United States v. One Ford Automobile Truck

286 F. 204, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1775
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 12, 1923
DocketNos. 6117, 6677
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 286 F. 204 (United States v. One Ford Automobile Truck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. One Ford Automobile Truck, 286 F. 204, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1775 (W.D. Wash. 1923).

Opinion

CUSHMAN, District Judge.

The libels of information in the above-entitled causes pray forfeiture, condemnation, and sale of the above-described automobiles because, as alleged in cause No. 6117:

“Said Ford automobile truck * * * was used in tbe removal and for tbe deposit and concealment of goods and commodities, to wit, morphine, on which the internal revenue tax imposed by law upon such morphine had not been paid, with, intent thentand there to defraud the United States of the said tax or some part thereof.”

And in cause No. 6677:

“Said Paige automobile * * * was then and there being used * * ' 9 in the removal of a commodity, * * * namely, cocaine, * * * with the intent * * * to defraud the United States of America of such tax, * * * and being used * * * in tbe concealment of * * * cocaine, * * * with intent * * * to defraud the United States of America of such tax. * * * ” i

[205]*205These causes, by consent and stipulation of counsel, were tried to the court without a jury. The evidence' showed that the drugs were carried upon the person of the individuals driving the automobiles.

The section under which the informations are drawn is section 3450, R. S. (3 Fed. Stats. Ann. p. 795; section 6352, Cómp. Stats.), being section 14 of the Act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. p. 151); the language used in that section being’ (the italics are those of the court):

“And be it further enacted, that in case any goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed, or any materials, utensils, or vessels proper or intended to be made use of for or in the making of such goods or commodities shall be removed, or shall be deposited or concealed in any place; with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, or any part thereof, all such goods and commodities, and all such materials, utensils, and vessels, respectively shall be forfeited; and in every such case, and in every ease where any goods or commodities shall he forfeited under this act, or any other act of Congress relating to the internal revenue, all and singular the casks, vessels, cases or other packages whatsoever, containing, or which shall have contained, such goods or commodities, respectively, and every vessel, boat, cart, carriage, or other conveyance whatsoever and all horses or other animals, and all th&ngs used in the removal or. for the deposit’ or concealment thereof, respectively, shall be forfeited; and every person who shall remove, deposit, or conceal, or be concerned in removing, depositing or concealing any goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed, with intent to defraud the United States of such tax or any part thereof, shall be liable to a fine or penalty of not exceeding five hundred dollars.”

The narcotics described in these informations were not in any sense “concealed” in the automobile, but they were “concealed” upon the person of the driver, as would be a “concealed” weapon. The automobile was not the place of “deposit” of the narcotics in either case, but the narcotics were placed or “deposited” in the pocket of the driver and he then got into the automobile. No fair construction of the word “deposit” would describe such an act.

The information charges, not only the use of the automobile for the “concealment” and “deposit” of the naixotic, but in its “removal.” There are two meanings to the word “removed” — one:

“To move away from the position occupied.” South v. Com’rs of Sinking Fund, 86 Ky. 190, 5 S. W. 569.

The other meaning is:

“To change place in any manner; to go from one place to another.” First Soc. of Waterbury v. Platt, 12 Conn. 186; 8 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2880.

The question for consideration is: In which sense is the word “removed” used in this statute? If used'in the latter sense, the offense is sufficiently charged and proven. If used in the former sense, if it is sufficiently charged in the information, it has not been sufficiently proven. While an expression originally used in one statute, when repeated in a later statute covering the same subject-matter, has not, necessarily, the same meaning in the latter that it had in the former, yet there is a strong presumption that it was so used. To determine this question, it is appropriate, if not necessary, to examine statutes in pari materia.

[206]*206The words “removed,” “removal,” and “removing,” in a similar connection, appear to have been first used by Congress in the Act of March 3, 1791 (1 Stat. 199, at page 203). This act provides that the “duties” on spirits shall be “paid or secured previous to the removal thereof from the distilleries.” Section 17. If paid “previous to such removal,” there rvas provision for abatement of duty of two cents for every ten gallons. Provision was made for a bond to secure payment upon all “spirits as shall be removed from such distillery.” The casks were, “previous to the removal of said spirits,” required to be branded. Entries in books of the distiller were required to show “all the spirits distilled at such distillery, and removed from the same * * * and the places to which removed.” Section 19. It was further provided:

“And if any of the said spirits shall be removed from any such distillery without having been branded or marked as aforesaid, or without such certificate as aforesaid, the same, together with the cask or casks containing, and the horses or cattle, with the carriages, "their harness and tackling, and the vessel or boat with its tackle and apparel employed in removing them, shall be forfeited, and may be seized by any officer of inspection. And the superintendent or manager of such distillery, shall also forfeit the full value of the spirits so removed, to be computed at the highest price of the like spirits in the market. * * * That no spirits shall he removed from any such distillery at any other times than between sun rising and sun setting. * * *" Section 19, at page 204.

Section 3 of the Act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. p. 98), provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall designate a place where cotton may be brought for the purpose of being weighed and marked. Section 4 provides that, after the same has been marked and permits issued, it “may be removed from the district in which it has been produced to any one other district, without prepayment of the tax.” Section 5 prohibits the removal of such cotton from any point in the district where it is produced without a permit and provides for the forfeiture of vessels and vehicles employed in such removal.

The Act of 1866 further provides for the seizure and forfeiture of—

“all goods, wares, merchandise, articles, or objects, on which taxes are imposed by the provisions of law, which shall be found in the possession, or custody, or within the control of any person or persons for the purpose of being sold or removed by such person or persons in fraud of the internal revenue laws.” Section 9, at page 111.
“And in case of the removal of any person or persons from the house or premises for which any trade, business, or profession was taxed/,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
286 F. 204, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1775, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-one-ford-automobile-truck-wawd-1923.