United States v. Oscar Nolasco-Tellez

671 F. App'x 650
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 20, 2016
Docket15-50511
StatusUnpublished

This text of 671 F. App'x 650 (United States v. Oscar Nolasco-Tellez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Oscar Nolasco-Tellez, 671 F. App'x 650 (9th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Oscar Javier Nolasco-Tellez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 36-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Nolasco-Tellez contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. The district court did not depart upward on the basis that Nolasco-Tellez’s criminal history category was inadequate. Accordingly, section 4A1.3 was not a “pertinent policy statement” that the district court was required to consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5).

Nolasco-Tellez next contends that the district court erred under Federal Rule of. Criminal Procedure 32(h) by imposing an above-Guidelines sentence without providing prior notice. Contrary to Nolasco-Tel-lez’s contention, the record reflects that the district court imposed an upward variance based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the district court was not required to provide notice under Rule 32(h). See United States v. Moschella, 727 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court is not required under Rule 32(h) to give advance notice before imposing a sentence outside of the advisory guideline range if the sentence is the result of a variance.”).

Finally, Nolasco-Tellez contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Nolasco-Tellez’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Nolasco-Tellez’s criminal and immigration history as well as his failure to be deterred by prior sentences. See United States v. Burgos-Ortega, 777 F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2015).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Related

Gall v. United States
552 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court, 2007)
United States v. Ronald Moschella
727 F.3d 888 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Valencia-Barragan
608 F.3d 1103 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Alejandro Burgos-Ortega
777 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
671 F. App'x 650, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-oscar-nolasco-tellez-ca9-2016.