Mr. Justice Lurton
delivered the opinion of the court.
This writ of error is prosecuted by the United States from a judgment sustaining a motion to quash an indictment.
The indictment is founded upon § 5440, Revised Statutes, and charges a conspiracy to defraud the United States by illegally obtaining title to forty contiguous tracts of coal lands in the District of Alaska, aggregating six thousand and eighty-seven acres, collectively known as the Stracey group, and averred to be of the value of ten million dollars.
The indictment is too long to be set out, even in an abbreviated form. The gravamen of the conspiracy chárged is that the defendants induced or procured divers qualified persons to take the several steps required by. law
to make locations of Alaska coal lands, not for themselves, :but as the mere agents or representatives of the defendants for the purpose of securing to two named corporations a larger area of coal land than such corporations could lawfully locate for themselves.
. For the defendants in error it has been very ably urged that since the concededly applicable coal land law gives to every individual, who is of age and a citizen of the United States, the right to make a coal land location for himself, and to assign his location when made, that there can be no fraud if he makes such location in the first instance for the benefit of another competent to buy the location when made. But if the provisions of the general coal land entry láw found in § 2350, Revised Statutes, apply to the entry of coal lands in Alaska, the contention is now no longer an open one under the repeated interpretations of that section found in the cases of
United States
v.
Trinidad Coal Co.,
137 U. S. 160;
United States
v.
Keitel,
211 U. S. 370, and
United States
v.
Forrester,
211 U. S. 399.
The corporations by whose procurement the forty locations by forty different persons were made, under the express terms of the statute referred to, were disqualified from making more than one location each, and being thus disqualified could not make a second location through an agent acting for their use and benefit. Any construction which would permit one prohibited by express command of the law from making more than one entry or location to make other entries or locations through the agency of a third person, qualified to make an entry for himself, wopld be to sanction a device which would nullify the purpose of the restriction.
The result must turn upon whether the restrictive features of § 2350, Revised Statutes, are applicable to the sale of coal lands in Alaska. The ruling of.the court below and the contention made by the defendants in error is that the act of April 28, 1904, 33 Stat., p. 525, c. 1772, is the
only act applicable to the
unsurveyed
coal lands of Alaska. That act will be found sét out in the margin.
It purports to be an amendment of the act of June 6,
1900, 31 Statutes at Large, p. 658, c. 796, which extended to Alaska “so much of the public land laws of the United States ... as relate to coal lands, namely, §§ 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes.” The sections of the general law thus extended to Alaska are set out in the margin.
These.sections came from the act oi March 3, 1873, 17
Statutes at Large, p. 607, c. 279. The only change made is in the substitution in § 2350 of the words, “The three preceding sections shall be held to authorize,” etc., for the words of the fourth section of the original act, reading, “That this act shall be held to authorize,” — a change made necessary because the provisions of the original act are made a part of- a chapter of the general land law embracing the sale of other public lands. The act of 1873, as thus carried into the Revised Statutes, did not permit an entry of coal lands which had not been surveyed. The
entry permitted was only “by legal subdivisions.” The coal lands in Alaska were unsurveyed. Thus it happened that although the act of- June 6, 1900, extended the provisions of the general law to Alaska, that law was for a time inoperative because the coal lands could not be entered “by legal subdivisions,” when no such legal subdivisions existéd. So obviously was this the case that a circular from the Department of the Interior was issued, instructing the registers and Receivers in the district of Alaska that no coal filing nor entry could be filed iii their offices until there should be filed with them “the official plat of survey of the township ” in which entries were sought to be made. This was the situation which brought about the act of April 28, 1904, set out in the margin.
The contention-is that although this act of 1904 expressly provides “that all of the provisions of the coal land laws of the United States not in conflict with the provisions of this act shall continue and be in full force in the district of Alaska,” that the'restrictions in the general coal land law authorizing “only one entry by the same person or association of persons,” etc., is in conflict and therefore not operative to locations authorized by the later legislation.
Prior to the act of 1873, the disposition of coal lands was included in the general provisions regulating the sale of public lands, and under which there were no limitations upon the number of entries one person might make. But in 1873, when Congress sought, to deal with the specific subject of the sale of coal lands, the rule was adopted of confining every qualified entryman to one entry, and every association of persons, not less than four in number and under certain conditions, to the entry of not exceeding six hundred and forty acres. A corporation has been held to be an association of persons within the meaning of this section.
United
States. v.
Trinidad Coal Company,
137 U. S. 160, 169. The policy of this restriction was to pre
vent a monopolization of such coal lands by securing to every citizen the right to obtain for himself one tract, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, of such coal land.
United States
v.
Trinidad Coal Company,
cited above;
United States
v.
Keitel,
211 U. S. 370.
That continued to be the uniform policy of Congress, and so continues, unless a departure has been made by the act of 1904.
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Mr. Justice Lurton
delivered the opinion of the court.
This writ of error is prosecuted by the United States from a judgment sustaining a motion to quash an indictment.
The indictment is founded upon § 5440, Revised Statutes, and charges a conspiracy to defraud the United States by illegally obtaining title to forty contiguous tracts of coal lands in the District of Alaska, aggregating six thousand and eighty-seven acres, collectively known as the Stracey group, and averred to be of the value of ten million dollars.
The indictment is too long to be set out, even in an abbreviated form. The gravamen of the conspiracy chárged is that the defendants induced or procured divers qualified persons to take the several steps required by. law
to make locations of Alaska coal lands, not for themselves, :but as the mere agents or representatives of the defendants for the purpose of securing to two named corporations a larger area of coal land than such corporations could lawfully locate for themselves.
. For the defendants in error it has been very ably urged that since the concededly applicable coal land law gives to every individual, who is of age and a citizen of the United States, the right to make a coal land location for himself, and to assign his location when made, that there can be no fraud if he makes such location in the first instance for the benefit of another competent to buy the location when made. But if the provisions of the general coal land entry láw found in § 2350, Revised Statutes, apply to the entry of coal lands in Alaska, the contention is now no longer an open one under the repeated interpretations of that section found in the cases of
United States
v.
Trinidad Coal Co.,
137 U. S. 160;
United States
v.
Keitel,
211 U. S. 370, and
United States
v.
Forrester,
211 U. S. 399.
The corporations by whose procurement the forty locations by forty different persons were made, under the express terms of the statute referred to, were disqualified from making more than one location each, and being thus disqualified could not make a second location through an agent acting for their use and benefit. Any construction which would permit one prohibited by express command of the law from making more than one entry or location to make other entries or locations through the agency of a third person, qualified to make an entry for himself, wopld be to sanction a device which would nullify the purpose of the restriction.
The result must turn upon whether the restrictive features of § 2350, Revised Statutes, are applicable to the sale of coal lands in Alaska. The ruling of.the court below and the contention made by the defendants in error is that the act of April 28, 1904, 33 Stat., p. 525, c. 1772, is the
only act applicable to the
unsurveyed
coal lands of Alaska. That act will be found sét out in the margin.
It purports to be an amendment of the act of June 6,
1900, 31 Statutes at Large, p. 658, c. 796, which extended to Alaska “so much of the public land laws of the United States ... as relate to coal lands, namely, §§ 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes.” The sections of the general law thus extended to Alaska are set out in the margin.
These.sections came from the act oi March 3, 1873, 17
Statutes at Large, p. 607, c. 279. The only change made is in the substitution in § 2350 of the words, “The three preceding sections shall be held to authorize,” etc., for the words of the fourth section of the original act, reading, “That this act shall be held to authorize,” — a change made necessary because the provisions of the original act are made a part of- a chapter of the general land law embracing the sale of other public lands. The act of 1873, as thus carried into the Revised Statutes, did not permit an entry of coal lands which had not been surveyed. The
entry permitted was only “by legal subdivisions.” The coal lands in Alaska were unsurveyed. Thus it happened that although the act of- June 6, 1900, extended the provisions of the general law to Alaska, that law was for a time inoperative because the coal lands could not be entered “by legal subdivisions,” when no such legal subdivisions existéd. So obviously was this the case that a circular from the Department of the Interior was issued, instructing the registers and Receivers in the district of Alaska that no coal filing nor entry could be filed iii their offices until there should be filed with them “the official plat of survey of the township ” in which entries were sought to be made. This was the situation which brought about the act of April 28, 1904, set out in the margin.
The contention-is that although this act of 1904 expressly provides “that all of the provisions of the coal land laws of the United States not in conflict with the provisions of this act shall continue and be in full force in the district of Alaska,” that the'restrictions in the general coal land law authorizing “only one entry by the same person or association of persons,” etc., is in conflict and therefore not operative to locations authorized by the later legislation.
Prior to the act of 1873, the disposition of coal lands was included in the general provisions regulating the sale of public lands, and under which there were no limitations upon the number of entries one person might make. But in 1873, when Congress sought, to deal with the specific subject of the sale of coal lands, the rule was adopted of confining every qualified entryman to one entry, and every association of persons, not less than four in number and under certain conditions, to the entry of not exceeding six hundred and forty acres. A corporation has been held to be an association of persons within the meaning of this section.
United
States. v.
Trinidad Coal Company,
137 U. S. 160, 169. The policy of this restriction was to pre
vent a monopolization of such coal lands by securing to every citizen the right to obtain for himself one tract, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, of such coal land.
United States
v.
Trinidad Coal Company,
cited above;
United States
v.
Keitel,
211 U. S. 370.
That continued to be the uniform policy of Congress, and so continues, unless a departure has been made by the act of 1904. But, if so, it is only as to the unsurveyed coal lands of Alaska, for undoubtedly when such lands shall be surveyed, they will come at once under the restrictions of the general law as found in §§ 2347 to 2350,. inclusive, of the Revised Statutes, since the act of 1904 applies only to the unsurveyed public lands of Alaska.
There occurs to us no reason for assuming that Congress intended to abandon the policy of keeping open the right of every citizen to enter one tract and no more of the unsurveyed coal lands of Alaska that would not lead also to the abandonment of the policy as respects coal lands which had been surveyed.
An intention to depart from a uniform policy, so long enforced in regard to coal lands, should not be imputed to Congress unless the act of 1904 admits of no other construction.
Morton
v.
Nebraska,
21 Wallace, 660, 669;
But it is said, that the purpose to depart from the policy which imposed a restriction upon the number of locations which had before been authorized is manifest in the provision of § 2 of the act in question, which requires that the locator or locators,
“or their assigns"
who are citizens of the United. States, shall receive a patent to the lands so located, etc. The fact that one who has made a lawful location is permitted to make an assignment, as is the plain implication from the requirement that a patent “shall” issue to “the locator or his assigns,” is not indicative'of a purpose to abandon the prohibition upon more than one location. • By going upon coal land, opening up a mine, permanently marking the boundaries, and filing
and making the notices required under the law one, otherwise qualified, initiates a claim to the land and may, by further compliance with the law, earn the right to a patent. That the policy of the law stops at this point and leaves him freé to assign his location, does not impeach the intent of Congress to confine a locator to a single location. The prohibition is against more than one entry, not against alienation, after a good-faith location.
Of the restrictions concerning the.entry of land under the Timber and Stone Act, it was said: “ The act does not in any respect limit the dominion which the purchaser has-over the land after its purchase from the government, or restrict in the slightest his power of alienation. All that it denounces is a prior agreement, the acting for another in the purchase.”
United States
v.
Budd,
144 U. S. 154, 163.
The same argument was addressed to this court in
United States
v.
Keitel,
211 U. S. 370, 389, as a reason for confining the prohibition to one entry made by a qualified person for the use and benefit of another who was disqualified from making a second entry. But this court said: “True, the statute imposes no limitation on the right of a purchaser who has acquired coal land from the Unitéd States to sell the same after he has become the owner of the land. The absence, however, of a limitation on the power to sell after acquisition affords no ground for saying that the express prohibition of the statute against more than one entry by the same person should not be enforced according to its plain meaning. This clearly follows, since the right to sell that which one has lawfully acquired neither directly nor indirectly implies the authority to unlawfully acquire in violation of an express prohibition.”
United States
v.
Keitel,
211 U. S. 370, 389.
Upon the same line of reasoning we find no reason for supposing that Congress intended by the act of 1904 to remove the 'restriction upon more than one entry by the
same person, because it imposed none upon alienation after the right to a patent had accrued by a good-faith location.
But it is said that the restriction upon the right to make more than one entry by the same person applied only to entries made under
the three preceding sections,
i. e., §§ 2347,' 2348 and 2349. That this peculiar limitation has no material significance, we have already pointed out, its presence in the section being due to the fact that § 2350 and the preceding three sections, constituting the original act of 1873, were placed in the midst of a chapter embracing many other provisions in no wise related to the entry of coal lands.- It is, however, to be borne in mind that this act of 1904 is but an amendment to the act of 1900, which extended these sections of the general coal entry law to the district of Alaska. The 'three acts are in
pari materia
and must be read together, and no part of the previously existing law upon the same subject is to be regarded as inoperative unless no other construction of the later legislation is reasonable.
The single object of Congress in the act of 1904 was to provide for the sale of coal lands which had not been surveyed. The provisions for the sale of such coal lands, in or out of Alaska, which had been surveyed, so that entries could be made “by legal subdivision,” had already been covered by the general law which had been extended to Alaska. The conditions in Alaska were but temporary. When the coal land there should be brought under the system of surveys which prevailed in the better settled parts of the country, the act of 1904 would cease to be operative, having nothing to which it could apply. The legislation, read in the light of the situation and of the uniform policy which had so long prevailed of prohibiting more than one entry to
one
person, makes it plain that Congress did not intend to except the unsurveyed coal lands of' Alaska from the operation of the restrictions which attached to
the sale of the surveyed coal lands in Alaska and elsewhere.
The judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.