United States v. New England S. S. Co.

297 F. 651, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1064
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 15, 1923
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 297 F. 651 (United States v. New England S. S. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. New England S. S. Co., 297 F. 651, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).

Opinion

MACK, Circuit Judge.

While the United States steamship New Hampshire was at anchor in Newport Harbor, between 4 and 5 a. m., July 7, 1912, the steamship Commonwealth collided with her. She was exonerated by a naval court of inquiry. The government then libeled the steamship Commonwealth to recover its damages; and by virtue of a special act of Congress, the material part of which is quoted below,1 the New England Steamship Company libeled the government to recover its damages.

[653]*653Judge Hough, holding both vessels at fault, referred the causes to E. E. Owen, Esq.,- as commissioner, to ascertain and report the damages. _ The commissioner rendered his report, dated February 2, 1922, finding, per stipulation, the damages of the Commonwealth in the sum of $59,761.23, and holding that interest was allowable upon the several items that malee up this total. He further found damages of the United States of America to be as follows:

Total maintenance and care during temporary repairs and navigating the New Hampshire to Brooklyn Navy Yard............. § 2,703.26
Interest from July 14, 1912—
Cost of repairs to New Hampshire at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.... 24,945.57 Interest from October 11, 1912—
Cost of maintenance and care of the New Hampshire while undergoing repairs at the Brooklyn Navy Yard...................... 13,645.001
Interest from October 11,1912—

The second of these items was stipulated: The commissioner reports that counsel for the Commonwealth substantially admitted that something was to be allowed on account of the first and third items. Counsel deny, and the record fails to show such admission. In determining the amount of the damages on these two items, the commissioner held that the United States was entitled to recover for the wages and subsistence of a reasonable number of officers and men on the New Hampshire for her care and maintenance during a reasonable period for repairs, both temporary at Newport and permanent at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and of the necessary number to navigate her from Newport to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, but disallowed the claim of a full complement of officers and men on the New Hampshire from the time of the collision until her arrival at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and for a larger number than he found reasonably necessary during the permanent repairs.

The government’s claim for the use of the Navy Yard dry dock by the New Hampshire, while undergoing repairs, was disallowed on the ground that the government thereby suffered no damage because all the other docks at the yard were unoccupied during this period.

The matter is now up on exceptions and cross-exceptions to the commissioner’s report: By the New England Steamship Company, as owner of the Commonwealth as follows:

(1) In that the commissioner allowed the United States of America to recover as damages $2,703.26, the wages and subsistence of 11 officers and 232 men of the crew of the New Hampshire while she was undergoing temporary repairs and being navigated to the Brooklyn Navy Yard.

(2) In that the commissioner allowed the United States of America to recover as damages $13,645, the wages and subsistence of 8 officers and 62 men of the crew of the New Hampshire, while she was undergoing permanent repairs at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.

By the government as follows:

(1) In that the commissioner erred in allowing interest against the United States upon the amount of damages and expenses of the Commonwealth.

[654]*654(2) In that the commissioner erred in not giving proper weight to and in rejecting the testimony of Capt. Preston, Commander Crosap, arid Lieut. Commander Zimmerman, all of the United States Navy, on the ground that each officer’s estimate of the number of officers and men necessary properly to care for and maintain the battleship New Hampshire while undergoing repairs at the Brooklyn Navy Yard was based on rules and regulations of the Navy Department, instead of irrespective thereof.

(3) In that the commissioner erred in omitting to allow the United States compensation for the usé of its dry dock, in which the New Hampshire was placed while undergoing repairs.

(4) In that the commissioner erred in holding that the government has failed in any manner to maintain its claim for expenses in caring for and preserving the New Hampshire while undergoing .repairs.

1. Interest. The Private Act does not regulate merely the action by the New England Steamship Company; it expressly covers both actions; it provides for judgment or decree either for or against the United States upon the same principles and measure of liability as in like cases in ádmiralty between private parties.

Concededly, if both were private parties, interest would be allowed; the United States asserts its right to interest, but it denies the counter right. In my judgment, if the United States is entitled to interest, then * under the fair construction of the act, a similar right is given to the other party. That the United- States is so entitled has not been and cannot be denied.

There is no similarity to the language of the act considered in Watts v. U. S. ([D. C.] 1904) 129 Fed. 222. While the language of the act in Pennell v. U. S. ([D. C.] 1908) 162 Fed. 75, is nearer, that act did not purport to give mutual rights and remedies by libel and cross-libel; it provided only for an action against the United States. In suits brought in the Court of Claims, the statute expressly prohibits allowance of interest except as therein specifically provided. U. S. v. North American Co. (1920) 253 U. S. 330, 336, 40 Sup. Ct. 518, 64 L. Ed. 935.

2. Dry do eking. The government had five dry docks at the yard; except for the use in question, all were idle during the repairs. While they were not intended for profit in the sense that they were intended to be used by others for commercial purposes, the evidence shows, however, that when suitable commercial docks in the vicinity were unavailable, the Navy Department, twice in the year 1913, permitted private vessels to use tjaem and made a charge therefor. Moreover, the government erected and maintained these docks as a substitute for renting the dry docks of private owners, temporarily or permanently; in that sense their use was commercial. That the New Hampshire was a naval vessel cannot differentiate the case from that of The A. A. Raven (C. C. A. 3, 1916) 231 Fed. 380, 145 C. C. A. 374, in which drydocking charges during the repairs of a government dredge at a government owned yard and dock were allowed. The difficulty in The Conqueror (1897) 166 U. S. 110, 125, 17 Sup. Ct. 510, 41 L. Ed. 937, was primarily that the inconvenience suffered by the owner of a pleasure yacht through temporary deprivation of its use is not measurable; therefore no damages are recoverable. The value of the use of this [655]*655dock is clearly measurable.

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Bluebook (online)
297 F. 651, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1064, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-new-england-s-s-co-nysd-1923.