United States v. Ovalles Torres

161 F. Supp. 2d 55, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14682, 2001 WL 1010464
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedAugust 30, 2001
Docket98-124(PG)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 161 F. Supp. 2d 55 (United States v. Ovalles Torres) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Ovalles Torres, 161 F. Supp. 2d 55, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14682, 2001 WL 1010464 (prd 2001).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge.

The Court held sentencing hearings for both Defendant Carlos Ovalles Torres and Defendant Ilio Matos to determine whether either defendant, separately, qualifies for the safety valve provision and thus a two point reduction. Ovalles hearing was held on September 14, 2000. Ilio Matos hearing was held August 14, 2000.

“Congress enacted the safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 8553(f), in order to mitigate the harsh effect of mandatory minimum sentences on certain first offenders who played supporting roles in drug-trafficking schemes. See Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d at 527 & n. 22 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 104-460, 2d Sess., at 4 (1994)).” United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d 146, 150 (1st Cir.2000). See also United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 133 F.Supp.2d 138, 141-42 (D.P.R.2001) (J. Pérez-Giménez).

The Sentencing Commission then incorporated the statutory text verbatim into the Sentencing Guidelines. See USSG § 5C1.2. When applicable, these provisions mandate both reduction of the defendant’s offense level and judicial disregard of statutes imposing mandatory minimum sentences. The safety valve applies if
1. The defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point ...;
2. The defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense;
3. The offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
4. The defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense ... and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise ...;
5. And not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan....

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.

United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d at 150-51.

Defendant bears the burden of showing his entitlement to a safety valve reduction. See United States v. Cadavid, 192 F.3d 230, 239 (1st Cir.1999); United States v. Richardson, 225 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2000) (citing See United States v. Cadavid, 192 F.3d at 239). Thus, the initial burden of proof “is incontestably on the defendant to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that he is eligible for the reduction.” United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 939-40 (9th Cir.1996). See also United States v. Montañez, 82 F.3d at 523 (1st Cir.1996) (“It is up to the defendant to persuade the district court that he has ‘truthfully provided’ the required information and evidence to the government.”).

The Court’s determination is fact-specific, one which depends on credibility determinations. The Court must provide more than “bare conclusions” for support. “[AJbsent either specific factual findings or easily recognizable support in the record,” the safety valve cannot be avoided. United States v. Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d 517, 528-30 (1st Cir.1996).

*58 The safety valve provision requires an affirmative act by the .defendant truthfully disclosing all the information he or she possesses that concerns his offense or related offenses. See United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir.1996). It is not sufficient for a defendant to “accede to the government’s allegations.” United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995). While it may be possible for a defendant to make a disclosure without a debriefing “so truthful and complete that no prosecutor could fairly suggest any gap or omission,” such a decision “takes a very dangerous course.” United States v. Montañez, 82 F.3d at 522-23. “It is up to the defendant to persuade the district court that he has ‘truthfully provided’ the required information and evidence to the government.” Id.

The defendant need not make the disclosure in any particular way. See United States v. Montañez, 82 F.3d at 522; United States v. Richardson, 225 F.3d at 53. The defendant is only required to “truthfully provide all the information he possesses concerning the crime,” id., by way of “an affirmative act of cooperation with the government.” United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d at 3.

The fifth criteria requires that the defendant must provide “all the information he possesses.” Included in this definition is “all information” concerning the offense of conviction and the acts of others if the offense is a conspiracy or involves joint activity. See United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 377-79 (10th Cir.1995). The defendant not only must provide all the information he has regarding his own involvement in the crime, he also must provide all the information he has relating to other participants as well. See id. In this respect, the requirement to provide “all the information” is read broadly. See United States v. Ventura Cruel, 133 F.Supp.2d at 142.

Defendants have not met their burdens. Defendants have not “truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.”

Defendant Ilio Matos is not entitled to the safety valve reduction because he did not truthfully provide all information and evidence. Matos’ attorney repeatedly asserted that his client may have omitted information but only because the government failed to specifically question him to elicit that information. What follows is taken verbatim from the sentencing hearing:

THE COURT: But counsel, I think we are putting the statute on its head. The statute says that the defendant has to come forth and truthfully testify as to everything he knows. Now, if he is going to sit back and say “Well, they didn’t ask me that,” then that is not what the statute requires.

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Related

United States v. Matos
328 F.3d 34 (First Circuit, 2003)
United States v. Mariel-Figueroa
328 F.3d 34 (First Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
161 F. Supp. 2d 55, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14682, 2001 WL 1010464, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-ovalles-torres-prd-2001.