United States v. Mnatsakanyan

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-5854
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-5854 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:19-cr-00674-JLS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* AZAT LEVON MNATSAKANYAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 17, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Azat Mnatsakanyan appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised

release and sentence to a further custodial term and supervised release thereafter.

He alleges violations of his rights under the Fifth Amendment and of 18 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 4241(a). Mnatsakanyan has not demonstrated either that his due process rights

were violated when the district court permitted him to waive his right to an

evidentiary hearing and accepted his admissions, or that it plainly erred by not sua

sponte ordering a hearing on his competence. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

In 2019, Mnatsakanyan pled guilty to two counts of bank fraud. The district

court sentenced him to a 31-month custodial term and a 5-year supervised release

period. Since his sentencing, Mnatsakanyan has violated the conditions of his

supervised release twice, in 2021 and again in 2023. This appeal concerns the

revocation proceedings for the second set of violations.

We apply de novo review to whether a waiver made during probation

revocation proceedings was voluntary and clear error review to the district court’s

determination that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. United States v. Stocks,

104 F.3d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1997). We review for plain error the district court’s

decision to not sua sponte order a competency hearing. United States v. Dreyer,

705 F.3d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 2013).

Mnatsakanyan fails to establish that the district court violated his

constitutional rights. The record here contained ample evidence that his waiver and

admissions were given in compliance with due process. Boykin v. Alabama, 395

U.S. 238, 243 (1969). He was expressly advised of his rights when the proceeding

2 24-5854 began and was represented by counsel with whom he had a lengthy conversation

before the hearing. The district court directly inquired as to whether there was any

reason he didn’t understand the proceedings, and he cogently and coherently

addressed the court. These inquiries meet the “limited requirement” outlined by

Boykin. United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2011).

Mnatsakanyan did not demonstrate that the district court erred by failing sua

sponte to order a hearing to examine his competence to proceed. Mnatsakanyan

displayed an appropriate court demeanor, did not demonstrate irrational behavior,

and failed to submit any medical evidence of incompetency. See United States v.

Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 814 (9th Cir. 2008). A suicide attempt may be enough to

establish doubt as to competency, but it does not necessarily do so. See United

States v. Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1997). Proximity to the

hearing date alone is not enough to meet the “substantial evidence” standard

required by this Court. Marks, 530 F.3d at 814; see also United States v. Mikhel,

889 F.3d 1003, 1039 (9th Cir. 2018). There was no reason to require the district

court to have proceeded differently.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-5854