NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-2323
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00207-DMG-1 v. MEMORANDUM* PATRICK MICHAEL O’REILLY; AKA Patrick Reilly AKA Patrick Michael Oreilly,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 22, 2026 Pasadena, California
Before: HIGGINSON, NGUYEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.**
Defendant Patrick Michael O’Reilly appeals the district court’s revocation of
his supervised release and his sentence on four distinct grounds: he argues that
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. (1) there was insufficient evidence to support revocation; (2) adding a new
allegation during the revocation hearing violated his due process rights; (3) the
district court made three procedural errors in imposing his sentence; and (4) his
sentence was substantively unreasonable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
1. O’Reilly first argues that the Government did not prove that he violated
the conditions of his supervised release, as described in three allegations in the
petition to revoke supervised release: (1) having been ordered not to commit
another crime, O’Reilly was arrested for grand theft; (2) having been ordered not
to possess a dangerous weapon, O’Reilly entered a federal building with an illegal
switchblade; and (3) having been ordered not to possess a dangerous weapon,
O’Reilly entered a federal building with a pocketknife. O’Reilly was arrested for
grand theft after he exited a Home Depot store with over $1,300 in merchandise
that he had not paid for, claiming that he planned to return to the store and pay
after checking his bank account balance outside. Shortly after that arrest,
O’Reilly’s probation officer directed him to report to her office at the Los Angeles
Federal Building. When O’Reilly entered the building, the metal detector alerted,
and a knife was found in his backpack. U.S. Marshals also found a second knife
on his person.
To revoke a term of supervised release, the district court must “find[] by a
2 25-2323 preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of
supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). On a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge to revocation, we consider whether, “viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United
States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, the district
court did not err in finding that O’Reilly violated conditions of his supervised
release. The district court heard testimony about the facts surrounding O’Reilly’s
arrest for grand theft and reasonably rejected O’Reilly’s contention that he lacked
intent to steal. Regarding the other two allegations, it is undisputed that O’Reilly
possessed two knives and brought them into a federal building. In this posture, we
defer to the district court’s weighing of the evidence. See United States v. Nevils,
598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also United States v. Richards,
52 F.4th 879, 889 (9th Cir. 2022). With the record before the district court, a
rational factfinder could conclude that O’Reilly more likely than not violated the
conditions of his supervised release.
2. O’Reilly separately argues that the introduction of an allegation about the
second knife during his revocation hearing violated his due process rights.
3 25-2323 Because O’Reilly did not object to the addition of this allegation before the district
court, we review this claim for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-
Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 2011) (plain error for due process challenge
not raised below); Richards, 52 F.4th at 888 (plain error for challenge to revocation
not raised below).
Before testimony about the knives began, the district court asked if each
party was aware of the additional allegation, which the probation office had shared
with the district court but had not yet served on the parties. The new allegation
stated that O’Reilly brought a pocketknife to a federal building, while an existing
allegation already stated that he brought a switchblade that same day. Neither
party had prior notice of the new allegation, but counsel for both sides stated that
they had assumed both knives were covered within the existing allegation.
Defense counsel said that she only needed to read the new allegation and ensure
O’Reilly understood it, emphasizing again that the parties had considered both
knives as part of the existing allegation. The district court then paused the hearing
until defense counsel informed the court that she and O’Reilly were ready to
continue.
Even assuming it was error to introduce that allegation at the hearing, it does
not rise to the level of reversible plain error. “Plain error is (1) error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Depue, 912 F.3d
4 25-2323 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d
1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009)). A plain error “affects substantial rights if the
defendant can ‘demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have received a
different sentence if the district court had not erred.’” Id. at 1234 (alteration
adopted) (quoting United States v. Joseph, 716 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 2013)).
O’Reilly has not made any showing that the new allegation affected his substantial
rights. He does not argue that it changed his Sentencing Guidelines range and has
not demonstrated that he would have received a different sentence with more time
to prepare a defense to the pocketknife allegation, which related to the same
conduct that defense counsel had prepared to address in the switchblade allegation.
Thus, district court did not plainly err by introducing the pocketknife allegation at
the revocation hearing.
3. Next, O’Reilly brings three procedural challenges to his sentence, each
reviewed for plain error because he did not object on these grounds below. See
United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). First,
O’Reilly argues that the district court improperly relied on retributive factors when
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-2323
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00207-DMG-1 v. MEMORANDUM* PATRICK MICHAEL O’REILLY; AKA Patrick Reilly AKA Patrick Michael Oreilly,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 22, 2026 Pasadena, California
Before: HIGGINSON, NGUYEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.**
Defendant Patrick Michael O’Reilly appeals the district court’s revocation of
his supervised release and his sentence on four distinct grounds: he argues that
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. (1) there was insufficient evidence to support revocation; (2) adding a new
allegation during the revocation hearing violated his due process rights; (3) the
district court made three procedural errors in imposing his sentence; and (4) his
sentence was substantively unreasonable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
1. O’Reilly first argues that the Government did not prove that he violated
the conditions of his supervised release, as described in three allegations in the
petition to revoke supervised release: (1) having been ordered not to commit
another crime, O’Reilly was arrested for grand theft; (2) having been ordered not
to possess a dangerous weapon, O’Reilly entered a federal building with an illegal
switchblade; and (3) having been ordered not to possess a dangerous weapon,
O’Reilly entered a federal building with a pocketknife. O’Reilly was arrested for
grand theft after he exited a Home Depot store with over $1,300 in merchandise
that he had not paid for, claiming that he planned to return to the store and pay
after checking his bank account balance outside. Shortly after that arrest,
O’Reilly’s probation officer directed him to report to her office at the Los Angeles
Federal Building. When O’Reilly entered the building, the metal detector alerted,
and a knife was found in his backpack. U.S. Marshals also found a second knife
on his person.
To revoke a term of supervised release, the district court must “find[] by a
2 25-2323 preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of
supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). On a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge to revocation, we consider whether, “viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United
States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, the district
court did not err in finding that O’Reilly violated conditions of his supervised
release. The district court heard testimony about the facts surrounding O’Reilly’s
arrest for grand theft and reasonably rejected O’Reilly’s contention that he lacked
intent to steal. Regarding the other two allegations, it is undisputed that O’Reilly
possessed two knives and brought them into a federal building. In this posture, we
defer to the district court’s weighing of the evidence. See United States v. Nevils,
598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also United States v. Richards,
52 F.4th 879, 889 (9th Cir. 2022). With the record before the district court, a
rational factfinder could conclude that O’Reilly more likely than not violated the
conditions of his supervised release.
2. O’Reilly separately argues that the introduction of an allegation about the
second knife during his revocation hearing violated his due process rights.
3 25-2323 Because O’Reilly did not object to the addition of this allegation before the district
court, we review this claim for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-
Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 2011) (plain error for due process challenge
not raised below); Richards, 52 F.4th at 888 (plain error for challenge to revocation
not raised below).
Before testimony about the knives began, the district court asked if each
party was aware of the additional allegation, which the probation office had shared
with the district court but had not yet served on the parties. The new allegation
stated that O’Reilly brought a pocketknife to a federal building, while an existing
allegation already stated that he brought a switchblade that same day. Neither
party had prior notice of the new allegation, but counsel for both sides stated that
they had assumed both knives were covered within the existing allegation.
Defense counsel said that she only needed to read the new allegation and ensure
O’Reilly understood it, emphasizing again that the parties had considered both
knives as part of the existing allegation. The district court then paused the hearing
until defense counsel informed the court that she and O’Reilly were ready to
continue.
Even assuming it was error to introduce that allegation at the hearing, it does
not rise to the level of reversible plain error. “Plain error is (1) error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Depue, 912 F.3d
4 25-2323 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d
1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009)). A plain error “affects substantial rights if the
defendant can ‘demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have received a
different sentence if the district court had not erred.’” Id. at 1234 (alteration
adopted) (quoting United States v. Joseph, 716 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 2013)).
O’Reilly has not made any showing that the new allegation affected his substantial
rights. He does not argue that it changed his Sentencing Guidelines range and has
not demonstrated that he would have received a different sentence with more time
to prepare a defense to the pocketknife allegation, which related to the same
conduct that defense counsel had prepared to address in the switchblade allegation.
Thus, district court did not plainly err by introducing the pocketknife allegation at
the revocation hearing.
3. Next, O’Reilly brings three procedural challenges to his sentence, each
reviewed for plain error because he did not object on these grounds below. See
United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). First,
O’Reilly argues that the district court improperly relied on retributive factors when
imposing his sentence by “consider[ing] to a limited degree the seriousness of the
conduct” underlying the revocation of supervised release. Our precedent permits
this limited consideration, so the district court did not commit plain error on this
basis. See United States v. Taylor, 153 F.4th 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he
5 25-2323 court may consider a violation of criminal law underlying the supervised release
violation in its evaluation of the criminal history of the defendant, the risk of
recidivism, and the violator’s breach of the court’s trust.”).
Second, O’Reilly contends that the district court failed to explain the reasons
for its sentence. The Sentencing Guidelines provided a range of four to ten months
in custody. The district court sentenced O’Reilly to six months in custody
followed by a year of supervised release. A sentence within a defendant’s
Guidelines range “often needs little explanation, and a sufficient explanation can
sometimes be inferred from the record as a whole.” United States v. Vasquez-
Perez, 742 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2014). The district court stated that the
sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet appropriate
sentencing aims, and its comments showed that it heard all the evidence and
arguments and made a reasoned decision based on the proper criteria. On this
record, further explanation was not necessary.
Third, O’Reilly asserts that the district court failed to consider his arguments
about mitigating factors. The district court need not explicitly address every
argument in announcing a sentencing decision. A sufficient “explanation
communicates that the parties’ arguments have been heard, and that a reasoned
decision has been made.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc). “It is most helpful for this to come from the bench,” but, again,
6 25-2323 “an adequate explanation in some cases may also be inferred from the [Presentence
Report] or the record as a whole.” Id.; see also United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d
988, 999 (9th Cir. 2008) (similar). The district court’s discussion of the sentence
showed it considered O’Reilly’s arguments, and the district court agreed to make
appropriate recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons to address the conditions of
confinement that defense counsel had raised. The district court’s explanations
were sufficient for the complexity of this case. See Vasquez-Perez, 742 F.3d at
900. Therefore, none of O’Reilly’s procedural challenges to his sentence
constitutes plain error.
4. Finally, we review the substantive reasonableness of O’Reilly’s sentence
for abuse of discretion, affording “significant deference” to the district court’s
decision. United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
On that standard, we only grant relief “in rare cases” where we have “a definite
and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.”
Id. at 1087–88 (quoting United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1055
(9th Cir. 2009)). The district court sentenced O’Reilly to six months in custody,
below the median of his four-to-ten-months Guidelines range. Although there is
not a presumption of reasonableness for a within-Guidelines sentence, we “abide
by the Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘when the judge’s discretionary decision
accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in
7 25-2323 the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable.’” Carty, 520
F.3d at 994 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)). The district
court imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range and indicated that it
considered the information before it and the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a) and 3583(e) in doing so. We see no clear error in judgment and affirm
the sentence imposed as substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.1
1 O’Reilly’s motion to file an unredacted reply brief under seal, Dkt. 34, is GRANTED. O’Reilly’s request for judicial notice, Dkt. 32, is GRANTED.
8 25-2323