United States v. Nai Fook Li

949 F. Supp. 42, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19503, 1996 WL 752881
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedDecember 13, 1996
DocketCriminal Action 96-10255-REK
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 949 F. Supp. 42 (United States v. Nai Fook Li) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Nai Fook Li, 949 F. Supp. 42, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19503, 1996 WL 752881 (D. Mass. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER FOR DETENTION OF MATERIAL WITNESSES, CHOU LEE LI, YEN CHIN CHEN, LI ZHONG, NI NU CHANG AND SHAING DIZHU

SWARTWOOD, United States Magistrate Judge.

Background

On November 5, 1996, a Superseding Indictment was returned against Nai Fook Li, Hui Lin, Yiu Ming Ewan, Ju Lin, Ben Lin, Mao Bing Mu and Sang Li (“Defendants”), charging them with conspiracy to cause the illegal immigration of citizens from the Peoples Republic of China (“PRC”) into the United States for profit, with attempting and aiding and abetting in that attempt, with conspiracy to cause the illegal immigration of citizens from the PRC to the United States and attempting to bring illegal aliens into the United States at a place other than a designated port of entry.

The Government alleges that several of the Defendants made arrangements with INS Special Agent Rendon, who was then posing as the owner of a fishing vessel, to off-load aliens from a larger vessel from the PRC and transport them to a Massachusetts port as a means for smuggling them into the United States. • On September 28, 1996, Special Agent Rendon, his crew and one of the Defendants left port in the area of Falmouth, Massachusetts and began their journey toward a rendezvous with a vessel carrying the aliens.

On October 2, 1996, the United States Coast Guard boarded a Chínese cargó ship bearing the name “Xing Da” in international waters. After boarding the Chinese cargo vessel, the Coast Guard reported that over 100 Chinese aliens were on board who were to have been illegally transported to the United States. After the “Xing Da” was boarded by the United States Coast Guard, this vessel was taken to Bermuda, where after a day or so, all aliens on board the “Xing Da” were transported to the United States Military facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where they were interviewed by INS Special Agents. As a result of these INS interviews, it was determined that four passengers from ■the “Xing Da” had information which could be material to the Government’s case. On November 13, 1996, I signed warrants for the arrest of Chou. Lee Li, Yen Chin .Chen, Li Zhong, Ni Nu Chang and Shaing Di Zhu as material .witnesses in a criminal proceeding in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3144. These five potential Government witnesses were then brought before this Court on December 6,1996 for a heaping to determine whether or not they would be detained as material witnesses in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3144 and 3142.

At that hearing, , an Affidavit of INS Special Agent David J. Golden was presented by the Government in support of its request to detain these witnesses.

Detention of Material Witnesses

A material witness may be detained in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3144 to insure *44 his or her appearance at a criminal proceeding. That statute provides as follows:

If it appears from an affidavit filed by a' party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title.. No material witness may be detained because. of inability to comply with any condition of releáse if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

18 U.S.C. § 3144.

“Under the statute, either the government or a criminal defendant can effectuate the detention of a material witness upon a showing that such material witness will, in all likelihood, be unavailable for the criminal proceeding. A material witness may not be detained, however, if a deposition would suffice as an adequate alternative to the witness’ live testimony at the proceeding.” Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir.1992).

This procedure presupposes first, that the material witness is willing to be deposed and second, that admission of the deposition of a material witness’ testimony at trial will be permitted as an alternative to live testimony over the objection of either the Government or the Defendant: Id. Generally, it is not readily apparent to the Court as to whether a material witness is willing to be deposed. For this and other reasons, one of the few circuit courts to address this issue has placed the burden on the witness to file a written motion pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a) requesting that he or she be deposed and released in lieu of detention. Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit has held that a material witness “must file a ‘written motion,’ requesting that he be deposed. The motion must demonstrate that his ‘testimony can adequately be secured by deposition,’ and that ‘further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.’ ” Id. If a material witness refuses to be deposed and it is impracticable to secure the appearance of that witness by subpoena, or if deposition testimony would not serve as an adequate alternative to the witness’s live testimony, than the court must consider the issue of detention in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3142.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (“The Bail Reform Act” or “the Act”), the judicial officer shall order that, pending trial, the Defendant or in this case, a material witness be (1) released on his or her own recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured bond; (2) released on a condition or combination of conditions; (3) temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional release, deportation, or exclusion; or (4) detained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a). Under the Act, as it applies to material witnesses, the judicial officer may detain a person pending trial only if, after a detention hearing held pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), the judicial officer determines that “no condition or combination of conditions [set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 3142

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Bluebook (online)
949 F. Supp. 42, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19503, 1996 WL 752881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-nai-fook-li-mad-1996.