F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 9 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT __________________________ PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4011 (D. Utah) BENITO NAVARETA-MARES, (D.Ct. No. 97-CR-410)
Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Benito Navareta-Mares appeals his conviction and sentence
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. following his conditional guilty plea, and the district court’s decision denying his
motion to suppress. We exercise our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
Following a custodial interview where Mr. Navareta-Mares made
inculpatory statements and gave a sworn statement, the government indicted Mr.
Navareta-Mares for illegal reentry of a deported alien, following conviction of an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Navareta-
Mares moved to suppress his sworn statement and any other statements and
evidence obtained as a result of the interview. He premised his motion primarily
on his young age of twenty years, alleged lack of education, and limited ability to
understand English and Spanish.
Following Mr. Navareta-Mares’ suppression motion, a magistrate judge
conducted an evidentiary hearing. Hearing testimony establishes that while
incarcerated at the Salt Lake City jail, an Immigration and Naturalization Service
Agent conducted a custodial interview with Mr. Navareta-Mares in Spanish. 1
1 Mr. Navareta-Mares’ incarceration in the Salt Lake City jail resulted from charges unrelated to those at issue here. Hearing testimony shows that prior to the interview, Agent Slaybaugh conducted an internal record check and discovered authorities previously deported Mr. Navareta-Mares’ to Mexico following his conviction for an aggravated felony and illegal reentry into this country.
-2- During the interview, Agent Gary Slaybaugh wore civilian clothes and did not
carry a weapon (id. at 12). No guards were in the room, and Mr. Navareta-Mares
was unrestrained and never handcuffed. Prior to asking Mr. Navareta-Mares any
questions, Agent Slaybaugh advised him of his Miranda 2 rights in Spanish reading
from Immigration and Naturalization form I-214. According to Agent Slaybaugh,
Mr. Navareta-Mares appeared to understand his rights prior to his signing the
waiver section of the form.
Following this waiver, Agent Slaybaugh asked Mr. Navareta-Mares
questions from Immigration and Naturalization form I-213 concerning his name,
birth place, country of citizenship, when he entered the United States, the status
of his entry, and status when found. In answering these questions, Mr. Navareta-
Mares implicated his unlawful reentry into the United States. Agent Slaybaugh
then took a sworn statement from Mr. Navareta-Mares using an Immigration and
Naturalization form entitled “Record of Sworn Statement,” which Mr. Navareta-
Mares signed. This form contains language that the statement given can be used
against the defendant “in any administrative proceeding,” but contains no
language addressing its use in a court of law. During the interview, Agent
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-3- Slaybaugh saw no evidence Mr. Navareta-Mares was physically debilitated or
confused. Although both Agent Slaybaugh and Mr. Navareta-Mares wore cloth
masks due to Mr. Navareta-Mares’ quarantine for possible tuberculosis, both later
testified they understood each other. At the evidentiary hearing, the Spanish
interpreter stated on the record that Mr. Navareta-Mares did not appear to have
any problem understanding, speaking or reading Spanish.
Based on the pleadings and evidence obtained at the evidentiary hearing,
the federal magistrate judge issued a recommendation to deny the motion. Based
on this evidence and credibility determinations, the magistrate judge found: (1)
Mr. Navareta-Mares understood the rights being abandoned and the consequences
of abandoning those rights; (2) no intimidation, coercion or deception occurred
during the custodial interview; and Mr. Navareta-Mares knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The magistrate judge also concluded
that the government’s concession it would not seek introduction of the “Record of
Sworn Statement” as evidence in the direct case disposed of any question
regarding its suppression. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and denied Mr. Navareta-Mares’ suppression motion as to the
other statements and evidence. Thereafter, Mr. Navareta-Mares entered a
conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to appeal dismissal of his
-4- suppression motion. The district court sentenced Mr. Navareta-Mares to forty-
one months in prison.
On appeal, Mr. Navareta-Mares claims the district court erred in denying
his suppression motion. He argues he only partially understood Agent Slaybaugh
when he advised him of his Miranda rights because: (1) at the time of the
interview, he was only twenty years old; (2) he had only a ninth grade education;
and (3) “his native language is not English and he only has a limited
understanding of Spanish.” In support, he asserts “he was deceived by an
[Immigration and Naturalization Service] Spanish speaker who advised him of
complex concepts in a language [Spanish] he was not proficient in” and gave him
his Miranda rights “in a foreign language like Spanish.” Finally, Mr. Navareta-
Mares claims the district court must suppress all his statements to Agent
Slaybaugh because those statements merged with his “Record of Sworn
Statement” and, therefore, could only be used in an administrative proceeding,
and not a criminal proceeding.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the district
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the district court’s findings. United States v. Erekson,
-5- 70 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1995). Because Mr. Navareta-Mares claims his
statements were involuntary, we review the issue of voluntariness de novo,
although the trial court’s rulings regarding subsidiary factual questions are subject
to review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Short, 947 F.2d
1445, 1449 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 989 (1992).
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 9 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT __________________________ PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4011 (D. Utah) BENITO NAVARETA-MARES, (D.Ct. No. 97-CR-410)
Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Benito Navareta-Mares appeals his conviction and sentence
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. following his conditional guilty plea, and the district court’s decision denying his
motion to suppress. We exercise our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
Following a custodial interview where Mr. Navareta-Mares made
inculpatory statements and gave a sworn statement, the government indicted Mr.
Navareta-Mares for illegal reentry of a deported alien, following conviction of an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Navareta-
Mares moved to suppress his sworn statement and any other statements and
evidence obtained as a result of the interview. He premised his motion primarily
on his young age of twenty years, alleged lack of education, and limited ability to
understand English and Spanish.
Following Mr. Navareta-Mares’ suppression motion, a magistrate judge
conducted an evidentiary hearing. Hearing testimony establishes that while
incarcerated at the Salt Lake City jail, an Immigration and Naturalization Service
Agent conducted a custodial interview with Mr. Navareta-Mares in Spanish. 1
1 Mr. Navareta-Mares’ incarceration in the Salt Lake City jail resulted from charges unrelated to those at issue here. Hearing testimony shows that prior to the interview, Agent Slaybaugh conducted an internal record check and discovered authorities previously deported Mr. Navareta-Mares’ to Mexico following his conviction for an aggravated felony and illegal reentry into this country.
-2- During the interview, Agent Gary Slaybaugh wore civilian clothes and did not
carry a weapon (id. at 12). No guards were in the room, and Mr. Navareta-Mares
was unrestrained and never handcuffed. Prior to asking Mr. Navareta-Mares any
questions, Agent Slaybaugh advised him of his Miranda 2 rights in Spanish reading
from Immigration and Naturalization form I-214. According to Agent Slaybaugh,
Mr. Navareta-Mares appeared to understand his rights prior to his signing the
waiver section of the form.
Following this waiver, Agent Slaybaugh asked Mr. Navareta-Mares
questions from Immigration and Naturalization form I-213 concerning his name,
birth place, country of citizenship, when he entered the United States, the status
of his entry, and status when found. In answering these questions, Mr. Navareta-
Mares implicated his unlawful reentry into the United States. Agent Slaybaugh
then took a sworn statement from Mr. Navareta-Mares using an Immigration and
Naturalization form entitled “Record of Sworn Statement,” which Mr. Navareta-
Mares signed. This form contains language that the statement given can be used
against the defendant “in any administrative proceeding,” but contains no
language addressing its use in a court of law. During the interview, Agent
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-3- Slaybaugh saw no evidence Mr. Navareta-Mares was physically debilitated or
confused. Although both Agent Slaybaugh and Mr. Navareta-Mares wore cloth
masks due to Mr. Navareta-Mares’ quarantine for possible tuberculosis, both later
testified they understood each other. At the evidentiary hearing, the Spanish
interpreter stated on the record that Mr. Navareta-Mares did not appear to have
any problem understanding, speaking or reading Spanish.
Based on the pleadings and evidence obtained at the evidentiary hearing,
the federal magistrate judge issued a recommendation to deny the motion. Based
on this evidence and credibility determinations, the magistrate judge found: (1)
Mr. Navareta-Mares understood the rights being abandoned and the consequences
of abandoning those rights; (2) no intimidation, coercion or deception occurred
during the custodial interview; and Mr. Navareta-Mares knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The magistrate judge also concluded
that the government’s concession it would not seek introduction of the “Record of
Sworn Statement” as evidence in the direct case disposed of any question
regarding its suppression. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and denied Mr. Navareta-Mares’ suppression motion as to the
other statements and evidence. Thereafter, Mr. Navareta-Mares entered a
conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to appeal dismissal of his
-4- suppression motion. The district court sentenced Mr. Navareta-Mares to forty-
one months in prison.
On appeal, Mr. Navareta-Mares claims the district court erred in denying
his suppression motion. He argues he only partially understood Agent Slaybaugh
when he advised him of his Miranda rights because: (1) at the time of the
interview, he was only twenty years old; (2) he had only a ninth grade education;
and (3) “his native language is not English and he only has a limited
understanding of Spanish.” In support, he asserts “he was deceived by an
[Immigration and Naturalization Service] Spanish speaker who advised him of
complex concepts in a language [Spanish] he was not proficient in” and gave him
his Miranda rights “in a foreign language like Spanish.” Finally, Mr. Navareta-
Mares claims the district court must suppress all his statements to Agent
Slaybaugh because those statements merged with his “Record of Sworn
Statement” and, therefore, could only be used in an administrative proceeding,
and not a criminal proceeding.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the district
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the district court’s findings. United States v. Erekson,
-5- 70 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1995). Because Mr. Navareta-Mares claims his
statements were involuntary, we review the issue of voluntariness de novo,
although the trial court’s rulings regarding subsidiary factual questions are subject
to review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Short, 947 F.2d
1445, 1449 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 989 (1992). We note waiver
of a constitutional right “must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege,” which depends on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). This includes examination of Mr.
Naraveta-Mares’ characteristics such as his age, intelligence, and education, and
the details of the interrogation, such as whether he was informed of his rights, the
length of his detention and interrogation, and the use of threat of physical force.
See United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 1096 (1999).
In this case, Mr. Navareta-Mares’ primary contentions are premised on his
inability to understand Spanish. A review of the record establishes Mr. Navareta-
Mares is a Hispanic male, born, raised and educated through the ninth grade in
Mexico. He is a Mexican citizen whose parents, common-law wife and children
-6- reside in Mexico. He admits he “was raised speaking, understanding Spanish, not
English.” He also admitted he understood Agent Slaybaugh who conducted their
interview in Spanish, and who in turn testified Mr. Navareta-Mares appeared to
fully understand his questions. Finally, at the evidentiary hearing, the Spanish
interpreter stated on the record Mr. Navareta-Mares did not have any problem
understanding, speaking or reading Spanish.
Under these facts, we find Mr. Navareta-Mares’ unsupported allegations
that his waiver and statements were involuntary, unintelligent and unknowing
because of his inability to understand Spanish incredulous, if not outrageous, and
unsupported by the record. Such conclusory allegations and incredible
contentions, unsupported by specifics, are subject to summary dismissal. See
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). We further note Mr. Navareta-
Mares never advises what, if any, language he is proficient in other than Spanish,
thereby reinforcing the determination that Spanish is his first and only language.
To the extent Mr. Navareta-Mares is somehow claiming he is not proficient in
Spanish because of an abnormally limited vocabulary, he has not demonstrated
facts sufficient to support this claim. See, e.g., Schildan v. Gladden, 426 F.2d
1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding twenty-seven-year old with brain damage had
extremely limited vocabulary and understanding of every-day language).
-7- As to his age and education, an examination of the record provides no
evidence showing he failed to understand Agent Slaybaugh, the rights he was
abandoning, or the consequences of that abandonment. To the contrary, the great
weight of the hearing evidence supports the district court’s determination that he
fully understood the nature and ramifications of his waiver and statements. Thus,
his conclusory remarks as to being only twenty years old and having only a ninth
grade education, alone, without further support, are insufficient to establish his
waiver and statements were involuntary, unintelligent or unknowing. See
Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74.
Finally, nothing in the record supports Mr. Navareta-Mares’ claims that his
statements, made prior to his “Record of Sworn Statement,” were somehow
merged and, therefore, could not be used during his criminal prosecution. The
record shows Agent Slaybaugh never advised Mr. Navareta-Mares any of his
statements, made prior to his “Record of Sworn Statement,” would not be used to
prosecute him. To the contrary, Mr. Navareta-Mares testified Agent Slaybaugh
advised him his statements could be used against him in a court of law. As such,
the district court properly allowed admission of all Mr. Navareta-Mares’
statements made before he signed the “Record of Sworn Statement.” The fact this
-8- document contained language that it could be used for administrative purposes did
not limit use of his other statements at his criminal prosecution. 3
Under these circumstances, Mr. Navareta-Mares’ claims must fail. For the
reasons stated, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Mr. Navareta-
Mares’ motion to suppress, and Mr. Navareta-Mares’ judgment and sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge
3 Because the issue of whether the prosecution may use the Record of Sworn Statement is not directly before us, we decline to comment on its admissibility.
-9-