United States v. Morales

91 F.R.D. 169, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14126
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJune 24, 1981
DocketCrim. No. 80-250(PG)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 91 F.R.D. 169 (United States v. Morales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Morales, 91 F.R.D. 169, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14126 (prd 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge.

THE FACTS:

This case began with the filing on November 12, 1980, of an indictment charging Mr. Rufino O. Morales and one Nellie Lora1 with a conspiracy to import approximately 2,093.7 grams of cocaine, in violation of Title 21, U.S.C., Sections 952(a) and 963.2 An arrest warrant was issued against Mr. Morales pursuant to said indictment and bail was set at $200,000 cash. Subsequently, on December 1,1980, Mr. Rufino Morales was arrested in Miami, Florida. On December 5,1980, removal proceedings 3 were held in the Southern District of Florida, as a result of which the defendant was ordered removed to the District of Puerto Rico. At said time defendant’s bond was modified as follows: $100,000 surety bond and $100,000 personal surety bond “to be secured with a note and mortgage on defendant’s sister-in-law’s home in Miami.”

Once defendant arrived in this District, a Motion for Reduction of Bail was filed on December 17, 1980, and at a hearing in chambers before a U.S. Magistrate the possibility of posting a $150,000 surety bond was discussed. Finally, on December 24, 1980, a $125,000 surety bond 4 was deposited in the Clerk’s Office on behalf of defendant by Mr. Pablo Tapia Rosado and Mrs. Antonia Fuentes Suárez, acting as sureties. Pri- or to posting bond, the sureties appeared at the Clerk’s Office, where they were fully advised in the Spanish language of their obligations under the bond. Thereafter, they both signed various documents 5 in the company of Mr. Rufino Morales and the defendant was released on bond. Other conditions or restrictions were placed on defendant, but for the purposes of this Memorandum and Order we will only concern ourselves with his failure to appear at trial.

The arraignment was held on December 31, 1980, and the defendant was present with his attorney.6 Various motions were filed afterwards, but of no consequence to our present purpose. On January 16, 1981, a status conference was held where defendant’s attorney at that time, Mr. Victor Gutiérrez, was advised to inform attorney of record, Mr. Luis Carbone, that jury trial was set for February 24, 1981, at 9:00 A.M., and that the same would not be changed. On January 27, 1981, Harold F. Keefe, Esquire, Coral Gables, Florida, appeared as additional counsel of record for defendant, together with Mr. Luis Carbone. It is important to note that upon granting Mr. Keefe’s appearance of record, by footnote [171]*171order dated January 29, 1981, the Court specifically provided that said appearance would not be grounds for continuance of the trial date as previously set. A motion for continuance of trial was filed by defendant on February 19, 1981, which was denied by the Court on that same date.

That is how things stood on February 24, 1981, when the case was called for trial. Defendant failed to appear, but at this time the Court did not order defendant arrested in view of the information offered to the Court by his attorney, Mr. Carbone.7 The case was continued until February 25, 1981, at which time the defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Additionally, orders to show cause were issued against the sureties to show cause why the $125,000 surety bond should not be forfeited. The Government was ordered to file a motion requesting that the surety bond be forfeited.8 THE LAW:

“The starting point for determining the extent of the sureties’ obligation is ‘the language of (their) undertaking’ ”, U. S. v. Carr, 608 F.2d 886, 888 (1 Cir., 1979), interpreted in light of federal law principals which govern the interpretation of federal bail bonds. U. S. v. Catino, 562 F.2d 1 (2 Cir., 1977); U. S. v. Miller, 539 F.2d 445 (5 Cir., 1976). The bond 9 signed by the sureties on December 24, 1980, specifically required the defendant “to appear” in the Judicial District of Puerto Rico “. . . in accordance with any and all orders and directions relating to the defendant’s appearance ... as may be given or issued .. . by the U. S. District Court ... ”. Clearly, this Court’s Order of January 16, 1981, setting the trial for February 24, 1981, is such an order as encompassed in the Appearance Bond.

Further, the bond made it patently clear that “. . . if the defendant fails to obey or perform any of these conditions, payment of the amount of this bond shall be due forthwith. Forfeiture of this bond for any breach of its conditions may be declared by any United States District Court having cognizance of the above entitled matter at the time of such breach . . . ”. Such was the extent of the sureties’ obligation at the time they signed the Appearance Bond. U. S. v. Carr, supra. The bond further provided that if such a breach of conditions occurred, judgment would be entered against each debtor jointly and severally, execution being made according to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (See Appendix).

The relationship that spawns when an Appearance Bond is signed is that of contract between the Government and the sureties. U. S. v. Plechner, 577 F.2d 566 (9 Cir., 1978); U. S. v. Lujan, 589 F.2d 436 (9 Cir., 1978), reh. den. 1979; U. S. v. Miller, supra, reh. den., 542 F.2d 576 (5 Cir., 1976). The wording of the bond makes the intention and commitment of the sureties manifest, and like any other contract, the bail bond should l?e interpreted to give effect to the reasonable intentions of the parties. As a general rule the terms of a bail contract are to be construed strictly in favor of the surety. U. S. v. Miller, supra.

Even though the jurisprudence favors the surety in the interpretation of the bail contract, the plain language of Rule [172]*17246(e)(1)10 makes forfeiture mandatory where there has been a breach of a condition of bond. U. S. v. Stanley, 601 F.2d 380 (9 Cir., 1979); U. S. v. Ryan, 580 F.2d 151 (5 Cir., 1978); U. S. v. Nolan, 564 F.2d 376 (10 Cir., 1977). It is precisely this Rule which establishes the procedures which are to be followed by federal courts for the enforcement of liability of surety. U. S. v. Vera-Estrada, 577 F.2d 598 (9 Cir., 1978); U. S. v. Boothman, 498 F.Supp. 798 (D.Kan, 1980).11 Where the bond agreement has been breached by defendant’s failure to appear for trial, as in this case, the surety then becomes absolutely liable to the government in the amount of the bond. U. S. v.

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Bluebook (online)
91 F.R.D. 169, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-morales-prd-1981.