United States v. Nilson Olaya Grueso

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: July 24, 2025
• Docket: 22-11929
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 1 of 9

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-11929 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus NILSON OLAYA GRUESO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20486-DPG-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 2 of 9

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No. 22-11932 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSE JUNIOR BAILON FRANCO,

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20486-DPG-2 ____________________

No. 22-11933 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 3 of 9

22-11929 Opinion of the Court 3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus LUIS ALBERTO QUIJIJE MERO,

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20486-DPG-3 ____________________

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and KIDD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Nilson Grueso, Jose Bailon Franco, and Luis Quijije Mero (collectively, the “Defendants”) appeal their convictions for con- spiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. On appeal, they challenge the constitutionality of the Maritime Drug Law En- forcement Act (“MDLEA”) and argue that the district court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the indictment. After careful re- view, we affirm. USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 4 of 9

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I. BACKGROUND In August 2021, the United States Coast Guard found the Defendants aboard a go-fast boat approximately 140 nautical miles west of Manta, Ecuador. The boat flew no physical flag, had no registration documents, and had no registration number, homeport, name, or other marking on the hull. Grueso, however, claimed Columbian nationality for the boat. The United States con- tacted the Colombian government, but it could neither confirm nor deny this information. As a result, the Coast Guard treated the boat as a “vessel without nationality,” subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and boarded the boat, recovering 964 kilograms of cocaine. In September 2021, the Defendants were indicted for the fol- lowing violations of the MDLEA: (1) conspiracy to possess with in- tent to distribute a controlled substance while aboard a vessel sub- ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, under 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 70506(b) (“Count 1”), and (2) possession with in- tent to distribute a controlled substance while aboard a vessel sub- ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, under 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (“Count 2”). Pursuant to a written plea agreement, each of the Defendants pleaded guilty to Count 1 in exchange for the government’s dismissal of Count 2. Prior to sentencing, the Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2). They asserted that the MDLEA was unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to their USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 5 of 9

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case, because: (1) Congress exceeded its authority under the Felo- nies Clause of the Constitution when enacting § 70502(d)(1)(C), which defines a “vessel without nationality,” since Congress could exercise jurisdiction only over vessels considered “stateless” under international law; and (2) their go-fast boat was stopped in Ecua- dor’s exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), not on the “high Seas,” meaning the offense fell outside of Congress’s jurisdiction. Over the Defendants’ objections, the district judge accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny the motion to dis- miss. The Defendants proceeded to sentencing, and they each re- ceived a term of imprisonment. The Defendants timely appealed, and their cases were consolidated. While this consolidated appeal was pending, we issued a limited remand to allow the district court to resolve two of the Defendants’ sentence reduction motions and stayed briefing pending issuance of our opinion in United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-6177 (May 19, 2025), and cert. denied sub nom. Rosario-Rojas v. United States, No. 24-6691 (May 19, 2025). Now that these pending matters have been resolved and the issues have been fully briefed, this ap- peal is ripe for our review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When a motion to dismiss an indictment is based on subject matter jurisdiction, we review the district court’s denial de novo. Id. at 820; see also United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that jurisdictional questions are reviewed de novo even when raised for the first time on appeal). We likewise “review USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 6 of 9

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de novo a district court’s interpretation of a statute and whether a statute is constitutional.” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 820 (quoting United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 586 n.10 (11th Cir. 2020)). Where a constitutional challenge is raised for the first time on ap- peal, however, we review only for plain error. Id. III. DISCUSSION The MDLEA makes it a crime to “knowingly or intention- ally . . . possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a con- trolled substance” on board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and to conspire to do the same. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), (e)(1), 70506(b). A “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” includes “a vessel without nationality,” which is defined to include “a vessel aboard which the master or individ- ual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(C). The MDLEA also “applies even though the act is committed out- side the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. § 70503(b). On appeal, the Defendants reassert the two constitutional challenges to the MDLEA raised in their motion to dismiss before the district court. They also argue for the first time that the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s powers and violates due process be- cause it permits the United States to exert jurisdiction over foreign nationals without a nexus between the offense and the United States. Each of these arguments is foreclosed by our recent USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 7 of 9

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decisions in Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025). In Alfonso, the defendants were convicted under the MDLEA after they were found aboard a go-fast vessel containing drugs in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ. 104 F.4th at 818. On appeal, the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the MDLEA as ap- plied to them under the Felonies Clause, which “bestows on Con- gress . . . the power to define and punish felonies committed on the high Seas.” Id. at 818–20 (quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. They specifically argued, in relevant part, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion over their case because a country’s EEZ was not part of the “high seas.” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 820. We rejected the defendants’ arguments, noting that “[w]e repeatedly have upheld the MDLEA as a valid exercise of Con- gress’s power to define and punish . . . [f]elonies on the high Seas.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We held that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause” and explained that “[n]othing about the modern EEZ as defined by customary international law disturbs in any way the Founding era concept of the term ‘high seas’ that informed the original meaning of the Felonies Clause.” Id. at 823, 826. We thus held that a nation’s EEZ is “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause,” and thus, “enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper.” Id. at 823, 827. We reaffirmed this holding in Canario-Vilomar, in which the appellants pursued the three arguments that the Defendants assert USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 8 of 9

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in the instant appeal. See 128 F.4th at 1378–79. Relying on Alfonso, we concluded that Congress was not constrained by international law in crafting the MDLEA and rejected the argument “that Con- gress could not reach [the appellant] merely because he chose to traffic drugs in Colombia’s EEZ rather than farther out into the open ocean.” Id. at 1381–82. Additionally, we rejected the argument “that the MDLEA’s definition of a vessel without nationality—specifically, the inclu- sion of vessels for which a claimed nation can neither confirm nor deny registration—is ultra vires.” Id. at 1381. Relying on Alfonso’s holding that the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary inter- national law, we reasoned “that international law cannot limit Congress’s authority to define a ‘stateless vessel’ for purposes of the MDLEA,” such that the appellants’ argument was foreclosed, even though prior cases had not addressed this precise issue. Id. Finally, we concluded that the argument that “the MDLEA violate[d] principles of due process” by allowing “the United States to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals for conduct that bears no nexus with the United States” was “plainly foreclosed by our binding precedent. . . .” Id. at 1382–83. In so holding, we empha- sized that we “ha[d] explained repeatedly” that “the conduct pro- scribed by the MDLEA need not have a nexus to the United States because universal and protective principles support its extraterrito- rial reach.” Id. at 1383 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2014)) (brackets omitted). USCA11 Case: 22-11929 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 9 of 9

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Here, under our prior precedent rule, we are bound to fol- low Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar, as they have not been overruled, or undermined to the point of abrogation, by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1163 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Morales, 987 F.3d 966, 976 (11th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, because our binding precedent fore- closes the Defendants’ constitutional challenges to the MDLEA, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying their mo- tion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the Defendants’ convictions.