United States v. New York

690 F. Supp. 1201, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6927
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJuly 13, 1988
DocketNo. CIV-88-138C
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 690 F. Supp. 1201 (United States v. New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. New York, 690 F. Supp. 1201, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6927 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).

Opinion

CURTIN, Chief Judge.

Pending is the motion of defendants to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1) on the ground that plaintiff lacks standing to bring the action and has failed to comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites of 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(2)(B).

The complaint alleges a violation of Civil Rights of the Institutionalized Persons Act [CRIPA]. Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff has failed to satisfy certain procedural prerequisites before commencing Litigation under this Act. Specifically, defendants state the CRIPA requires the Attorney General of the United States under section 1997b(a)(2)(B) to require the State to correct the alleged condition through informal conferences and to voluntarily remedy unacceptable conditions before suit is brought.

The complaint, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997b, et seq., CRIPA, alleges in general terms that the inpatients at the Buffalo Psychiatric Hospital [BPC] of the State of New York’s Office of Mental Health are deprived of rights secured to them by the United States Constitution.

The facts underlying the motion are not in serious dispute and are set forth in detail in the motion brought by the Attorney General to dismiss. There, the correspondence between the State and Federal officials is set forth, as well as a record of meetings which were held between the representatives of the State and the Department of Justice [DOJ].

For the purpose of this motion, the essential facts may be summarized as fol[1202]*1202lows.1 In January, 1986, William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, wrote to Governor Mario M. Cuomo of New York, advising him that the DOJ intended to commence a CRIPA investigation of the BPC (Exh. A). An official of the State Office of Mental Health replied, saying that arrangements would be made for a visit to the Center (Exh. B).

Six months later, two consultants from the DOJ toured the BPC. About eight months later, in February (see Exh. C), of 1987, the Assistant Attorney General wrote to the Governor advising that the DOJ had concluded that unconstitutional conditions existed at the BPC (Exh. C). In general terms, the report criticized the BPC for seriously inadequate care, deficient medical practices, misuse of seclusion, and unsafe environmental conditions. The Assistant Attorney General proposed that the State enter into a consent decree which would require remedial measures and agreed to meet with State officials on April 15, 1988 in Albany, New York to discuss this situation. The DOJ confirmed the meeting in a letter of March 24, 1987, repeating that “a legally binding and judicially enforceable agreement” was the procedural device favored by the DOJ (Exh. D).

The day before the meeting, State counsel received a copy of the proposed consent decree (Exh. E). See Appendix A. At the meeting, State officials expressed their concern over the vagueness of the proposed decree and said that it would retain consultants to review conditions at the BPC (Ex. F).

In June, 1987 the DOJ again wrote to the State insisting that it was the DOJ’s position that “a consent decree provides the best vehicle for remedying conditions at BPC” (Exh. I). In response, Paul Litwak, counsel for the Office of Mental Health of New York State, stated that he thought the matter could be settled probably through entry of a consent decree, but since information was still being gathered, he believed settlement discussions were premature (Exh. J).

In September, 1987 the State informed DOJ of its plan to make a number of substantive changes at the BPC. The State asked the DOJ to submit the plan to the DOJ’s experts for review and comment, but there was no response made to that request (Exh. N). In November, 1987 the State provided DOJ with additional information concerning their plan to upgrade facilities at BPC (Exh. L). A second letter was sent by the State in November, 1987 giving further information about the State’s remedial plan (Exh. O). A meeting was held on November 20, 1987, at which the information was discussed. At that meeting, the DOJ continued to insist that a consent decree be entered into.

In a December 14, 1987 letter to DOJ (Exh. P) the State pointed out that:

your continued insistence upon a consent decree as the only acceptable method of resolving this matter is very troublesome. In my opinion, it is inconsistent not only with the spirit of the CRIPA legislation, but also with the terms of the meeting held November 19 with Mr. Reynolds and his associates. I am not able at this point to commit to entering a decree; however, we are eager to continue our discussions and we do not rule out a decree as the ultimate outcome of this process. At the same time, I urge you to consider alternative forms of concluding this matter, such as a Rule 41 voluntary stipulation of dismissal which was suggested at the November 20 meeting by [New York State] Assistant Attorney General Doug Cream.
While I have tried to provide you with as much information as possible, you or your consultants may have additional questions. If so, please give me a call as soon as practicable so that we may continue these discussions.

(Exh. P).

No response was made by the DOJ until January 29, 1988. At that time, the DOJ wrote to the State stating that it continued to be amenable to discussion of a settlement, but that it remained the DOJ’s “strong preference to settle this case by [1203]*1203consent decree.” That letter was signed on the same day as the complaint in this action. The certificate of the Attorney General, a prerequisite to commencement of an action under CRIPA, had been signed on January 25, 1988, four days earlier.

FACTS

This lawsuit was filed on February 5, 1988. On the same date a press release was issued by the DOJ (Exh. R). The release announced that a civil suit was filed charging the State of New York with depriving 700 residents of the BPC of their constitutional rights and adequate medical care and treatment. The news report concluded that the facility had been under investigation by the Justice Department since January, 1986 and had been visited by independent experts and Civil Rights Division attorneys. It said that the Governor had been informed of the findings in February of 1987 and since that time the DOJ had sought to negotiate a consent decree to correct the alleged unconstitutional conditions to which the residents are subjected. In the press release no mention was made of the additions to staff and other changes at BPC which have been reflected in the affidavits filed by the Attorney General of the State of New York in support of its motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

42 U.S.C. § 1997a provides that whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any state is subjecting persons confined to an institution in that state to conditions which violate their constitutional rights, the Attorney General may institute a civil action to obtain a suitable remedy.

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Related

United States v. Pennsylvania
863 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1994)
United States v. State of Ill.
803 F. Supp. 1338 (N.D. Illinois, 1992)
United States v. Illinois
803 F. Supp. 1338 (N.D. Illinois, 1992)
United States v. State of NY
690 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. New York, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
690 F. Supp. 1201, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6927, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-new-york-nyed-1988.