United States v. Owen

4 Ct. Cust. 480, 1913 WL 19742, 1913 CCPA LEXIS 156
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedNovember 11, 1913
DocketNo. 1232
StatusPublished

This text of 4 Ct. Cust. 480 (United States v. Owen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Owen, 4 Ct. Cust. 480, 1913 WL 19742, 1913 CCPA LEXIS 156 (ccpa 1913).

Opinion

Martin, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The merchandise now before the court consists of small boards of Spanish cedar imported from Cuba, each approximating 5 or 6 feet in length, 5 or 6 inches in width, and three-sixteenths to a quarter of an inch in thickness. The importation was designed for use as material for the manufacture of cigar boxes.

The appraiser, acting under the department’s instructions (T. D. 32482), returned an advisory classification of the merchandise as sawed cedar, dutiable at 15 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 203 of the tariff act of 1909. Duty was assessed by the collector in accordance with this return.

The importers duly filed their protest against the assessment, claiming classification of the merchandise as sawed lumber, not specially provided foiq dutiable at $1.25 per thousand feet board measure, under the provisions of paragraph 201 of the act.

[481]*481The protest was heard upon evidence by the Board of General Appraisers and was sustained, from which decision the Government now appeals.

The single issue made by the record is whether or not the importation is dutiable as sawed cedar under paragraph 203 of the tariff act of 1909. If the merchandise is not governed by that paragraph it would without question be dutiable under paragraph 201, as claimed by the importers.

The following is a copy of paragraph'203 of the act of 1909:

203. Sawed boards, plants, deals, and all forms of sawed cedar, lignum-vitas, lancewood, ebony, bos, granadilla, mahogany, rosewood, satinwood, and all other cabinet woods not further manufactured than sawed, fifteen per centum ad valorem; veneers of wood, and wood unmanufactured, not specially provided for in this section, twenty per centum ad valorem.

The importers do not deny that the boards in question are Spanish cedar. They maintain, however, that this fact alone does not bring the merchandise within the terms of the foregoing paragraph, for they contend that the word “ cedar,” as used in the paragraph in conjunction with the description “ all other cabinet woods,” covers only such cedar as is fitted or intended for use as cabinet wood. The importers maintain that the boards now in question were sawed and fitted for use in the manufacture of cigar boxes and are not shown by the record to be cabinet wood. The importers therefore contend that the imported cedar boards are not dutiable as sawed cedar under paragraph 203, but as sawed lumber not specially provided for under paragraph 201.

The board sustained the protest of the importers, and the following quotations from the board’s decision give the reasons upon which the decision rests:

It is not disputed that the wood in question is known as Spanish cedar and that from SO to 90 per cent of all such cedar imported into the United States is used in the manufacture of cigar boxes.
Narrowed down, the question involved must turn upon whether this cedar is a cabinet wood. On the part of protestants it is contended that the wood in issue is not only not a cabinet wood by reason of being a-soft wood, but also for the added reasons that it is resinous and so cut and prepared as to make it fit only for use in the making of cigar boxes. The Government, on the other hand, contends that Spanish cedar is a cabinet wood and is so known commercially.
$ $ * ‡ ‡ * *
If it were a conceded fact that this cedar was a cabinet wood, adaptable to uses for which cabinet woods are ordinarly used, it would not be open to question that it must take classification under paragraph 203; but, notwithstanding the testimony of witnesses who were shown to be dealers in cabinet woods, it was not established that there existed such a uniform and general understanding different from the common or ordinary understanding as to what it is in fact, or' the uses to which it is practically and commercially [482]*482adapted, as to take it out of the class to which it commonly belongs and give it a distinctly different name having an altogether different meaning.
The one undisputed fact that we think must be accepted as controlling the classification here is that of use.
As already stated, it is conceded that from 80 to 90 per cent of this class of cedar is used in making cigar boxes, and by a long line of authorities there is warrant for holding that the classification of merchandise may be determined by its chief use. Magone v. Weiderer (159 U. S., 555) ; Meyer v. Cadwalader (89 Fed., 963) ; Vandiver v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 194; T. D. 31219) ; United States v. Marsching (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 216; T. D. 31257). Therefore upon this question of use alone the protests should be sustained, but another fact not to be overlooked is the long-continued practice of classification which the Government seeks in this case to have changed. Congress presumably had before it the decision of Judge Coxe, In re Myers, supra, when the tariff revision of 1897 was made, and having indicated no purpose to avoid its effects it must be presumed that its terms were acquiesced in. The Abbotsford (98 U. S., 440).
We find as a fact that the merchandise is sawed lumber and hold it subject to duty at the rate of $1.25 per thousand feet board measure as claimed.

Upon a review of the present record the court is unable to sustain the foregoing findings of the board, for, according to the court’s reading of the record, those findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence. The board’s decision rests upon the construction that no cedar is dutiable under paragraph 203 except such as is included within the term “ cabinet woods.” If this construction be correct, it becomes necessary in the first instance to find the correct definition of the term “ cabinet woods ” as used in the paragraph. The first inquiry in this behalf is to determine whether or not the legislative term in question possessed a definite, general, and uniform commercial meaning in the usages of the trade in this country. If it appears that there existed such a commercial definition of the term differing from the general one the commercial meaning must of course prevail.

At the trial before the board the Government examined 10 witnesses upon the subject of the commercial usage of the term “ cabinet woods.” One of these witnesses had dealt in mahogany, rosewood, granadilla, ebony, Spanish cedar, boxwood, etc., at wholesale in this country during the period of 34 years, another 37 years, another 50 years, and the others for varying periods, mostly of great length.

These witnesses all testified either in exact words or in substance that the term cabinet woods ” had for very many years possessed a definite, uniform, and general commercial meaning and application in trade in this country, and that Spanish cedar was one of the woods included therein.

The following extracts from the testimony of witness William E. Uptagrove will exemplify the Government’s evidence upon this subject:

Q. Was the term “cabinet woods” one with which you came in contact in the trade? — A. It was.
[483]*483Q. Was it a term which liad a uniform meaning tlirougliout the wholesale trade? — A. It did.
Q.

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Related

The" Abbotsford"
98 U.S. 440 (Supreme Court, 1879)
Magone v. Wiederer
159 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1895)
Vandiver v. United States
1 Ct. Cust. 194 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1911)
United States v. Marsching
1 Ct. Cust. 216 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1911)
Meyer v. Cadwalader
89 F. 963 (Third Circuit, 1898)

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Bluebook (online)
4 Ct. Cust. 480, 1913 WL 19742, 1913 CCPA LEXIS 156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-owen-ccpa-1913.