United States v. Montalvo-Febus

254 F. Supp. 3d 319, 2017 WL 2417921, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86086
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJune 5, 2017
DocketCRIMINAL NO. 15-406 (PAD)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 254 F. Supp. 3d 319 (United States v. Montalvo-Febus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Montalvo-Febus, 254 F. Supp. 3d 319, 2017 WL 2417921, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86086 (prd 2017).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

Delgado-Hernández, District Judge.

Defendant was charged in a 3-count indictment with transporting a 13-year old female minor (2 counts) and a 14-year old female minor (1 count) with the intent to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 67), which the government opposed (Docket No. 92). For the reasons explained below, the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Section 2423(a) provides that whoever “knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person may be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined ... and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.” The section was originally enacted in 1910 as part of the Mann Act, also known as the “White Slave Traffic Act,” 36 Stat. 825, Ch. 395 (1910)(codi-fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2428). It is currently codified at Chapter 117 of Title 18 of the United States Code, titled “Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity and Related Crimes.”

[321]*321As alleged in the indictment, defendant transported the minor(s) from locations in Salinas, Puerto Rico to other locations in Salinas, and from Salmas to Ponce, Puerto Rico (Docket No. 1). Relying on United States v. Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d 339, 350 (1st Cir. 2016), however, he claims that § 2423(a) requires transportation across a state line or a foreign country (Docket No. 67 at p. 4-5). Given that any transportation here occurred solely within Puerto Rico, he asks that the indictment be dismissed. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Basic Framework

In Maldonado-Burgos, the First Circuit dealt with § 2421(a) of the Mann Act, which prohibits transportation of an individual “in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States” for purposes of prostitution or other unlawful sexual activity. See, 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a). As such, this section requires an interstate or foreign nexus in case of states, but requires no such nexus in ease of territories or possessions. So the First Circuit faced the question whether § 2421(a) applies to illegal transportation occurring solely within Puerto Rico, a question in turn to be answered by the extent to which Congress intended to treat Puerto Rico as a state or territory under § 2421(a). See, Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d at 343-345 (explaining inquiry).

Discussing the issue, the First Circuit examined the text of the statute, noting that “neither § 2421(a) nor any other provision of the Mann Act explicitly mentions Puerto Rico.” Id. at 341.1 Next, it surveyed the evolution of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States from 1898 when the United States invaded Puerto Rico up to the period of 1950-1952, when Congress passed legislation which later became part of the Federal Relations Act authorizing the People of Puerto Rico to adopt a constitution; and the Puerto Rico Constitution became law with congressional approval. Id. Along the same line, it: (1) observed that the congressional purpose behind the 1950-1952 legislation was to accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the Union (id.); (2) pointed to judicial decisions preceding that period that allowed prosecution for activity within Puerto Rico under the Mann Act and the Sherman Act (id. at 342); and (3) discussed Córdova & Simonpietri Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981), concluding that § 2421(a) did not apply to transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico. Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d at at 343, 349-350.

The First Circuit explained that this is so, because under Cordova the court must ask whether the statute’s framers, if aware of Puerto Rico’s current constitutional status, would have intended it to be treated as a “state” or “territory.” Id. And in its view, the framers of the Mann Act would have intended Congress to treat Puerto Rico as a State under § 2421(a). Id. at 350. Defendant contends Maldonado-Burgos requires the same conclusion in connection with § 2423(a).2

[322]*322B. Interaction of Factors

Several factors pull in different directions here. For one thing, the First Circuit emphasized that its holding in Maldonado-Burgos is a narrow one and applies only to the scope of § 2421(a) and not to the other provisions of the Mann Act. Id. at 350-351.3 Similarly, it recognized, that § 2421(a) and § 2423(a) specify separate crimes against separate classes of victims. Id. at 351. To that effect, § 2421(a) refers to the transportation of any individual, whereas § 2423(a) deals with transportation of individuals who have not yet attained the age of 18 years. Further, the First Circuit pointed out that these sections have not been amended in lockstep with one another. In that regard, Congress enacted the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, expanding § 2421 and § 2423 to criminalize the attempt to violate their provisions, and increased the statutory maximum terms of imprisonment for violations of both provisions. However, before the bill was enacted, a floor amendment proposed adding the word “commonwealth,” to the phrase “in any territory or possession of the United States” in § 2423(a), albeit not in § 2421(a). The amendment passed without explanation.

Still, the amendment may be significant as part of the analysis, because the Puerto Rico Constitutional Assembly decreed in 1952, that the official English-language name of the body-politic of Puerto Rico would be “Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,” as it considered “commonwealth” an appropriate translation of Puerto Rico’s Spanish-language name of “Estado Libre Asociado.” See, Resolution No. 22 of the Puerto Rico Constitutional Convention, February 4, 1952, Miscellaneous Provisions, P.L. 5, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1 at pp. 135-136 (stating reason for adoption of English-language name). So there is a logical basis to conclude that Congress intended § 2423(a) to apply to transportation within the Commonwealth.

For another thing — and pulling in the opposite direction — the First Circuit noted that the critical fact in Córdova was the absence of specific evidence or clear policy reasons embedded in the Sherman Act to demonstrate a statutory intent to intervene more extensively into the local affairs of post-Constitutional Puerto Rico than into the local affairs of a state. See, Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d at 344 (citing Córdova, 649 F.2d at 42). Applying the same formulation, it concluded that no such evidence or reasons demonstrated a congressional intent to apply § 2421(a) in Puerto Rico as a territory rather than as a State. Id. at 347-350.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Cotto-Flores
970 F.3d 17 (First Circuit, 2020)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
254 F. Supp. 3d 319, 2017 WL 2417921, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86086, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-montalvo-febus-prd-2017.