United States v. Nyree Letterlough

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: October 18, 2023
• Docket: 22-2703
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _________________ No. 22-2703 _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

NYREE LETTERLOUGH, Appellant

_________________ No. 22-3119 _________________

SAQUEENA WILLIAMS, a/k/a Queenie, Appellant

________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Nos. 1:19-cr-00043-001 & 1-19-cr-00043-002) District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner ________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 19, 2023

Before: RESTREPO, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: October 18, 2023)

______________

OPINION* ______________

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Nyree Letterlough and Saqueena Williams appeal their judgment and

conviction orders. They were jointly tried and convicted of drug trafficking and firearms

offenses. Prior to trial, the District Court denied Letterlough’s motion to sever her trial

from co-defendant Williams’s trial and denied Williams’s motion to suppress evidence

seized during the search of two residences. Letterlough now challenges the denial of the

motion to sever, and Williams challenges the denial of the motion to suppress. For the

reasons set forth below, we will affirm.1

I. MOTION TO SEVER

Letterlough contends that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her

motion to sever because a joint trial prevented Letterlough from calling co-defendant

Williams to testify on her behalf. We review the denial of a severance motion for abuse

of discretion.2 A district court should grant a severance motion “only if there is a serious

risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991). 2 prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”3 Where a

defendant moves for severance on the basis that a joint trial would prevent her from

calling her co-defendant to testify, a district court considers the following factors

enumerated in United States v. Boscia: “(1) the likelihood of [a] co-defendant[]

testifying; (2) the degree to which such testimony would be exculpatory; (3) the degree to

which the testifying co-defendant[] could be impeached; (4) judicial economy.”4

Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in reaching the conclusion that

the Boscia factors did not warrant severance. In considering the likelihood that a co-

defendant will testify, “[b]are assertions that co-defendants will testify are insufficient.”5

The District Court properly concluded that the first factor weighed against severance

because Letterlough asserted without any evidence that Williams would testify on her

behalf.6 Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the

second factor weighed in favor of severance because Williams’s purported testimony

would be exculpatory.7 It also did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the third

factor weighed against severance because Williams’s testimony would likely be

3 Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). 4 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1978). 5 Id. 6 Although Letterlough argues that this factor should be neutral because “Ms. Williams never denied she would testify at Ms. Letterlough’s trial,” Letterlough Br. 22–23, the burden was on Letterlough to provide evidence that Williams would testify on her behalf. 7 While Letterlough contends that the District Court should have found that Williams’s testimony “weighed significantly in favor of severance” because “the government had no evidence to refute it,” Letterlough Br. 24–25, the government presented other evidence at trial that could have refuted Williams’s testimony. 3 impeached.8 Lastly, Letterlough and Williams were alleged to have participated in a

single conspiracy and were charged in the same nine counts out of an eleven count

indictment.9 Thus, the District Court properly concluded that the fourth factor—judicial

economy—weighed against severance because “[t]he public interest in judicial economy

favors joint trials where the same evidence would be presented at separate trials of

defendants charged with a single conspiracy.”10 We will affirm the District Court’s denial

of Letterlough’s motion to sever because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that the Boscia factors cumulatively weighed against severance.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Williams argues that the District Court erred by denying her motion to suppress

the evidence seized at her two residences (Rudy Road and Bradley Drive) because the

warrants to search these residences lacked probable cause. We exercise plenary review of

a district court’s assessment of a magistrate’s probable cause determination.11 “By

contrast, we conduct only a deferential review of the initial probable cause determination

8 Letterlough argues that this factor “should not have weighed significantly against severance” because of the “potential testimony’s highly probative value.” Letterlough Br. 25, but this factor does not look at the probative value of the testimony, it looks at the likelihood the testifying co-defendant would be impeached. 9 Letterlough and Williams were charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Counts 4, 7); three counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 5, 8, 11); two counts of possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (Counts 6, 9); and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (Count 10). Williams was also charged with two counts of distribution of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Counts 2, 3). 10 Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568. 11 United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 554 (3d Cir. 2010). 4 made by the magistrate.”12 “If a substantial basis exists to support the magistrate’s

probable cause finding, we must uphold that finding even if a ‘different magistrate judge

might have found the affidavit insufficient to support a warrant.’”13

Williams argues that the warrants lacked probable cause because the affidavit

contained stale information and failed to demonstrate a nexus between her drug

trafficking and the residences.14 The District Court did not err when it rejected these

arguments and upheld the magistrate’s probable cause determination.

On February 1, 2018, after an eighteen-month investigation into Williams’s drug

trafficking, State Trooper Shawn Panchik applied for warrants based on his affidavit of

probable cause. In the affidavit, Panchik provided historical information learned from

confidential sources in 2012 before the investigation into Williams’s drug distribution

began in 2016. Panchik also included a voluminous amount of information gathered

during the eighteen-month investigation, including surveillance of Williams and her two

residences, geolocation monitoring of Williams’s cell phone, discussions with

confidential informants, and three controlled drug buys—the last of which resulted in

Williams’s arrest.

Williams contends that the information in the affidavit was stale and insufficient to

establish probable cause. Our staleness analysis focuses on “[t]he likelihood that the

evidence sought is still in place[, which] depends on a number of variables, such as the

12 Id. 13 Id. (quoting United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993)). 14 The warrants for both searches were based on the same affidavit of probable cause. 5 nature of the crime, of the criminal, of the thing to be seized, and of the place to be

searched.”15 “The passage of time ‘loses significance’ when the evidence sought relates

to protracted or ongoing criminality,”16 which “is inherent in a large-scale narcotics

operation.”17 While the affidavit contained historical information, it catalogued an

ongoing and continuous large-scale drug trafficking operation. Thus, the information in

the affidavit was not stale.

Williams also argues that the affidavit did not sufficiently connect Williams’s drug

trafficking to either of her residences. “When the crime under investigation is drug

distribution, a magistrate may find probable cause to search the target’s residence even

without direct evidence that contraband will be found there.”18 It is reasonable to infer

that drug dealers often store evidence of drugs in their homes.19 “[A]pplication of this

inference is based on evidence supporting three preliminary premises: (1) that the person

suspected of drug dealing is actually a drug dealer; (2) that the place to be searched is

possessed by, or the domicile of, the dealer; and (3) that the home contains contraband

linking it to the dealer’s drug activities.”20

15 United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1983). 16 United States v. Henley, 941 F.3d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 774 (3d Cir. 2005)). 17 United States v. Harris, 482 F.2d 1115, 1119 (3d Cir. 1973). 18 Stearn, 597 F.3d at 558. 19 Id. 20 United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 104 (3d Cir. 2002). 6 Williams denies that the affidavit included evidence that the residences contained

contraband linking them to Williams’s drug activities. There are many factors that may

connect a defendant’s drug dealing to her home, including but not limited to:

large-scale operations, a defendant’s attempts to evade officers’ questions about h[er] address, the conclusions of experienced officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found, the proximity of the defendant’s residence to the location of criminal activity, probable cause to arrest the defendant on drug-related charges, and the tip of a concerned citizen that a specific stolen item would be found in the defendant’s residence.21

Williams was running a large-scale drug operation. The affidavit avers that

Williams lived at Rudy Road since 2005. The affidavit also avers that Williams left Rudy

Road before the controlled drug buys, which occurred in close proximity to Rudy Road,

and Williams was arrested in possession of three ounces of cocaine after the final

controlled drug buy. Additionally, the affidavit avers, based on surveillance, direct

observation, cell phone geolocation, and information from confidential informants, that

Williams spent a considerable amount of time at Bradley Drive. When an undercover

officer spoke with Williams at Bradley Drive, Williams provided a false name and falsely

stated that she had just moved into the house. Panchik attested that he inferred that the

residences were used for drug trafficking based on his experience, Williams’s use of the

residences, and their locations. This information, as well as additional information about

the residences in the affidavit, establishes that the District Court correctly concluded that

there was a sufficient nexus between both residences and the contraband.

21 Stearn, 597 F.3d at 559–60 (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Even if the District Court had erroneously concluded that the magistrate had

probable cause to issue the warrants, the District Court properly denied the motion to

suppress because the officers executed the warrants in good faith. Under the good faith

exception to the exclusionary rule, “a court should not suppress evidence seized under a

warrant’s authority, even if that warrant is subsequently invalidated, unless ‘a reasonably

well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s

authorization.’”22 “Ordinarily, the ‘mere existence of a warrant . . . suffices to prove that

an officer conducted a search in good faith,’ and will obviate the need for ‘any deep

inquiry into reasonableness.’”23 However, “the good faith exception does not apply where

the affidavit is ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its

existence entirely unreasonable.’”24 Here, the affidavit was not so lacking that reasonably

well-trained officers would have known that it was illegal despite the magistrate’s

authorization. The District Court properly denied the motion to suppress.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and conviction

orders.

22 Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2002)). 23 Id. (quoting United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2001)). 24 Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). 8