United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

52 F. Supp. 681, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1957
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedDecember 11, 1943
DocketCr. 10512
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 52 F. Supp. 681 (United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 52 F. Supp. 681, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1957 (N.D. Tex. 1943).

Opinion

ATWELL, District Judge.

On November 25, 1942, the indictment was returned. It contains thirty-four pages and has two counts.

On February 13, 1943, demurrers and dilatory pleas were presented.

After argument and consideration, I rendered an oral opinion which sustained certain objections and dismissed the bill.

The Circuit Court of Appeals, in 137 F.2d 459, 462, by a divided court, reversed that action as to all defendants except Business Organizations and Carl Byoir, and the Supreme Court, 64 S.Ct. 191, refusing to review, the cause is before me on motions to strike and to particularize, filed since the mandate was received on November 26, 1943.

In the Circuit Court majority opinion it is stated that, “We agree with the district judge * * * that there are many allegations in the indictment which are irrelevant and unnecessary to the charging of the offense and which, if not designed to be, are in fact inflammatory and prejudicial, and that the defendants are entitled to relief against them. We think it clear, however, that the necessary relief from their effect may be accorded without dismissing the indictment and requiring a reindictment and that it was error for the court to quash the indictment and dismiss it for this ground.”

The court then continued, “While, therefore, defendants are entitled to be relieved against and protected from all the allegations of the indictment, which, going beyond the legitimate office of pleading to bring forward relevant background, are inflammatory and prejudicial, they are not entitled, because of inflammatory allegations, to the relief of dismissal of the indictment, or to have excluded, from the jury facts as to the group setup, which are relevant to and have bearing upon the conspiracy charged.” Citing Ralston v. Cox, 5 Cir., 123 F.2d 196; Johnson v. United States, 5 Cir., 124 F.2d 101.

This court is bounden to accept the majority opinion as the law of this case. [682]*682So the question arises as to what is to be deleted.

Such an action is entirely different from the sustaining of an exception to the presence of a defendant, or, to the insufficiency of an entire count, or, to the ordering of a verdict of not guilty for someone charged. Here the court must run the risk of seeking to perform a major operation on an indictment which has been returned by a grand jury, and without which inflammatory and prejudicial matter it might never have been returned. The indictment is what the grand jury found to be a violation of the law, when this court and the Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that there are many statements in the indictment which are not at all in violation, and are highly prejudicial and inflammatory. Garrett v. United States, 5 Cir., 17 F.2d 479; Stewart v. District Court, 9 Cir., 16 F.2d 863.

In the opinion which went up for review, there were eleven pages of inflammatory and prejudicial matter set out. The majority opinion approves some allegations, apparently, which relate to size, and which give statistics as to other organizations in the same field. These allegations contrast chain-operated and independent stores, both as to number and earnings. The words of the indictment in these respects should really be given in order that the student can appreciate their enormity.

The statute is brief, concise, and easily understood. It only penalizes and makes unlawful every contract or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The maker of the contract, his stature, and, even ability to carry forward his conspiracy, are thought to be immaterial.

That which is immaterial, when calculated to work upon the minds of the triers of the facts to the extent that they sit as guardians of the small and struggling, rather than as the punishers of the one who has been unlawful, is an appealing and tempting territory which ought not to be opened for the wandering of the fact judges. That which is in the indictment can be argued before the jury. Evidence can be offered to show that the defendants, prior to 1940, limited their sales to a billion dollars annually, but in December 1940 that policy was abandoned.

On the other hand, a stricken allegation may have been regular, yet the prosecution has no remedy, because, the trial goes forward on the reformed indictment. An error - in reforming may be advantaged by the defendants but not by the prosecution.

With those general observations to caution, guide and assist, let us study these motions.

Sub-division (a) is to eliminate irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial allegations; (b) for particulars as to certain allegations ;l (c) for particulars as to impounded documents.

The first appeal is granted as to all of sub-division 10 of paragraph 4, as shown' on page 9, of the indictment, except the first sentence, which is as follows: “In 1939 there were about 387,337 grocery and combination stores, including super-markets, in the United States with sales of $7,721,-753.000. 00, or about 70% of the food sales of all food stores in the United States.”

As to sub-division 14 of paragraph 4, sentence (a) on page 10, is stricken. Also that portion of (g) beginning with the word, “reclamation,” and ending with the word, “stores,” in the sentence next preceding the last sentence of that division.

In paragraph 4, sub-division 16, page 14, all is deleted except the first sentence, to-wit: “In 1914 A. & P. operated 585 stores and had sales of $31,000,000.00; in 1930 there were 15,737 stores with sales of $1,~ 065.807.000. 00.”

The last sentence in sub-division 19 of paragraph 4, page 18, “While there are inherent stock losses in all retail food stores, there have been stock gains in A. & P. stores of millions of dollars annually,” is deleted.

That portion of sub-division 23 of paragraph 4, immediately preceding sub-division 24 of paragraph 4, reading, “By the systematic practice of secretly enhancing their actual prices above their advertised prices through short-changing, short-weighing and marking up prices on store tags and purchases,” is stricken.

Under sub-division 23 of paragraph 4, that part on page 23 labeled (g), and reading, “By demanding discounts and allowances for so-called floor space rentals, store sales service, feature payments, label and container allowances, sign space rentals, and mass displays, for pretended services rendered to suppliers, but in reality performed in the ordinary course of selling the defendants’ own merchandise at retail,' and so-called special newspaper supplement space sales and special circular supplement [683]*683sales in which defendants advertise only their own merchandise for sale,” is stricken.

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Related

United States v. Byoir
58 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Texas, 1945)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
52 F. Supp. 681, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1957, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-new-york-great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-txnd-1943.