United States v. Nichols

661 F. Supp. 507, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4540
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedJune 3, 1987
DocketG87-18-04-Cr.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 661 F. Supp. 507 (United States v. Nichols) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Nichols, 661 F. Supp. 507, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4540 (W.D. Mich. 1987).

Opinion

OPINION

ENSLEN, District Judge.

On March 12, 1987, defendant Larry Nichols, together with the other defendants *508 in the above-captioned case, was indicted by a federal grand jury for the Western District of Michigan. The indictment charges one count of conspiracy and four counts of violations of the Weapons Registration and Sales Act. On March 30, 1987, defendant Nichols was arraigned before the Honorable Stephen W. Karr, United States Magistrate for the Western District of Michigan, at which time a plea of not guilty was entered. Defendant was then placed on bond.

The matter is presently before the Court on defendant Nichols’ motion for a psychiatric examination to determine competency. In his prayer for relief, defendant also asks for a hearing to determine competency after the Court receives the psychiatric report.

In support of his motion, defendant relies on United States v. Geier, 521 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.1975). In Geier, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the standard for granting a motion for psychiatric examination is different from the test of competency to stand trial. The Sixth Circuit went on to analyze the procedural steps accompanying the granting of a motion for a psychiatric examination as a prerequisite for the judicial determination of mental incompetency pursuant to a hearing after arrest and before trial under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (current version of § 4241). See generally, chapter 313, Mental Defectives, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 et seq. 1

Section 401 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 indicates that Title IV may be cited as the “Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1983” (hereinafter the “Act”). The Act amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 Pub.L. No. 98-473, 403(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2057-68. For example, chapter 313 is now entitled “Offenders With Mental Disease or Defect.” Section 4241 is presently captioned “determination of mental competency to stand trial.” Analogues of the relevant provisions of section 4241 now under discussion, were formerly found in 18 U.S.C. § 4244, captioned “mental competency after arrest and before trial.” It was the provisions found in § 4244 which the Sixth Circuit had occasion to discuss in Geier.

In Geier, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the provisions of § 4244 calling attention to the procedural steps involved in granting a defendant’s post-arrest motion for a psychiatric examination prior to the court’s determining the competency of a defendant to stand trial. 2 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that there is basically a three-step process involved in the proper application of [former] section 4244 [now § 4241(a)].

Chapter 313 of title 18 dealing with the procedures federal courts are to follow with respect to offenders suffering from a mental disease or defect has been significantly modified and its scope broadened since Geier. It was necessary to completely amend sections 4241 et seq. in part to accommodate a definition of insanity which significantly narrowed the definition that had been evolving in federal case law. 3

*509 Under the new statutory scheme, motions for a psychiatric examination and motions for a hearing to determine the pre-trial competency of a defendant pursuant to § 4241 are still related, yet they now maintain more of an independent identity. Still, mutatis mutandis, the Sixth Circuit’s three-part paradigm as set forth in Geier provides a useful analytical structure as well as practical guidance for the court in addressing motions for a psychiatric examination and a competency hearing.

Relying on Geier, defendant argues that when a motion is made for a psychiatric examination, the trial court “should ” grant it if the standard set forth in the statute [18 U.S.C. § 4241(b)] is satisfied. Defendant’s Brief at 2. Given the plain language of the statute, the Court notes that the defendant’s operative word “should” is properly precatory since the mandatory “shall” has been deleted from the section with respect to psychiatric examinations. 4 While defendant has brought his motion for a psychiatric examination under § 4241(a), the current version of the relevant section, defendant relies upon the Geier court’s analysis of former § 4244 for support.

Defendant has to some degree confused and conflated the current prerequisites which mandate that the Court grant a motion for a competency hearing with the former requirements for a motion of a psychiatric examination — the granting of the latter motion is now in the Court’s discretion. Defendant's apparent confusion is understandable. While under the present statutory scheme defendant can make both *510 motions pursuant to 4241(a), the language of the statute makes those motions somewhat less interdependent than they were under the former scheme. For example, the statute indicates that a court may now consider the motion for a competency hearing prior to its taking up the motion for a psychiatric or psychological examination.

Moreover, because significant changes were made in chapter 313, pre-Act case law is not always on point in interpreting the new and/or the amended sections. Further, while a growing number of reported cases have noted that section 4241 et seq. was amended in 1984 by P.L. 98-473, few have carefully analyzed the differences in the amended section and none has had occasion to discuss the amended sections in the context of deciding motions to compel psychiatric testimony and/or motions for a hearing to determine competency. 5

While section 4241(a) now mandates that the court grant a motion for a hearing to determine competency if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant presently meets the statutory standard of incompetency, it leaves it in the court’s discretion whether or not to order a psychiatric or psychological examination prior to the hearing — even if the court grants defendant’s motion for a hearing to determine competency. The Court essentially agrees with defendant, however, that where the standard has been met, the court should, in most instances, order a psychiatric or psychological examination.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
661 F. Supp. 507, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4540, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-nichols-miwd-1987.