United States v. Neeley

675 F. Supp. 2d 655, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120788, 2009 WL 5124864
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedDecember 29, 2009
DocketCase 2:09CR00016
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 675 F. Supp. 2d 655 (United States v. Neeley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Neeley, 675 F. Supp. 2d 655, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120788, 2009 WL 5124864 (W.D. Va. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES P. JONES, Chief Judge.

The defendant objects to proposed modifications of his supervised release, arguing that the restrictions, relating generally to sex offenders, are unreasonable and unrelated to his federal firearm conviction. While I agree that several of the proposed restrictions should not be imposed, others are necessary given the defendant’s prior criminal history.

I

The defendant, Rufus Ezra Neeley, was indicted in the Eastern District of Tennessee on four charges related to his possession of a sawed-off shotgun. 1 Neeley pled *657 guilty to one count of the indictment, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and on December 16, 2003, he was sentenced to 87 months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.

Upon his release from prison, Neeley wished to reside in this judicial district, and his supervision was accepted by this court. Because of his prior state convictions for sexual offenses, a probation officer of this court has filed a petition seeking to modify the conditions of supervision imposed upon Neeley when he was sentenced in 2003.

In 1986, Neeley was convicted by a jury of molesting his eight-year-old daughter and sentenced to three and a half years in prison. In 1995, he was convicted by a jury of inappropriate sexual contact with a ten-year-old girl and sentenced to six years imprisonment. Neeley’s parole from this latter conviction was revoked on two separate occasions because he failed to register as a sex offender and to participate in sex offender counseling. Neeley also has prior convictions for driving while intoxicated and a conviction for soliciting a prostitute. Neeley is now 60 years old.

The present petition seeks to impose upon Neeley additional conditions of supervision as set forth in the so-called Tier III Sex Offender Conditions, a copy of which is attached hereto as an appendix. 2 Among other things, these conditions included a 7 P.M. to 7 A.M. curfew, the prohibition against use or possession of devices that can access the Internet, a ban on the possession of pornography, “erotica,” 3 or sexually oriented material, and mandatory participation in a sex offender treatment program. Under these restrictions, Neeley could not live or directly associate with children under the age of 18, and he could not purchase, possess, or use alcohol.

Neeley objected to the proposed conditions and sought a hearing as to the modification of his supervised release terms. That hearing has been held and for the following reasons, Neeley’s objections will be granted in part and denied in part.

II

Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(2) (West 2000 & Supp.2009), the court may modify the terms of a defendant’s supervised release, after consideration of the normal sentencing factors established by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).

When imposing conditions for supervised release, district courts have broad discretion. United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir.2003). Although these conditions must be reasonably related to the purposes behind sentencing, courts may consider a variety of factors including the nature of the crime, the defendant’s characteristics and criminal history, and the need to protect the public from future crimes. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a); Dotson, 324 F.3d at 260. Special conditions that limit a defendant’s liberty must not involve a greater deprivation than reasonably necessary. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir.2009). While a restriction does not need an “of *658 fense-specific nexus,” it must reasonably relate to the goals of supervised release. United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir.2009). And, the court must adequately explain its reasons for imposing the conditions. Armel, 585 F.3d at 186.

Restrictions upon a defendant’s Internet access during supervised release have been upheld when a defendant has used the Internet in the underlying offense, has a history of using the Internet for illegal conduct, or certain “characteristics of the defendant suggested that such a restriction was warranted.” Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d at 70-71.

Ill

Neeley asserts the proposed modifications should not be imposed because they have no proper relation to his federal firearm conviction. While he objects to any of the proposed conditions, he particularly objects to the imposition of a curfew, the prohibition on access to the Internet, and the ban upon his possession of sexually stimulating material.

I find that the computer-based restrictions and curfew involve a greater deprivation of rights than is reasonably necessary. There is nothing in Neeley’s background that indicates Neeley has engaged in illicit activity on the Internet. Neeley’s prior offenses did not involve Internet activity or computers. Although Neeley disclaims any interest in computers or the Internet, a total prohibition on electronic devices connecting to the Internet is unreasonable. Moreover, the suggested curfew is unreasonable in light of Neeley’s background and his aim of finding employment as a construction worker, which could require reporting to job sites early in the morning.

On the other hand, the restrictions limiting Neeley’s association with children, or individuals who have young children, are reasonable given Neeley’s background and my duty to protect the public from future crimes. Neeley was convicted for molesting young girls and he repeatedly failed to comply with the terms of his parole. Neeley’s criminal history supports the reasonable inference that he poses a genuine threat to children and that he should not be permitted to freely associate with them.

The ban on Neeley’s possession of pornography and sexually stimulating material is also reasonable considering Neeley’s history of sex offenses and his prior behavior toward women. In addition to his child molestation convictions, Neeley was also convicted for soliciting a prostitute. Neeley’s federal conviction stemmed from his alleged threat to kidnap a woman whom he wanted to marry. A ban upon pornographic and sexually stimulating material could aid with Neeley’s rehabilitation and help deter future crimes against women. The condition requiring submission to search will allow enforcement of that ban.

For similar reasons, I also will uphold the prohibition upon Neeley’s use or possession of alcohol. Neeley has three convictions for driving while intoxicated, he has abused marijuana several times, and he has declined substance abuse counseling. Based upon Neeley’s background, it appears that his alcohol abuse may lead him to commit criminal acts. The ban on use or possession of alcohol provides a deterrent against future criminal conduct by Neeley and serves to protect others.

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Bluebook (online)
675 F. Supp. 2d 655, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120788, 2009 WL 5124864, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-neeley-vawd-2009.