NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 23 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50177
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00390-RGK-23 v.
MONICA RODRIGUEZ, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50253
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00390-RGK-12 v.
ALEXIS JAIMEZ, AKA Alexis Dominic Jaimez, AKA Alexis Dominica Jaimez, AKA Lex, AKA Lil Travieso,
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 17, 2022 Pasadena, California
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Before: OWENS and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,** District Judge.
Following a jury trial, Monica Rodriguez and Alexis Jaimez appeal their
convictions for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846; money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h);
and RICO conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Rodriguez challenges
each conviction for lack of sufficient evidence, and both defendants contest the jury
instructions and special verdict forms for each charge.1 We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
“[W]e review de novo the district court’s denial of [a] motion to acquit,
affirming the conviction if, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Perez, 962 F.3d 420, 446 (9th
Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
“A preserved instructional error warrants reversal unless it is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt[, and an] unpreserved objection is subject to plain error review.”
United States v. Rodriguez, 971 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020).
** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 1 Jaimez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions. We affirm Jaimez’s convictions in a concurrently filed, published opinion. The opinion also addresses Jaimez’s challenge to the money laundering conspiracy jury instructions.
2 1. Regarding her drug distribution conspiracy conviction, Rodriguez does not
contest the existence of the criminal enterprise, the Canta Ranas Organization
(CRO), or that it was involved in a drug distribution conspiracy. Rather, Rodriguez
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence connecting her to the conspiracy. See
United States v. Collazo, 984 F.3d 1308, 1319 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). But the
evidence established that Rodriguez held an elevated status in the CRO; facilitated
communications with various CRO members and its incarcerated leader, David
Gavaldon; personally sent Gavaldon drug and extortion proceeds; and benefitted
from the gang’s activities through her receipt of money and status. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, this was sufficient to show that Rodriguez
knew the purpose and scope of the drug distribution conspiracy, intended to
effectuate its purpose, and believed she would benefit from its success. See id. at
1319–20.
2. Sufficient evidence supported Rodriguez’s money laundering conspiracy
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). As we have explained in our accompanying
published opinion, the elements of a § 1956(h) violation are: (1) there was an
agreement to commit money laundering, (2) the defendant knew of the objective of
the agreement, and (3) the defendant joined the agreement with the intent to further
its unlawful purpose. The government presented significant evidence of an
agreement to commit money laundering. And, viewing the evidence in the light
3 most favorable to the prosecution, Rodriguez’s status as a high-ranking member of
a sophisticated criminal enterprise, her knowledge that the funds she sent Gavaldon
came from the CRO, and her efforts to conceal the source of funds throughout her
coded communications are together sufficient to show she knew the objective of the
money laundering agreement and intended to further its purpose.
3. We review Rodriguez’s challenge to the money laundering conspiracy jury
instructions for plain error. See United States v. Macias, 789 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th
Cir. 2015). Even if the district court used the instruction that Rodriguez now seeks—
omitting the line, “The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew
that his or her acts or omissions were unlawful”—it is highly unlikely “the result of
the proceeding would have been different” because sufficient evidence showed
Rodriguez knew her own actions, taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, were
unlawful. United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1190 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).
4. Sufficient evidence also supported Rodriguez’s conviction for RICO
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d
1199, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 2004), modified, 425 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2005). The
government proved Rodriguez participated in at least two predicate racketeering
acts: drug distribution conspiracy and money laundering conspiracy. See
§§ 1962(c), 1961(5); see also Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1259 (“[P]redicate
4 racketeering acts that are themselves conspiracies may form the basis for a charge
and eventual conviction of conspiracy under § 1962(d).”). Her knowledge of and
intent to accomplish those conspiracies, together with her role in the CRO, were
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she joined the RICO conspiracy
knowing of its object and intending to facilitate its goals. See United States v.
Mendoza, 25 F.4th 730, 740 (9th Cir. 2022). 2
5. The RICO conspiracy jury instructions for each defendant misstated the
law because the district court should have instructed that the jury needed to find that
each defendant specifically intended that a member of the conspiracy would commit
each element of the substantive offense. See Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282,
288 (2016). But sufficient evidence showed that each defendant committed each
element of the substantive offense—two predicate racketeering acts—and
specifically intended to do so.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 23 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50177
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00390-RGK-23 v.
MONICA RODRIGUEZ, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50253
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00390-RGK-12 v.
ALEXIS JAIMEZ, AKA Alexis Dominic Jaimez, AKA Alexis Dominica Jaimez, AKA Lex, AKA Lil Travieso,
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 17, 2022 Pasadena, California
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Before: OWENS and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,** District Judge.
Following a jury trial, Monica Rodriguez and Alexis Jaimez appeal their
convictions for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846; money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h);
and RICO conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Rodriguez challenges
each conviction for lack of sufficient evidence, and both defendants contest the jury
instructions and special verdict forms for each charge.1 We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
“[W]e review de novo the district court’s denial of [a] motion to acquit,
affirming the conviction if, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Perez, 962 F.3d 420, 446 (9th
Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
“A preserved instructional error warrants reversal unless it is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt[, and an] unpreserved objection is subject to plain error review.”
United States v. Rodriguez, 971 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020).
** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 1 Jaimez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions. We affirm Jaimez’s convictions in a concurrently filed, published opinion. The opinion also addresses Jaimez’s challenge to the money laundering conspiracy jury instructions.
2 1. Regarding her drug distribution conspiracy conviction, Rodriguez does not
contest the existence of the criminal enterprise, the Canta Ranas Organization
(CRO), or that it was involved in a drug distribution conspiracy. Rather, Rodriguez
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence connecting her to the conspiracy. See
United States v. Collazo, 984 F.3d 1308, 1319 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). But the
evidence established that Rodriguez held an elevated status in the CRO; facilitated
communications with various CRO members and its incarcerated leader, David
Gavaldon; personally sent Gavaldon drug and extortion proceeds; and benefitted
from the gang’s activities through her receipt of money and status. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, this was sufficient to show that Rodriguez
knew the purpose and scope of the drug distribution conspiracy, intended to
effectuate its purpose, and believed she would benefit from its success. See id. at
1319–20.
2. Sufficient evidence supported Rodriguez’s money laundering conspiracy
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). As we have explained in our accompanying
published opinion, the elements of a § 1956(h) violation are: (1) there was an
agreement to commit money laundering, (2) the defendant knew of the objective of
the agreement, and (3) the defendant joined the agreement with the intent to further
its unlawful purpose. The government presented significant evidence of an
agreement to commit money laundering. And, viewing the evidence in the light
3 most favorable to the prosecution, Rodriguez’s status as a high-ranking member of
a sophisticated criminal enterprise, her knowledge that the funds she sent Gavaldon
came from the CRO, and her efforts to conceal the source of funds throughout her
coded communications are together sufficient to show she knew the objective of the
money laundering agreement and intended to further its purpose.
3. We review Rodriguez’s challenge to the money laundering conspiracy jury
instructions for plain error. See United States v. Macias, 789 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th
Cir. 2015). Even if the district court used the instruction that Rodriguez now seeks—
omitting the line, “The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew
that his or her acts or omissions were unlawful”—it is highly unlikely “the result of
the proceeding would have been different” because sufficient evidence showed
Rodriguez knew her own actions, taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, were
unlawful. United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1190 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).
4. Sufficient evidence also supported Rodriguez’s conviction for RICO
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d
1199, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 2004), modified, 425 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2005). The
government proved Rodriguez participated in at least two predicate racketeering
acts: drug distribution conspiracy and money laundering conspiracy. See
§§ 1962(c), 1961(5); see also Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1259 (“[P]redicate
4 racketeering acts that are themselves conspiracies may form the basis for a charge
and eventual conviction of conspiracy under § 1962(d).”). Her knowledge of and
intent to accomplish those conspiracies, together with her role in the CRO, were
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she joined the RICO conspiracy
knowing of its object and intending to facilitate its goals. See United States v.
Mendoza, 25 F.4th 730, 740 (9th Cir. 2022). 2
5. The RICO conspiracy jury instructions for each defendant misstated the
law because the district court should have instructed that the jury needed to find that
each defendant specifically intended that a member of the conspiracy would commit
each element of the substantive offense. See Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282,
288 (2016). But sufficient evidence showed that each defendant committed each
element of the substantive offense—two predicate racketeering acts—and
specifically intended to do so. See Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1259 (stating that
conspiracies constitute predicate racketeering acts under § 1962(d)). Thus, the
proper instruction would not have affected the verdict, so the given instruction was
harmless. See Perez, 962 F.3d at 441.
6. The drug quantity jury instructions and special verdict forms, used for each
defendant’s drug distribution conspiracy and RICO conspiracy convictions,
erroneously permitted the jury to convict if it found the drug quantity and type were
2 Appellants’ unopposed motion for judicial notice, Dkt. No. 26, is granted.
5 reasonably foreseeable to the defendants or within the scope of the conspiracy
agreement. See Collazo, 984 F.3d at 1315. Instead, the government was required to
prove the conspiracy involved a specific drug quantity and type. Id. at 1336.
However, it is “uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence,” id. (citation
omitted), that the drug distribution conspiracy involved more than 50 grams of
methamphetamine. Therefore, the instructional error in this case was harmless and
did not contribute to the guilty verdicts, and so we need not reverse the convictions.
See id.; Perez, 962 F.3d at 441.
Additionally, failure to instruct the jury on drug quantity findings for the
RICO conspiracy charge does not mandate reversal. The jury received the quantity
instruction for the underlying drug distribution conspiracy and was instructed to fill
out the drug quantity finding for the RICO charge only if it found the defendants
guilty of the distribution conspiracy. Thus, the quantity instruction was accounted
for in the RICO conspiracy charge, and the failure to receive the same instruction
twice did not contribute to the guilty verdict. See Perez, 962 F.3d at 441.
AFFIRMED.