United States v. Mondaca

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 24, 2024
• Docket: 23-283
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 24 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-283

Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:21-cr-00130-TOR-1

v. MEMORANDUM* MIGUEL ANTONIO MONDACA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 12, 2024 Seattle, Washington

Before: CHRISTEN and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge**

Defendant Miguel Mondaca appeals the district court’s judgment convicting

him of attempted and actual sex trafficking of a minor under the Trafficking and

Violence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) and 1594(a), the denial of his request

for a new trial on the same count, and the imposition of a thirty-year sentence. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and recite them only as necessary.

Viewing the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the Government, we review

de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Amintobia,

57 F.4th 687, 697 (9th Cir. 2023). We review for abuse of discretion both the denial

of a motion for a new trial and the reasonableness of the sentence imposed. See

United States v. Voris, 964 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Carty,

520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm the district court in all respects.

A conviction for attempted sex trafficking under § 1591 requires that the

defendant be shown to be “aware of an established modus operandi that will in the

future cause a person to engage in prostitution.” United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329,

334 (9th Cir. 2010). The record contains sufficient evidence for a rational jury to

find beyond reasonable doubt that Mondaca was aware of an established modus

operandi that would cause his twelve-year-old victim to be trafficked. On day one

of messaging the victim on an online social platform, Mondaca obtained the victim’s

home address and explained to her that “the way it works is I pick you verify my self

with the customer then Skype the customer me and you then I take you to a spot and

leave you there they come for you.” Shortly thereafter, he added, “if you want to go

by faster we can start with advertising you now” and took a substantial step towards

achieving his stated sex-trafficking goal by requesting detailed information about

2 the victim (height, weight, breast size, languages, race, medical condition). Mondaca

also requested “5 full body pictures then 4 close ups [and] 1 video,” specifying

different angles and body parts, which he subsequently received. These photographs

both advanced and verified the existence of Mondaca’s purpose to sex traffic the

minor victim. See United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2007).

While this evidence alone is sufficient to carry the Government’s burden,

Mondaca argues on appeal that his talk of the “way it works” was mere fantasy,

because for the next approximately two weeks (before he was apprehended by the

law enforcement), he never expressly mentioned sex trafficking again. In his

subsequent conversations with the victim, however, Mondaca mentioned kidnapping

her from her parent’s home and ultimately bought a plane ticket to visit her in

Washington. A reasonable jury could construe these actions as additional,

independent substantial steps toward his expressed sex trafficking plan. For these

reasons, the district court properly denied Mondaca’s motion for judgment of

acquittal, and it did not abuse its discretion in denying Mondaca’s request for a new

trial.

As for the reasonableness of his sentence, Mondaca argues that the district

court did not adequately consider mitigating factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

namely his history of being sexually abused as a child, his diagnoses of depression

and anxiety, and his lack of prior criminal history. But in fact, the record shows that

3 the court considered all evidence submitted by Mondaca. See United States v. Knows

His Gun, 438 F.3d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that articulation of some

§ 3553(a) factors was sufficient, so long as the record indicates that all of the relevant

factors were considered.). Moreover, the district court reduced the offense level by

four levels and varied Mondaca’s sentence down to thirty years. The district court

did not abuse its discretion in imposing this sentence.

AFFIRMED.