USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12790 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus OLAJUWON RAHEEM WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00122-JRH-BKE-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 23-12790
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Olajuwon Williams appeals his 120-month sentence for pos- session of a firearm by a convicted felon. He asserts the district court clearly erred in failing to apply a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), because he had clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility by the time of sentencing. The Government has moved for summary affirmance, arguing that, under § 3E1.1, Williams’ obstruction of justice en- hancement precludes a reduction for acceptance of responsibility except in “extraordinary cases,” and submits that United States v. Coats, 8 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2021), dictates that Williams’ case is not extraordinary. After review, 1 we grant the Government’s mo- tion for summary affirmance. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, a defendant’s offense level will be increased by two levels if: (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecu- tion, or sentencing of the instant offense of convic- tion, and
1 We “review the district court’s determination of acceptance of responsibility
only for clear error.” United States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 2004). USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 3 of 7
23-12790 Opinion of the Court 3
(2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defend- ant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense . . . . U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, a defendant’s of- fense level may be decreased: (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels. (b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under sub- section (a), the offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and upon motion of the government stating that the de- fendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notify- ing authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. Id. § 3E1.1. The defendant bears the burden of clearly demonstrat- ing he has accepted personal responsibility. United States v. Wright, 862 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017). A relevant factor for whether the reduction is appropriate is whether the defendant voluntarily terminated or withdrew from criminal conduct or associations. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(B)). In addition, we have held a court may consider USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 4 of 7
4 Opinion of the Court 23-12790
“subsequent criminal conduct in deciding whether a decrease pur- suant to § 3E1.1 is appropriate,” even if that conduct is unrelated to the offense of the conviction. United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 343 (11th Cir. 1994); Wright, 862 F.3d at 1279. Commentary appli- cation note 4 of § 3E1.1 specifies that “[c]onduct resulting in an en- hancement under § 3C1.1 . . . ordinarily indicates that the defend- ant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4). In Coats, we rejected Coats’ argument he was entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction despite his obstructive con- duct, which preceded his guilty plea. Coats, 8 F.4th at 1232-34. Dur- ing his incarceration in county jail, Coats assaulted a material wit- ness in his case by punching him in the face in an attempt to influ- ence his testimony. Id. at 1233, 1261. A federal grand jury later indicted Coats for the same underlying incident as his state charges, and he subsequently pleaded guilty. Id. at 1233, 1261. Coats re- ceived an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his as- sault of the witness, and he was denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility given the obstruction of justice and based on the court’s finding that there were no “extraordinary circumstances” warranting the reduction. Id. at 1233–34, 1262. On appeal, Coats argued he was entitled to the reduction because of the “extraordinary circumstance” that his obstructive conduct preceded his guilty plea. Id. at 1234. We rejected his USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 5 of 7
23-12790 Opinion of the Court 5
argument and determined the speed of federal authorities is an ar- bitrary and inapt factor in determining whether a case is extraordi- nary. Id. at 1263. While Coats contended his guilty plea evidenced acceptance of responsibility despite his obstructive conduct, we re- jected his argument, because a defendant “must present more than just a guilty plea to establish acceptance of responsibility . . . even more so when . . . the obstructive act was a violent assault of a key witness.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We noted Coats’ argu- ment failed to account for the violent nature of his obstructive con- duct and held the court did not clearly err. Id. We grant the Government’s motion for summary affir- mance because its position is clearly correct as a matter of law. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 2 (explaining summary disposition is appropriate where “the posi- tion of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous”). The court did not clearly err in declining to apply the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Alt- hough Coats did not define “extraordinary cases,” the facts in the instant case are similar such that a finding of clear error in Williams’ case is irreconcilable with this Court’s holding in Coats. First, while Williams suggests his guilty plea and apology sufficiently
2In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 6 of 7
6 Opinion of the Court 23-12790
demonstrate that he accepted responsibility, this Court directly re- jected that argument in Coats. Coats, 8 F.4th at 1263; see also Wright, 862 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, Williams’ contention that his guilty plea alone demonstrated acceptance of responsibility cannot suc- ceed.
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USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12790 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus OLAJUWON RAHEEM WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00122-JRH-BKE-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 23-12790
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Olajuwon Williams appeals his 120-month sentence for pos- session of a firearm by a convicted felon. He asserts the district court clearly erred in failing to apply a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), because he had clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility by the time of sentencing. The Government has moved for summary affirmance, arguing that, under § 3E1.1, Williams’ obstruction of justice en- hancement precludes a reduction for acceptance of responsibility except in “extraordinary cases,” and submits that United States v. Coats, 8 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2021), dictates that Williams’ case is not extraordinary. After review, 1 we grant the Government’s mo- tion for summary affirmance. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, a defendant’s offense level will be increased by two levels if: (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecu- tion, or sentencing of the instant offense of convic- tion, and
1 We “review the district court’s determination of acceptance of responsibility
only for clear error.” United States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 2004). USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 3 of 7
23-12790 Opinion of the Court 3
(2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defend- ant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense . . . . U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, a defendant’s of- fense level may be decreased: (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels. (b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under sub- section (a), the offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and upon motion of the government stating that the de- fendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notify- ing authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. Id. § 3E1.1. The defendant bears the burden of clearly demonstrat- ing he has accepted personal responsibility. United States v. Wright, 862 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017). A relevant factor for whether the reduction is appropriate is whether the defendant voluntarily terminated or withdrew from criminal conduct or associations. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(B)). In addition, we have held a court may consider USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 4 of 7
4 Opinion of the Court 23-12790
“subsequent criminal conduct in deciding whether a decrease pur- suant to § 3E1.1 is appropriate,” even if that conduct is unrelated to the offense of the conviction. United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 343 (11th Cir. 1994); Wright, 862 F.3d at 1279. Commentary appli- cation note 4 of § 3E1.1 specifies that “[c]onduct resulting in an en- hancement under § 3C1.1 . . . ordinarily indicates that the defend- ant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4). In Coats, we rejected Coats’ argument he was entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction despite his obstructive con- duct, which preceded his guilty plea. Coats, 8 F.4th at 1232-34. Dur- ing his incarceration in county jail, Coats assaulted a material wit- ness in his case by punching him in the face in an attempt to influ- ence his testimony. Id. at 1233, 1261. A federal grand jury later indicted Coats for the same underlying incident as his state charges, and he subsequently pleaded guilty. Id. at 1233, 1261. Coats re- ceived an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his as- sault of the witness, and he was denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility given the obstruction of justice and based on the court’s finding that there were no “extraordinary circumstances” warranting the reduction. Id. at 1233–34, 1262. On appeal, Coats argued he was entitled to the reduction because of the “extraordinary circumstance” that his obstructive conduct preceded his guilty plea. Id. at 1234. We rejected his USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 5 of 7
23-12790 Opinion of the Court 5
argument and determined the speed of federal authorities is an ar- bitrary and inapt factor in determining whether a case is extraordi- nary. Id. at 1263. While Coats contended his guilty plea evidenced acceptance of responsibility despite his obstructive conduct, we re- jected his argument, because a defendant “must present more than just a guilty plea to establish acceptance of responsibility . . . even more so when . . . the obstructive act was a violent assault of a key witness.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We noted Coats’ argu- ment failed to account for the violent nature of his obstructive con- duct and held the court did not clearly err. Id. We grant the Government’s motion for summary affir- mance because its position is clearly correct as a matter of law. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 2 (explaining summary disposition is appropriate where “the posi- tion of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous”). The court did not clearly err in declining to apply the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Alt- hough Coats did not define “extraordinary cases,” the facts in the instant case are similar such that a finding of clear error in Williams’ case is irreconcilable with this Court’s holding in Coats. First, while Williams suggests his guilty plea and apology sufficiently
2In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 6 of 7
6 Opinion of the Court 23-12790
demonstrate that he accepted responsibility, this Court directly re- jected that argument in Coats. Coats, 8 F.4th at 1263; see also Wright, 862 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, Williams’ contention that his guilty plea alone demonstrated acceptance of responsibility cannot suc- ceed. As in Coats, Williams did not dispute the obstruction en- hancement or the underlying facts, nor did he dispute the court’s reliance on the advisory Guidelines commentary. Coats, 8 F.4th at 1261. Additionally, like Coats’ one-time violent assault, Williams’ obstructive conduct of threatening to kill China Harris while incar- cerated was similarly isolated, yet serious and threatening in na- ture, and concerned a material witness in his case. Id. at 1263. Though Coats argued his case was extraordinary because his ob- structive conduct occurred prior to his federal indictment, this Court does not distinguish between pre- and post-indictment ob- structive conduct. Regardless, the same principles apply to Wil- liams’ argument—construed liberally—that the temporal gap be- tween his obstructive conduct and his sentencing presents extraor- dinary circumstances. Williams’ conduct at trial suggests he pleaded guilty as soon as the court agreed to dismiss Counts 1 and 2. Accordingly, had the court dismissed the counts sooner, there would have been a shorter gap between his obstructive conduct and his guilty plea. Applying the same logic as in Coats, the speed by which the court moved is an arbitrary and inapt factor in deter- mining whether Williams’ case is extraordinary. Id. As such, the temporal distance between Williams’ obstructive conduct and his guilty plea is not an extraordinary circumstance. USCA11 Case: 23-12790 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/03/2024 Page: 7 of 7
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Finally, the court was entitled to consider Coats’ contraband charge for possession of cigarettes while in custody as evidence he did not voluntarily withdraw from criminal conduct. See Pace, 17 F.3d at 343. Taken in conjunction with the court’s finding that his obstruction of justice was serious, and the great deference the dis- trict court has on such a determination, the court did not clearly err. Wright, 862 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, we GRANT the Government’s motion for summary affirmance and DENY as moot its motion to stay the briefing schedule. See 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c) (providing a motion for summary affirmance shall postpone the due date for filing any re- maining brief until we rule on such a motion). AFFIRMED.