United States v. Newton

48 F. 218, 1891 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Iowa
DecidedNovember 17, 1891
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 48 F. 218 (United States v. Newton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Newton, 48 F. 218, 1891 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160 (S.D. Iowa 1891).

Opinion

Siiiras, J.

By section 5440 of the Revised Statutes it is enacted that—

“If two or more persons conspire, either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner, or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable,” etc.

Section 4002 provides the method by which the compensation to be paid to railway companies for the transportation of mail matter is to be ascertained, the average weight of the matter transported being the controlling factor; and, for the purpose of ascertaining such weight, it is enacted that the average weight is to be ascertained by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than 80, and at such times as the postmaster general may direct, but not less frequently than once in four years.

In the indictment now under consideration it is charged that John C. Newton was, at the times therein named, the vice-president and general manager of the Des Moines & Kansas City Railway Company, a corporation engaged in operating a line of railway from Des Moines, Iowa, to Cainsville, Mo., and over which line the public mails of the United [219]*219States were mid are transported: that, for the purpose of ascertaining and fixing the rate of compensation to be paid by the United States to said railway company for the transportation of tho mails over its lino of road from and after July 1, 1891, the proper officers of the postal department ordered that the mail matter passing over the line of said railway should be weighed for 30 successive working days from aud after April 1, 1891, and that such weighing was done in accordance with such lawful order, and for tho purpose aforesaid; that the defendants w'ell knew that such weighing of the mails was about to be made for the purposes aforesaid, and, for the purpose of deceiving the officials of the United States having charge of such weighing of the mails, and for tho purpose of defrauding the United States by falsely causing it to appear that the average weight of mail matter transported over such line of railway was largely in excess of the actual average amount usually carried over such road, and thereby causing the United States to pay to said railway company a eompensatioii largely in excess of the amount actually earned, the said defendants did conspire together to defraud tho United States, by sending, and causing to be sent, over such line of railway, during the days the mail matter thereon was being weighed, alargo amount of old newspapers, periodicals, and other like materials, weighing many hundred pounds; the same being so sent, not for the purpose of being delivered to the parties to whom it was addressed, for their use and benefit, but solely that it might bo weighed during transportation, and thus fraudulently increase the weight of mail matter for which the company would bo paid after the transportation of such material had ceased. To this indictment a demurrer has been filed upon several grounds, the principal one being that the object of the conspiracy is not shown to bo criminal, under the laws of the United States, nor is it made to appear that tho means made use of or contemplated in the carrying out of the conspiracy were in themselves criminal.

A very able argument has been made by the counsel for the defendants in support of tho propositions that to make out a case of indictable conspiracy to defraud the United States, under the provisions of section 5440, above cited, it must appear that the object of the conspiracy is to accomplish some act which the law’s of the United Slates declare to be a crime or fraud; that it is not competent for the court or jury to define the acts which, if brought about, or attempted to be brought about, by means of a combination or conspiracy, will constitute a crime under this section, as being a criminal fraud; that to constitute a crime it must ap-licar that when tho acts complained of were done there was in existence a statute forbidding the doing thereof; that it cannot be supposed that congress, in enacting tho general terms found in section 5440, relative to a conspiracy to defraud the United Slates, meant to declare that all acis which a jury might find would work a fraud upon the United States were therefore to Lie deemed crimes, and to be punishable as such, but that tho true construction of the section is to hold that the same forbids and punishes all conspiracies io commit any offense against the United States, — -that is, a conspiracy to do an act, which, if done, would itself be [220]*220a violation of the criminal laws of the United States, — and further, all conspiracies to do acts or accomplish results which are forbidden by the statutes of the United States, and whicli, if done or accomplished, would defraud the United States in any manner, or for any purpose. In support of these views are cited, among others, State v. Jones, 13 Iowa, 269; State v. Potter, 28 Iowa, 555; State v. Stevens, 30 Iowa, 391; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; U. S. v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531; In re Wolf, 27 Fed. Rep. 606; U. S. v. Watson, 17 Fed. Rep. 145.

Without entering upon a specific discussion of the general propositions thus advocated by counsel 'for defendants, we may say that we do not concur in the practical conclusions sought to be based thereon. We have cited so far only the provisions of section 5440, because counsel assume that the same constitute the only foundation for the present indictment; but this is not. the logical result of the very line of reasoning employed by counsel in support of the general propositions already stated. If the object sought to be accomplished by the'alleged conspiracy to defraud is declared to be a punishable crime by any section of the statute of the United States, then counsel admit that, under section 5440, an indictment charging a conspiracy to defraud the United States by means of some act, which, if done, would be thus punishable, is sustainable, it being also charged that some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy has been done. What then, in fact, does the indictment aver was the object of the conspiracy charged against the defendants? Briefly stated, the object of the conspiracy is averred to be the aiding the D.es Moines & Kansas City Railroad Company in obtaining payment from the United States of a false and fraudulent claim for services in transporting the public mails over the line of its railway. The means by which it was proposed to accomplish this end are fully set forth in the indictment, and the statement of the means employed show that, if they had been permitted to work out their intended and natural consequences, there would have been obtained from the United States the payment of a false and fraudulent claim, — false, because it would have included a large amount never earned, and fraudulent, because such amount had been intentionally increased by the nefarious means set forth in the indictment.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
48 F. 218, 1891 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-newton-iasd-1891.