United States v. Ohm

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-1497
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 16 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1497

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 8:21-cr-00123-DOC-1 v. MEMORANDUM* HECTOR OHM,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 14, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: IKUTA, R. NELSON, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Hector Ohm appeals his conviction on the ground that his guilty plea was

involuntary. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Based on the totality of the circumstances, United States v. Kaczynski, 239

F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001), Ohm voluntarily entered his plea. Ohm expressed

his intent to plead guilty several times before the change-of-plea hearing, and he

affirmed that he wanted to proceed with entering his plea on multiple occasions

during the change-of-plea hearing. During Ohm’s pre-plea hearing on substitution

of counsel, the district court addressed Ohm’s concerns about counsel. Ohm’s

argument that the court’s pre-plea comments coerced him into entering the plea, do

not overcome the “great weight” and “strong presumption of verity” that we give

his plea colloquy statements to the contrary, United States v. Anderson, 993 F.2d

1435, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by

United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 608–10 (2013), which we credit over his

subsequent arguments, see United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815 (9th Cir.

1984). Nor was Ohm coerced by having to choose between continuing with his

guilty plea or proceeding to trial with his existing counsel. See United States v.

Foreman, 329 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by

United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc);

cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 746–47 (1970).

Ohm’s argument that his decision was coerced by insufficient time likewise

fails. Ohm had been negotiating his plea agreement for months, had signed and

2 filed his plea agreement weeks before the change-of-plea hearing, and signed and

affirmed a certification stating he had sufficient time to review and consider the

agreement and that he had carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of it with

his attorney.

Because Ohm has not shown his plea was involuntary, his plea agreement is

enforceable. He has no other argument that his guilty plea is invalid.

AFFIRMED.