United States v. Morris

550 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36199, 2008 WL 1971379
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedMay 2, 2008
DocketCriminal Action 2:06cr218-MHT (WO)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 550 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (United States v. Morris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Morris, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36199, 2008 WL 1971379 (M.D. Ala. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Defendant George Hoey Morris was tried and found guilty on one count of making a false statement in a passport application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. This criminal case is before the court again, this time on whether Morris is now mentally competent to be sentenced. Based on the evidence submitted, including that presented at a hearing on February 21, 2008, the court reaches two conclusions: (1) that Morris is not mentally competent to undergo sentencing at this time and (2) that he should be committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will become competent in the foreseeable future.

I. BACKGROUND

Morris did not raise any mental-competency issues before or during his trial in the fall of 2006, and the court did not observe anything that called into question his mental competency. 1

After trial, Morris fired his court-appointed attorney and retained private counsel. Soon thereafter, by and through his privately retained attorney, Morris filed two motions for a psychiatric evaluation, one on February 26 and another on May 18, 2007. At a hearing, defense counsel expressed her concern that Morris was not competent to proceed to the sentencing phase of his case. She noted that he was a veteran of the Vietnam War, had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and was classified as 100% disabled by the Veterans Administration. More importantly, she stated that Morris was irrationally obsessed with certain issues not pertinent to his case and that he seemed incapable of focusing on issues relevant to his sentencing. The court was skeptical that there was any reason to question Morris’s mental competency, but promised to take the matter under consideration and reach a decision prior to sentencing.

Around this time, Morris began to send correspondence to the court and to file pro-se motions, something he had not done before or during his trial. Some of the *1292 material the court received was irrational, paranoid, and otherwise inappropriate.

Morris’s retained attorney was compelled to withdraw because of a conflict that developed between her and Morris, and the court reappointed his trial attorney to represent him at sentencing. At a subsequent hearing, the re-appointed counsel told the court the same thing it heard from the retained attorney: that Morris had significant trouble focusing on the relevant issues in his case and had become obsessed with tangential issues not related to sentencing. Significantly, counsel stated that this marked a change in Morris’s behavior since the trial.

Prior to the scheduled sentencing, the court learned from Morris’s presentence-investigation report that he was being prescribed two psychotropic medicines and that he had been hospitalized on several occasions for mental-health reasons. The court also took judicial notice of the fact that one of the medicines prescribed to Morris is commonly used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.

On July 17, 2007, 2007 WL 2069854, the court granted Morris’s motions for a psychiatric evaluation and appointed Dr. Guy J. Renfro to perform the evaluation. In a report filed on January 14, 2008, Dr. Ren-fro determined that Morris suffers from Bipolar II disorder, chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder. He concluded that Morris suffered from “delusions of prosecution” that “appear to be the result Bipolar II Disorder, severe with psychotic features,” Psychological Evaluation (Doc. No. 114), at 6; that his delusions “would render him unable to participate [in a sentencing hearing] in a reasonable and understanding manner in his own behalf,” id; that Morris should receive treatment in order to restore him to mental competency; and that this treatment should take place in a facility where Morris’s medicines could be adjusted and his behavior monitored. Dr. Renfro explained that, with appropriate treatment, Morris could participate in a sentencing hearing in a rational and understanding manner. The government did not contest the evaluation or the recommendations made by Dr. Renfro.

II. DISCUSSION

A. 18 U.S.C. § 4241

18 U.S.C. § 4241, entitled “Determination of mental competency to stand trial to undergo postrelease proceedings,” is the relevant statute governing the process for determining and establishing the competency of Morris to be sentenced.

The first legal issue presented by Dr. Renfro’s report under § 4241(a) is whether Morris is mentally competent to undergo sentencing, that is, whether he is currently “suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). 2

Counsel for both Morris and the government agreed to have the court resolve the *1293 issue of Morris’s mental competency on the basis of Dr. Renfro’s psychiatric report. The court has reviewed the report and, based on the report, finds that Morris is currently suffering from a mental disease or defect such that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense at sentencing.

Section 4241(d) has two provisions that come into play once a court has found under § 4241(a) that a defendant is currently incompetent to undergo sentencing. 3 The first provision, § 4241(d)(1), requires the court to order the Attorney General of the United States to hospitalize an incompetent defendant for a period of time, not to exceed four months, in order for medical and psychiatric personnel to determine whether there is a substantial probability that “in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). The second provision, § 4241(d)(2), permits the Attorney General to hospitalize a defendant for an additional reasonable period of time upon a finding by the court that there is a substantial probability that the defendant will become competent within that time. If, after either the initial commitment under § 4241(d)(1) or the additional commitment under § 4241(d)(2), the court finds that there is little or no chance that the defendant will become competent, the defendant then becomes subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
550 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36199, 2008 WL 1971379, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-morris-almd-2008.