the new
Count Six and that he should prepare a defense for that allegation.
Moreover, if anything, Count Six only increased the government's
burden for succeeding on the § 924(c) offense charged in Count Two.
To obtain the § 924(c) conviction under the original indictment,
the government would have had to prove that Padilla agreed to
commit a Hobbs Act robbery. Under the superseding indictment,
however, the government had to prove that he committed the
substantive robbery offense.
Nothing about the superseding indictment increased the
consequences for Padilla on Count Two or caused him to respond to
allegations with which he was not already familiar. Accordingly,
the district court correctly denied Padilla's motion to dismiss
Counts Two and Six of the superseding indictment on
statute-of-limitations grounds.2
2 Padilla also argues that the addition of Count Six prejudiced him because of "its tardy filing, since it significantly affected his trial strategy." He explains that had the original indictment remained in effect, he would have moved to dismiss Count Two based on Davis at the appropriate time. Padilla claims prejudice because the superseding frustrated this strategy. The prosecution may, however, obtain a superseding indictment at any
- 7 - B. Motions for Continuances and Requests for Funds
We next turn to Padilla's argument that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied a series of motions for
continuances and requests for additional funds to obtain
investigatory and expert-witness services. Because the issues are
related, we discuss them together.
1. Motions for Continuances
On April 19, 2022, two days before trial, Padilla filed
a motion for a thirty-day continuance. The motion alleged that he
needed to obtain discovery in response to witness-related material
disclosed by the government four days earlier. The government
disclosed this material pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500, which requires the prosecution to produce prior statements
made by a witness. The following day, Padilla filed a supplemental
motion where he explained that he also needed additional time to
retain an expert to interpret cell phone location data that the
time prior to trial so long as it does not do so for purposes of harassing or punishing the defendant. United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1982). When the purpose for a superseding indictment "can be traced to a legitimate, non-vindictive rationale . . . the government may proceed with its new charges." Id. at 248; see United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108, 112 (1st Cir. 2009) ("It is difficult to make [a vindictive prosecution] showing pretrial, however, in light of the broad discretion afforded the prosecutor to determine who should be prosecuted and for what crime, and the presumption that the prosecutor has exercised that discretion in good faith."). Here, nothing suggests that the government acted in bad faith by bringing the charges into conformity with the post-Davis law.
- 8 - government had produced on April 8, 2022. The same day that
Padilla filed his supplemental motion, the district court held a
hearing after which it denied both motions.
We review the denial of a motion for continuance for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d
167, 195 (1st Cir. 2014). Because "[t]rial management is
peculiarly within the ken of the district court," such courts have
substantial leeway to control their dockets. United States v.
Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir. 1995). Therefore, an abuse
of discretion in denying a continuance exists only when there has
been "an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness
in the face of a justifiable request for delay." Id. (quoting
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)). Factors to consider
in making this determination include the reasons presented in
support of the motion, the party’s diligence, the inconvenience to
the court, and the utility of the continuance. Id.; United States
v. Williams, 630 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 2010). Additionally, a
party seeking to establish an abuse of discretion for the denial
of a continuance must provide "specific, concrete ways in which
the denial resulted in 'substantial prejudice' to [their]
defense." United States v. Carbone, 110 F.4th 361, 372 (1st Cir.
2024) (quoting Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d at 196).
The district court’s denials of Padilla’s eleventh-hour
continuance requests were well within its discretion. We cannot
- 9 - ignore the obvious fact that twelve years elapsed between the
robbery and the start of trial. As the court observed at the
motions hearing, there was reason for concern about the reliability
of the evidence, particularly given this lengthy time gap.
Padilla's counsel himself expressed concern for his own memory,
which led the court to state that his fears were precisely why
"[it] can’t continue [the trial]."
General delay concerns aside, Padilla failed to show
that he needed these particular continuances. The motions asserted
two different reasons: the production of cell phone location
records on April 8, 2022, and the disclosure of Jencks material on
April 15, 2022. For the cell phone records, the government agreed
at the motions hearing not to introduce the records for location
purposes. This addressed Padilla's concern about the need for his
counsel to educate himself about the location data. And as for
the Jencks material, the disclosure indicated that Samuel
Figueroa, a previously uncooperative witness, would testify for
the government. Although Padilla did not learn of Figueroa's
participation until April 15, 2022, he knew Figueroa well –- they
were co-defendants in a previous prosecution -- and thus could not
claim unfamiliarity with the new witness. Moreover, the
information Padilla sought about Figueroa was, as the district
court aptly described it, largely "collateral impeachment"
evidence. Under the circumstances, Padilla's desire for more time
- 10 - to pursue such evidence was not a sufficient basis to again delay
the trial.
In any event, Padilla's argument about Figueroa also
fails because he has not demonstrated prejudice from the denial of
his motion. At the motions hearing, the district court described
Padilla's request as a "fishing expedition" because he failed to
identify any particular evidence for which he was looking. Even
now, Padilla repeats the same conclusory argument that more time
would have led to more "impeachment evidence." But Padilla did
impeach Figueroa at trial. Without reference to specific
impeachment evidence that may have made a difference, we cannot
conclude that the court's ruling prejudiced the defense.
2. Requests for Additional Funds
Padilla also argues that the district court improperly
denied him funds for expert services that he requested in April
2022, and for investigatory services he requested in a series of
motions filed in late 2021. He also argues that the court wrongly
denied his motion without convening a hearing so that he could
explain his requests.
Like the denial of continuance motions, we review for
abuse of discretion the denial of a funds request. United States
v. Correa-Alicea, 585 F.3d 484, 491 (1st Cir. 2009). Under 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1), counsel for an indigent defendant may
request additional funding from the court for investigatory or
- 11 - expert services. Courts typically grant funds for such services
where the services are "pivotal to the indigent defendant's
defense." United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 218 (1st Cir.
1996). The burden rests with the applicant to show why funds are
necessary. See United States v. Mateos-Sanchez, 864 F.2d 232, 240
(1st Cir. 1988). Courts have "substantial leeway" to determine if
a defendant has met this burden of showing necessity. United
States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 2016). Only a "clear
and convincing showing that the constraint [on funds] prejudiced
the defendant" will support a new trial. Id.
We first address the April 2022 denial of Padilla's
request for funds for expert services to interpret the phone
records disclosed on April 8, 2022. A review of the docket reveals
that Padilla never actually submitted a motion for funds. In his
April 20, 2022, supplemental motion for a continuance, Padilla
stated that he needed time to retain an expert to interpret the
cell phone records. But he never followed up on this statement
with a request for funds. The district court cannot be faulted
for not providing what it was never asked to give. Cf. United
States v. Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1395-96 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that in absence of reference to the statute or defendant’s
financial ability, a request for time to hire an expert will not
be construed as a request for funds).
- 12 - We turn next to the two ex parte motions for funds that
Padilla did file. In October 2021, Padilla requested funds to
cover approximately forty hours of investigatory work so that his
private investigator could assist his counsel in trial
preparation. The district court denied that motion, stating that
it would not fund a private investigator to help with trial
preparation. But the court left open the possibility of approving
funds if Padilla engaged the investigator for appropriate
investigator services. In November 2021, Padilla moved to
reconsider; the court denied that motion because Padilla had failed
to allege any new grounds.
In December 2021, Padilla filed a second funds motion,
requesting $2,500 so that his investigator could attend witness
interviews because of supposed government misconduct. The
district court denied this motion, concluding that Padilla’s fears
of government misconduct were unsubstantiated. As with the October
motion, the court stated that it would reconsider if Padilla filed
a sufficiently grounded request.
The district court appropriately denied both ex parte
motions. Both motions fell short of containing the specificity
required to support a request for funds. The first did not
identify what Padilla’s counsel wanted the private investigator to
do in assisting with trial preparation, and the second did not
detail any grounds for fearing government misconduct. See
- 13 - Mateos-Sanchez, 864 F.2d at 240 (holding that funding requests
require specificity and that general allegations of usefulness do
not suffice). Moreover, the court invited Padilla to supply the
missing specificity in motions for reconsideration, but Padilla
did not take up the offer. In short, there was no abuse of
discretion in denying Padilla's funds requests.3
C. Credibility Findings
Padilla argues at length about the damaged credibility
of several government witnesses based on contradictory and
internally inconsistent statements. He contends that the
testimony from these witnesses was so incredible that it could not
have supplied a basis for the district court to find him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. But there is a fundamental flaw in the
argument: it is at bottom a challenge to credibility findings that
the district court may or may not have made.
As previously noted, Padilla did not request that the
district court make specific findings of fact under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 23(c).4 We therefore do not know what
3 Padilla complains that the district court erred in not holding a hearing on his December 2021 motion. But we cannot fault the court for declining to convene a hearing when a funding request is, on its face, inadequately justified -- especially when a defendant does not accept a court's invitation to address its concerns in writing. See Prieto, 812 F.3d at 15-16. 4 Padilla argues that because he made a Rule 29 motion for acquittal, he impliedly made a Rule 23(c) motion for specific
- 14 - testimony the court credited and what it rejected. Consequently,
we may only ask whether there was sufficient evidence to support
the court's verdict. And as Padilla implicitly recognizes by not
arguing otherwise, there was substantial support for his
convictions. That he may have successfully impeached some
witnesses on some points is not a basis for upsetting the verdict.
United States v. Rosario-Pérez, 957 F.3d 277, 291 (1st Cir. 2020)
(stating that "reliability and credibility of in-court witnesses
are matters for [the finder of fact] to determine").
D. Exclusion of Prior Inconsistent Statements and Polygraph Evidence
Padilla concludes by challenging several evidentiary and
trial management rulings. None of his arguments has merit.
Padilla first argues that the district court improperly
barred him from introducing prior inconsistent statements by
witnesses Anabel Ayala and Miguel Maldonado. He also argues that
the court abused its discretion by refusing to let him ask
Maldonado leading questions on direct examination to elicit prior
inconsistent statements for impeachment, in violation of Federal
Rules of Evidence 611(c) and 613. But our review of the record
reveals that Padilla did in fact introduce Ayala's prior
credibility findings. Padilla provides no support for this proposition, which he raises for the first time in his reply brief. The argument is waived. See United States v. Torres, 162 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1998).
- 15 - inconsistent statements through the testimony from the FBI agent
who interviewed her two days after the robbery. And as to
Maldonado, Padilla did not attempt, at trial or now, to demonstrate
why he was a hostile witness or a witness identified with an
adverse party. Thus, the court acted within its discretion by
precluding leading questions on direct examination.5 Fed. R.
Evid. 611(c).
Finally, Padilla argues that the district court should
have granted him access to certain polygraph results. At the
district court, the government provided Padilla a list of five
individuals to whom the FBI had administered polygraph tests during
the investigation. Padilla moved initially to obtain the results
from these tests because "prosecutors have a duty to produce Brady
material for all relevant government agencies." The government
responded that the prosecutor was not in possession of the
polygraph results for the identified individuals but represented
that only two of the individuals were potential trial witnesses.
The government said that it would seek the test results and provide
them to Padilla if they could be located.
Despite the government's apparent willingness to provide
the results, the district court issued an order relieving it of
5 Padilla also did not make any other attempt to introduce Maldonado's prior inconsistent statements as allowed under Fed. R. Evid. 613.
- 16 - any obligation to do so. Rather than accepting Padilla's framing
of the issue as arising under Brady, the court considered the issue
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.6 That rule requires
the government to produce items in its possession if the items are
material to preparing the defense. Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(a)(1)(E)(i). The court found that the polygraph tests were
immaterial under this rule because the court "would not place any
weight on polygraph results and . . . will not admit them at
trial." Thus, the court concluded that "there is no need for the
government to disclose them."
Padilla responded to this order by seeking
reconsideration. In so doing, he argued that it was "obvious"
that the requested test results were "material to a witness's
credibility" and thus discoverable. In his motion to reconsider,
Padilla again mentioned Brady but did not discuss Rule 16 or cite
a single case about its application. The district court denied
Padilla's motion, concluding that he had not adequately developed
his argument.
6 The district court did not explain why it converted Padilla's Brady-based motion to compel into one made pursuant to Rule 16, even though the two motions invoke different tests for production. That said, Padilla does not argue to us that he was somehow prejudiced by the court's unilateral conversion of his motion, and thus, to the extent he may mean to suggest he was, the argument is waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
- 17 - Even if we were to disagree with the merits of the
district court's Rule 16 ruling, we see no basis for relief. "To
succeed on a claimed violation of Rule 16, a defendant must
demonstrate that he has been prejudiced." United States v.
Rosario-Peralta, 175 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 1999). Padilla has not
done so.
Padilla does not claim that the undisclosed polygraph
results were favorable to him. But even if they were, the district
court, who was the fact finder at trial, stated plainly that it
did not "place any weight on the polygraph results." Padilla also
has developed no argument on how he may have used the polygraph
results to locate additional evidence that would have supported
his defense. Thus, he argues only that if he had received the
results and they turned out to be favorable to him, he could have
used them for impeachment purposes.
Ultimately, Emanuel Cosme-Rosa was the only government
witness for whom Padilla did not receive polygraph results. Even
without these results, Padilla impeached Cosme's credibility
through his prior inconsistent statements and the testimony of an
FBI agent. Thus, the polygraph results would have been cumulative.
Moreover, given the district court's negative view about polygraph
evidence and the impeachment evidence that Padilla was able to
use, we view as negligible any resulting prejudice from the court’s
Rule 16 ruling. That is especially so given the other strong
- 18 - evidence against Padilla which included multiple cooperating
witnesses and the physical evidence, which included cell phone
records connecting Padilla to several witnesses during the
robbery.
***
We have considered all remaining arguments that Padilla
raises and conclude that none of them provides a basis for ordering
a new trial.
Affirmed.
- 19 -