United States v. Munday

222 U.S. 175, 32 S. Ct. 53, 56 L. Ed. 149, 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1769
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 4, 1911
Docket593
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 222 U.S. 175 (United States v. Munday) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Munday, 222 U.S. 175, 32 S. Ct. 53, 56 L. Ed. 149, 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1769 (1911).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Lurton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This writ of error is prosecuted by the United States from a judgment sustaining a motion to quash an indictment.

The indictment is founded upon § 5440, Revised Statutes, and charges a conspiracy to defraud the United States by illegally obtaining title to forty contiguous tracts of coal lands in the District of Alaska, aggregating six thousand and eighty-seven acres, collectively known as the Stracey group, and averred to be of the value of ten million dollars.

The indictment is too long to be set out, even in an abbreviated form. The gravamen of the conspiracy chárged is that the defendants induced or procured divers qualified persons to take the several steps required by. law *177 to make locations of Alaska coal lands, not for themselves, :but as the mere agents or representatives of the defendants for the purpose of securing to two named corporations a larger area of coal land than such corporations could lawfully locate for themselves.

. For the defendants in error it has been very ably urged that since the concededly applicable coal land law gives to every individual, who is of age and a citizen of the United States, the right to make a coal land location for himself, and to assign his location when made, that there can be no fraud if he makes such location in the first instance for the benefit of another competent to buy the location when made. But if the provisions of the general coal land entry láw found in § 2350, Revised Statutes, apply to the entry of coal lands in Alaska, the contention is now no longer an open one under the repeated interpretations of that section found in the cases of United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U. S. 160; United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, and United States v. Forrester, 211 U. S. 399.

The corporations by whose procurement the forty locations by forty different persons were made, under the express terms of the statute referred to, were disqualified from making more than one location each, and being thus disqualified could not make a second location through an agent acting for their use and benefit. Any construction which would permit one prohibited by express command of the law from making more than one entry or location to make other entries or locations through the agency of a third person, qualified to make an entry for himself, wopld be to sanction a device which would nullify the purpose of the restriction.

The result must turn upon whether the restrictive features of § 2350, Revised Statutes, are applicable to the sale of coal lands in Alaska. The ruling of.the court below and the contention made by the defendants in error is that the act of April 28, 1904, 33 Stat., p. 525, c. 1772, is the *178 only act applicable to the unsurveyed coal lands of Alaska. That act will be found sét out in the margin. 1

It purports to be an amendment of the act of June 6, *179 1900, 31 Statutes at Large, p. 658, c. 796, which extended to Alaska “so much of the public land laws of the United States ... as relate to coal lands, namely, §§ 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes.” The sections of the general law thus extended to Alaska are set out in the margin. 1

These.sections came from the act oi March 3, 1873, 17 *180 Statutes at Large, p. 607, c. 279. The only change made is in the substitution in § 2350 of the words, “The three preceding sections shall be held to authorize,” etc., for the words of the fourth section of the original act, reading, “That this act shall be held to authorize,” — a change made necessary because the provisions of the original act are made a part of- a chapter of the general land law embracing the sale of other public lands. The act of 1873, as thus carried into the Revised Statutes, did not permit an entry of coal lands which had not been surveyed. The *181 entry permitted was only “by legal subdivisions.” The coal lands in Alaska were unsurveyed. Thus it happened that although the act of- June 6, 1900, extended the provisions of the general law to Alaska, that law was for a time inoperative because the coal lands could not be entered “by legal subdivisions,” when no such legal subdivisions existéd. So obviously was this the case that a circular from the Department of the Interior was issued, instructing the registers and Receivers in the district of Alaska that no coal filing nor entry could be filed iii their offices until there should be filed with them “the official plat of survey of the township ” in which entries were sought to be made. This was the situation which brought about the act of April 28, 1904, set out in the margin.

The contention-is that although this act of 1904 expressly provides “that all of the provisions of the coal land laws of the United States not in conflict with the provisions of this act shall continue and be in full force in the district of Alaska,” that the'restrictions in the general coal land law authorizing “only one entry by the same person or association of persons,” etc., is in conflict and therefore not operative to locations authorized by the later legislation.

Prior to the act of 1873, the disposition of coal lands was included in the general provisions regulating the sale of public lands, and under which there were no limitations upon the number of entries one person might make. But in 1873, when Congress sought, to deal with the specific subject of the sale of coal lands, the rule was adopted of confining every qualified entryman to one entry, and every association of persons, not less than four in number and under certain conditions, to the entry of not exceeding six hundred and forty acres. A corporation has been held to be an association of persons within the meaning of this section. United States. v. Trinidad Coal Company, 137 U. S. 160, 169. The policy of this restriction was to pre *182 vent a monopolization of such coal lands by securing to every citizen the right to obtain for himself one tract, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, of such coal land. United States v. Trinidad Coal Company, cited above; United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370.

That continued to be the uniform policy of Congress, and so continues, unless a departure has been made by the act of 1904.

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Bluebook (online)
222 U.S. 175, 32 S. Ct. 53, 56 L. Ed. 149, 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1769, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-munday-scotus-1911.