United States v. Mosuro

648 F. Supp. 316, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17973
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedNovember 6, 1986
DocketCrim. 86-313
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 648 F. Supp. 316 (United States v. Mosuro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Mosuro, 648 F. Supp. 316, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17973 (D.D.C. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

JOHN GARRETT PENN, District Judge.

The defendants, Olatunji Mosuro and Oliyinka Sobamowo are charged in a 41 count superseding indictment filed on October 22, 1986. Both are charged with conspiracy to unlawfully distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (heroin), (21 U.S.C. § 846), count 14, while Mosuro is charged with unlawful use of a communication facility to facilitate a conspiracy to distribute heroin, (21 U.S.C. § 843(b)), counts 21, 28, 30, 34, 36, 38, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprise and aiding and abetting, (18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3) and (2)), counts 29 and 37. The defendants are charged in the superseding indictment along with Eddie Adair, Francis G. Sheen, Omowumni Sheen, Paula Teele and Victoria Toomer. The only issue addressed in this memorandum order is whether Mosuro and Sobamowo should be held in pretrial detention pending their trial, and all references herein to “defendants” refer only to them.

I

The defendants were arraigned before this Court on October 24, 1986. At that time the Government moved that the Court hold the defendants without bond pending trial because no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearances of the defendants as required and the safety of other persons and the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). The Government then moved that the detention hearing be continued over until Monday, October 27, 1986. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The Court ordered the defendants held without bond pending a hearing on October 27.

At the hearing on October 27, 1986, the Government argued that there is a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearances of the defend *318 ants and the safety of the community. In support of this argument, the Government relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) which provides that the presumption arises where a judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the defendants committed an offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years or more under the Controlled Substance Act (Act). 21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. These defendants have been charged with such offenses under the Act, and the Government contends that the probable cause requirement has been met since the defendants have been indicted by a grand jury. Moreover, the Government alleges that a probable cause determination was made by a federal magistrate in the United States District Court for Maryland; however, the Court disregards the latter determination because it is not reflected in the records. The Government reasons that since there is a presumption in favor of holding the defendants without bond, the burden of proof, or the burden of persuasion, now shifts to the defendants to establish that they should be released on bond.

The defendants dispute the Government's interpretation of Section 3142(e) and argue that the presumption has not come into play because the above section provides that the probable cause determination must be made by a judicial officer, not the grand jury, and because the defendants are entitled to cross-examine the Government’s witnesses and to present evidence.

After brief consideration of the respective arguments, this Court ruled that the indictment is sufficient to establish probable cause for the purpose of Section 3142(e), and that, this being the case, the defendants then had the burden of going forward, or of production; “to offer some credible evidence contrary to the statutory presumtion.” United States v. Alatishe, 247 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 254, 768 F.2d 364, 371 (1985). See also United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 389 (1st Cir.1985). The burden of proof remains with the Government, but once the rebuttable presumption arises, the defendants are required to go forward, and if they fail to do so, they may be held without bond provided that all of the requirements of the statute have been met. Here, the defendants elected to go forward; they called a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assigned to the case. At the conclusion of the evidence, and after arguments, the Court ruled that defendants are to be held without bond pending trial.

The Court has had a further opportunity to consider the question of whether an indictment establishes probable cause sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption under Section 3142(e). The Court is satisfied that it does and that therefore the burden of production properly shifted to the defendants. This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court’s holding that:

An indictment “fair upon its face,” and returned by a “properly constituted grand jury” sufficiently determines the existence of the probable cause [ ]. The willingness to let a grand jury’s judgment substitute for that of a neutral an detached magistrate is attributable to the grand jury’s relationship to the courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust prosecution.

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117, n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, n. 19, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (citations omitted). The Court concludes that the indictment does establish probable cause. This result is consistent with the holdings of several courts of appeals. United States v. Vargas, 804 F.2d 157, 162-63 (1st Cir.1986); United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706, n. 7 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479, n. 15 (11th Cir.1985), rehearing denied, 788 F.2d 1570 (1986); United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 52 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.1985). Here the Court finds that there is a serious likelihood that the defendants will flee.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Caternor
District of Columbia, 2017
United States v. Smoot
District of Columbia, 2017
United States v. Roba
District of Columbia, 2017
United States v. Kent
District of Columbia, 2017
United States v. Cherry
221 F. Supp. 3d 26 (District of Columbia, 2016)
United States v. Roque
District of Columbia, 2016
United States v. Addison
217 F. Supp. 3d 69 (District of Columbia, 2016)
United States v. Ali
District of Columbia, 2011
United States v. Holguin
791 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D. New Mexico, 2011)
United States v. Perez
785 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. New Mexico, 2011)
United States v. Perez
608 F. Supp. 2d 95 (District of Columbia, 2009)
United States v. Fernandez Velez
608 F. Supp. 2d 93 (District of Columbia, 2009)
United States v. Campaz
District of Columbia, 2009
United States v. Floyd
11 F. Supp. 2d 39 (District of Columbia, 1998)
United States v. Gerald Smith
79 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Circuit, 1996)
United States v. Melvin Williams
903 F.2d 844 (D.C. Circuit, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
648 F. Supp. 316, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17973, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mosuro-dcd-1986.