United States v. Morgan

8 C.M.A. 341, 8 USCMA 341, 24 C.M.R. 151, 1957 CMA LEXIS 352, 1957 WL 4731
CourtUnited States Court of Military Appeals
DecidedNovember 1, 1957
DocketNo. 9284
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 8 C.M.A. 341 (United States v. Morgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Military Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Morgan, 8 C.M.A. 341, 8 USCMA 341, 24 C.M.R. 151, 1957 CMA LEXIS 352, 1957 WL 4731 (cma 1957).

Opinions

Opinion of the Court

ROBERT E. Quinn, Chief Judge:

A general court-martial convicted the accused of a number of offenses, in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. These included one specification of assault with intent to commit sodomy upon a Private Frank, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code, 10 USC § 934, and a specification of consummated sodomy with Private Frank, in violation of Article 125,10 USC § 925. Both offenses were committed at the [342]*342same time and as part of a single occurrence, with the completed act of sodomy being the consummation of the assault. At the trial, the defense contended that the accused could not be punished cumulatively for both the assault and the completed act of sodomy. This contention was overruled by the law officer, and his ruling was affirmed by intermediate appellate authorities. We granted review to consider whether this determination is legally correct.

Our research convinces us that the weight of authority in American criminal law supports the conclusion that when one commits an assault with intent to commit sodomy, and that assault carries over into completion of an act of sodomy, the wrongdoer is subject to punishment for one or the other of the offenses, but not for both.

At the outset, it is appropriate to note that we have found few cases which specifically mention our problem. Considering the propensity of prosecutors to allege as many offenses as the transaction is capable of supporting, we suppose that the scarcity of cases indicates a general feeling in the legal profession that the assault and the completed offense are not separately punishable. The supposition gains force from the fact that there are hundreds of reported cases in which the act of sodomy was accomplished by force and violence, but in which the accused was charged only with the completed act. In any event, on the side of separateness of offense and punishment, we have found 'but a single case. In Commonwealth v Beideman, 68 Montg Co LR 80, 81 (1951), The Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, held that the two offenses were separate because “the persons involved may both assent to the commission of the crime [of sodomy] and, therefore, there would not be any ‘assault’.” It is immediately apparent that the opinion ‘gives no consideration to the effect of actual allegation and proof upon the question of separateness of offense and punishment, but treats the matter as one of mere possibility of a difference. Cf. United States v Brown, 8 USCMA 18, 23 CMR 242; United States v Redenius, 4 USCMA 161, 15 CMR 161. Apart from this criticism, the Beideman ruling is contrary to the holding of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v Hoffman, 38 Luz Leg Reg 317 (1944). In the Hoffman case, the court held that it was improper to try the accused for an assault with intent to commit sodomy when the evidence unmistakably shows consummation of the act and completion of the crime of sodomy.

The reported cases pointing in the direction of singleness of punishment for the aggravated assault and the completed act are also few in number. In several cases in New York, the accused was charged with both assault with the intent to commit sodomy and the completed act which followed. People v Crocker, 272 App Div 1087, 74 NYS2d 593 (1947) ; People v Rosenthal, 264 App Div 822, 85 NYS2d 215, reversed on other grounds, 289 NY 482, 46 NE 2d 895; People v Jackson, 278 App Div 734, 103 NYS2d 303 (1951), affirmed 303 NY 680, 102 NE2d 837. In these cases, a single sentence was imposed for both offenses. New York has a special statute limiting the imposition of punishment for “an act . . . made . . . punishable in different ways by different provisions.” New York Penal Law, Section 1938. Whether that statute is more favorable to an accused than the punishment provisions of military law need not concern us because the New York courts clearly regard the assault offense as lesser included in a sodomy charge; to that extent, military law also does not permit punishment for “both a principal offense and for an offense included therein.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, paragraph 76a. United States v McVey, 4 USCMA 167, 15 CMR 167. In People v Saverese, 1 Misc2d 305, 114 NYS2d 816, the court discussed the sentence imposed upon a defendant in the Jackson case and said: “He was also sentenced to 10 to 20 years for the sodomy which governed the included crimes of assault with intent to commit sodomy.” (Italics supplied.) In Crocker, the defendant was, as already noted, also convicted of sodomy and assault with intent to commit sodomy, yet the court [343]*343referred to the “offense charged” as being serious and repulsive, and that the defendant should not be “found guilty of such an offense without clear and reliable testimony.”1

The same view of singleness of punishment for assault and the act of sodomy appears in the California case of People v Hickey, 109 Cal 275, 41 Pac 1027. There, the accused was charged with, and convicted of, sodomy. He moved for, and was granted, a new trial on the ground that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault. The Government appealed from that ruling. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Garoutte said:

. . The offense of simple assault may nor may not be an element in the felony designated as ‘sodomy.’ It is not an element of the offense where the crime is hot committed with or upon a human being; and, secondly, it is not an element in the offense where the act is done or attempted with the consent of the other party. It therefore follows that in many cases the trial court is justified in refusing to instruct the jury as was here requested. This case is not one coming within the first class stated. . .

The Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas and the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine seem to have taken a similar approach to the problem. Each has held that an assault is an “essential element” of sodomy when the crime is perpetrated against an unwilling human being. Darling v State, 47 SW 1005 (Texas); State v Langelier, 136 Me 320, 8 A2d 897. In the Territory of Hawaii, the idea that assault with intent to commit sodomy is a lesser included offense tu a charge of sodomy is expressly recognized by statute. Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1945, Section 11679; Territory v Chee Sui, 25 Hawaii 814. Bishop, in his well-known work on criminal law, describes án assault with the intent to commit sodomy as a form of an attempt to commit that offense. 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, 9th ed, page 883. Cf. United States v Hobbs, 7 USCMA 693, 23 CMR 157, opinion by Judge Latimer.

It has been said that sodomy and rape are “kindred crimes” and that the principles of law governing the one also govern the other. Territory v Chee Sui, supra, page 816; Hopper v State, 302 P2d 162 (Oklahoma). The analogy has been applied to the requirement for penetration, United States v Kelly, 119 F Supp 217; State v Pratt, 151 Me 236, 116 A2d 924, and to the admissibility of evidence of “fresh complaint.” See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, paragraph 142c. The basic difference between the two is the element of consent. State v Langelier, supra. But, if force, rather than consent, is present, the analogy between the two offenses extends to the kind of lesser offense included within the charge.

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Bluebook (online)
8 C.M.A. 341, 8 USCMA 341, 24 C.M.R. 151, 1957 CMA LEXIS 352, 1957 WL 4731, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-morgan-cma-1957.