United States v. Nevell

58 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11728, 1999 WL 552846
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedJuly 30, 1999
DocketCR 99-19-JO
StatusPublished

This text of 58 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (United States v. Nevell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Nevell, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11728, 1999 WL 552846 (D. Or. 1999).

Opinion

*1206 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ROBERT E. JONES, District Judge.

This case involves a confidential and reliable informant (“CRI”), whom the defendant knows. The CRI provided information to the police that led to an issuance of a search warrant. The police searched defendant’s residence and found a marijuana growing operation and seized other incriminating evidence. Defendant argues the search warrant was facially invalid because there was insufficient information provided to establish probable cause. In the alternative, defendant argues that even if probable cause were facially established, omissions of certain facts by the affiant negated probable cause. Defendant argues that because the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights, all the evidence seized must be suppressed.

Summary of Facts

In October 1998, the CRI was arrested in Skagit County, Washington, for vehicle theft. The CRI informed the authorities that defendant Lance Nevell loaned the truck to him. The CRI also stated that he would cooperate with law enforcement and that he had information concerning criminal activity in the Salem area.

Detectives with the Salem Area Inter-agency Narcotics Team (“SAINT”) were contacted by Skagit County and spoke with the CRI. SAINT found the information given by CRI concerning various suspects to be accurate. SAINT was informed by the prosecutor in Skagit County that the case against the CRI was very weak. Because of these difficulties, the charges against the CRI were eventually dismissed in December 1998.

In early November 1998, SAINT detectives drove the CRI from Washington to the Salem area and provided food and lodging. The CRI informed SAINT that he was at defendant’s residence during the prior month and saw a marijuana growing operation there. SAINT detectives verified through their own investigations that defendant had a prior criminal history with narcotics.

While in Salem, the CRI attempted several times to contact defendant and was successful on two occasions. During their conversation, the CRI did not ask about, nor did defendant mention, marijuana. Three days after meeting defendant, the CRI was beaten by several members of the Gypsy Jokers. Defendant was alleged to be one of those who beat the CRI. The next day, the CRI contacted SAINT and was admitted to the hospital. The CRI stated that his assailants wanted to obtain information on his cooperation with law enforcement officials.

Based upon statements and diagrams provided by the CRI and verified through independent investigation, SAINT requested and received a search warrant. Officers executed the search warrant a few days later and found a marijuana growing operation that closely matched the description provided by the CRI. The officers also found a letter signed by defendant which stated that he was raising hybrid marijuana and expected profits of $20,000 from the sale. The letter also mentioned that defendant intended to resume purchasing large amounts of marijuana in Arizona. On April 26, 1999, defendant filed the motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant and requested a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). 1

*1207 Discussion

Defendant argues that: 1) the information provided by the CRI contained in the affidavit does not give rise to probable cause and therefore the search warrant is facially deficient; 2) even if probable cause exists based on the incomplete affidavit, the omitted facts, once included in the affidavit, negates probable cause; 3) a “good faith”0 exception does not apply here; and 4) a Franks hearing is required. The defendant argues because the search warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the evidence seized pursuant to that search must be suppressed.

After reviewing the evidence and considering the arguments presented, I find the facts were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause and the omitted facts would not defeat that finding. I will address defendant’s arguments below.

1. Contention that the Search Warrant Lacked Probable Cause

The standard for determining probable cause from information provided by a CRI is found in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In Gates, the United States Supreme Court stated that:

The rigid “two-pronged test” under Aguilar and Spinelli for determining whether an informant’s tip establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant is abandoned, and the “totality of the circumstances” approach * * * is substituted in its place. * * * The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense .decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 232-240, 103 S.Ct. 2317. In replacing the old Aguilar-Spinelli two prong test, which required both veracity and a basis of knowledge prongs to be satisfied, the Court’s “totality of circumstances” approach allowed a strong showing of one prong to offset a weak showing of another so long as the “totality of circumstances” supports a finding of probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317.

Defendant argues that the information provided in the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause because the CRI did not satisfy the “totality of circumstances” test. I reject this argument because I find the affidavit adequately established the CRTs veracity and basis of knowledge.

SAINT officers went to considerable efforts to verify elements of the CRI’s information that could be verified without a search warrant. The CRI stated that there was a metal-framed shop near the mobile home. He also stated that defendant did not have the utilities or the mobile home registered under his own name. The CRI provided defendant’s unlisted phone number and stated that defendant owned a red Toyota 4-Runner. SAINT was able to corroborate all of this information. 2

Although the CRI’s information that SAINT was able to corroborate was not by itself incriminating, the fact that CRI’s story “checked out” increased the probability that CRI’s incriminating allegations were also accurate. In Gates, the police received an anonymous letter from an informant stating that the defendants were involved in trafficking narcotics from Florida to Illinois. The CRI in Gates provided innocuous information such as the dates and times of defendants’ arrival and departure, alongside incriminating allegations.

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Related

Draper v. United States
358 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1959)
Franks v. Delaware
438 U.S. 154 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Illinois v. Gates
462 U.S. 213 (Supreme Court, 1983)
United States v. Robby Dean Hole
564 F.2d 298 (Ninth Circuit, 1977)
United States v. Joseph Meling
47 F.3d 1546 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
58 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11728, 1999 WL 552846, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-nevell-ord-1999.