United States v. Mitchell Melega

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 24-2298
• Status: Published
• Author: Scudder

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-2298 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

MITCHELL A. MELEGA, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 4:20-cr-40056-JES-JEH-2 — James E. Shadid, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2025 — DECIDED APRIL 24, 2026 ____________________

Before SCUDDER, PRYOR, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Mitchell Melega appeals his 75- month federal sentence for conspiracy, bank fraud, and money laundering based on his role in a multimillion-dollar scheme to defraud two banks. In calculating the advisory sen- tencing range, the district court applied one two-level en- hancement for Melega’s use of sophisticated means and an- other for his role in the offense. The court then sentenced him below the advisory range. Melega challenges both 2 No. 24-2298

enhancements, the district court’s reliance on certain facts, and its application of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We affirm. I A Mitchell Melega served as financial controller for I-80 Equipment LLC, a company owned by his co-defendant, Erik Jones, that bought, refurbished, and sold used vehicles. As controller, Melega managed the company’s borrowing and participated in management decisions. He held a similar fi- nancial role in Jones’s property management and rental com- pany, J.P. Rentals LLC. From about August 2016 to November 2017, Melega and Jones ran a scheme to defraud two regional banks, First Mid- west Bank and Northwest Bank, through I-80 and J.P. Rentals. The fraud on each bank followed a similar pattern—Melega and Jones leveraged false promises, and for First Midwest Bank, forged documents, to obtain loan advances for work their companies did not plan to undertake. They then di- verted the funds and failed to repay the debt. The fraud committed through I-80 focused on vehicle loans. Jones executed loan agreements on the company’s be- half with First Midwest Bank under which the bank agreed to provide 80% of the capital needed to buy and improve vehi- cles. I-80 documented purchases with these funds and tracked the vehicles using vehicle identification numbers. The com- pany owed the principal and interest once it sold a vehicle. But I-80 instead diverted the funds through the following process. Melega would start with a list of vehicles from a sup- plier. Someone—we do not know who—then altered the No. 24-2298 3

invoices to inflate purchase prices. Melega knowingly submit- ted the fraudulent invoices, as well as unaltered invoices for vehicles I-80 did not buy, to First Midwest along with a loan- advance request. He also requested funds for improvements to vehicles that I-80 had not purchased. Unbeknownst to the bank, I-80 never intended to buy or improve many of these vehicles. In addition to coordinating the loan applications, Melega directed employees to make excuses for missing vehi- cles when bank inspectors visited I-80. Melega and Jones perpetrated a similar scheme to defraud Northwest Bank through Jones’s rental company. Jones exe- cuted a loan agreement with the bank on behalf of J.P. Rentals to buy and renovate an apartment complex. Northwest Bank later discovered that the improvements associated with cer- tain loan advances were never made. At some point, Jones and Melega discussed diverting funds to pay I-80’s debts. In the end, Melega and Jones’s scheme caused over $7,000,000 in losses to First Midwest Bank and Northwest Bank. A grand jury indicted Melega and Jones with the same 12 counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344), conspiracy to commit bank fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349), and money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1957). Jones entered a plea agreement under Fed- eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) in which he agreed to a sentence between 24 and 60 months’ imprison- ment. The district court sentenced him to 54 months’ impris- onment. Six months after Jones’s plea, Melega entered an open plea agreement with no promise of a minimum or max- imum sentence. 4 No. 24-2298

B The district court sentenced Melega using the 2023 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In doing so, it applied two enhance- ments over Melega’s objections. First, it applied a two-level enhancement for use of sophisticated means under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The district court acknowledged that the scheme as a whole was complex, extending beyond garden- variety bank fraud. It further determined that Melega himself undertook sophisticated measures to conceal the fraud by “procur[ing] and produc[ing]” false documents and “hiding” and “redirecting” assets. Second, the district court applied a two-level role enhance- ment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) after finding that Melega su- pervised at least one participant in the scheme. Melega admit- ted that he knowingly gathered falsified documents from I-80 employees and transmitted them to the banks to secure funds. The government offered two examples of Melega going a step further and directing Jones’s employees to provide infor- mation, including false information, to secure loan advances. In one email, Melega told I-80 employee Sean Young to obtain a list of vehicles from a supplier, ETI, to use to apply for more bank funds. The email then divulged that the funds would be used in an unauthorized manner—to pay off prior invoices from ETI instead of purchasing new vehicles. This approach would “eliminate any issues with payments in the future” so they could “repeat the cycle going forward.” Young ultimately followed through and the funds went to paying off debt to ETI. In another email, Melega informed J.P. Rentals employee Kim Thompson that the company intended to buy a house No. 24-2298 5

and make renovations, with a total cost of $101,430. Melega directed Thompson to “see what type of improvements [the company could] slip into this estimate to bump that number” up and take advantage of the “remaining proceeds.” He also cautioned that the “inflated improvements” should be some- thing “the appraiser can’t put his eyes on from the road.” From there the company would try to have a tenant in the property before the appraiser could reevaluate, making it “more difficult for him to assess internal renovations.” The record does not tell us if Thompson complied. After hearing about both emails, the district court deter- mined that Melega “supervised or controlled somebody … specifically one participant.” It did not name who, but it did adopt the government’s position on the facts and those re- counted in the Probation Office’s Presentence Investigation Report. Once it addressed all of Melega’s objections to the PSR, the district court adopted its calculation of a sentencing range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment based on a total offense level of 30 points and criminal history category of I. The district court then heard Melega’s mitigation evidence and sentenced him below the advisory range to 75 months’ imprisonment. The court observed that 75 months was the median sentence for the offense level. It also addressed the 21- month disparity between Melega and Jones’s sentences ex- plaining that, while the culpability for each defendant was similar, Melega did not take full responsibility for his actions. The fraud scheme was also “arguably” Melega’s “second go- around” because the PSR indicated that he stole from a prior employer. This conduct, the court observed, demonstrated 6 No. 24-2298

that the sentence needed to protect the public from further crime. Melega now appeals, challenging the district court’s appli- cation of the sentencing enhancements, reliance on certain facts, and the disparity with Jones’s sentence. II A We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear er- ror and whether those facts support an enhancement without deference. See United States v. Dennis, 119 F.4th 1103, 1109 (7th Cir. 2024). A sentencing court must find by a preponderance that the facts support the enhancement in question. See id. We may also affirm an enhancement on any ground supported by the record. See United States v. Sheikh, 367 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2004). Where, as here, the district court adopted the Pro- bation Office’s findings of fact for sentencing, the record available for review includes the PSR. See United States v. Stra- che, 202 F.3d 980, 987 (7th Cir. 2000). The Sentencing Commission authorized a two-level en- hancement if the offense “involved sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). “Sophisticated means” entail “especially complex or espe- cially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B). The en- hancement “does not require a brilliant scheme, just one that displays a greater level of planning or concealment than the usual fraud case.” United States v. Kowalski, 103 F.4th 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Lundberg, 990 F.3d 1087, 1097 (7th Cir. 2021)). No. 24-2298 7

The district court committed no error in imposing the en- hancement. In no uncertain terms, the court found that the overall scheme was “relatively intricate.” The record supports that finding, as the fraud extended over a year and required Jones’s companies to track and hide assets to perpetuate it without detection. The court also underscored the sophistica- tion of Melega’s actions, identifying his role in “procur[ing]” false documents and “produc[ing]” them to the banks, as well as “redirecting or hiding” the assets “knowing they were fraudulent.” See United States v. Griffin, 76 F.4th 724, 751 (7th Cir. 2023) (observing that a district court cannot apply § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) without determining “whether the defend- ant’s own conduct was ‘sophisticated’” (quoting U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, Amdt. 792 (Reason for Amendment))). While the court could have elaborated more on Melega’s specific acts, the record is sufficient to support the finding that he used sophisticated means to carry out the fraud. To be sure, we recognize that merely transmitting fraudu- lent documents to a bank is no more complex than the average fraud scheme, as virtually all bank fraud involves fabrications or misrepresentations. See United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2014). At the same time, concealment need not go “far beyond” the “concealment inherent in the fraud” to be sophisticated. Griffin, 76 F.4th at 751 (cleaned up). Melega went much further. As I-80’s controller, he stood at the epicenter of the scheme, not only handling the procure- ment and submission of fraudulent loan requests but also par- ticipating in financial decisions about when and how to re- quest and divert funds. See United States v. Knox, 624 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Knox’s coordination of various moving parts of the scheme and his ability to fool so many lenders … 8 No. 24-2298

also speaks to the scheme’s sophistication.”). For instance, Melega and Jones discussed drawing funds from the North- west Bank loan to pay I-80’s expenses. Melega also told Thompson how to covertly pad a loan request. And he di- rected Young to obtain information for more loan advance- ments, revealing that I-80 would divert the funds to avoid fi- nancial calamity and repeat. This is textbook sophisticated planning and coordination. Melega disclaims authoring the email to Young because it did not bear his written signature even though it came from his account. But the district court seemed to resolve this dis- pute by hearing each side on the issue and then accepting the government’s position that Melega sent it. It also accepted the PSR, which echoes that position. See United States v. Blake, 965 F.3d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that a sentencing court may resolve a factual dispute consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3) by adopting the government’s position, as set forth in the PSR, without further explanation). That ruling was not clearly erroneous. Melega never ex- plained how the email could have been sent from his address without his knowledge or permission. And the thrust of it mirrors his unchallenged email to Thompson in which he ad- mitted similar fraudulent intent. See United States v. Sunmola, 887 F.3d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 2018) (observing that a sentencing court has broad discretion to make factual determinations and may draw conclusions from evidence that has sufficient indicia of reliability). Beyond coordinating the fraud, Melega hid his deception by directing I-80 employees to make excuses about why vehi- cles were missing when banks showed up to conduct inspec- tions. Melega may not have lied to bank inspectors himself, No. 24-2298 9

but he caused others to do so. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (providing that the enhancement applies if “the defendant in- tentionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting so- phisticated means” (emphasis added)). In the final analysis, Melega’s actions evinced a “greater level of planning or concealment” than the typical bank fraud. United States v. Harris, 791 F.3d 772, 781 (7th Cir. 2015). His deception allowed the scheme to continue for over a year. See United States v. Friedman, 971 F.3d 700, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2020) (determining that “covering … up” a bank fraud scheme “over a span of three years, as opposed to one or two fake loan applications” contributed to the scheme’s sophistication for the purposes of a § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) enhancement). The district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement. B Melega next challenges his role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, which increases the offense level for a de- fendant who acts as an organizer, leader, manager, or super- visor in a criminal scheme, reflecting their “greater contribu- tions to” and “culpability in” the offense. United States v. Co- lon, 919 F.3d 510, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2019). The defendant must have acted in one of these roles vis-a-vis “one or more other participants,” which is “a person who is criminally responsi- ble for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. nn.1–2. If the scheme had fewer than five participants and was not otherwise extensive, the offense level increases by two points. Id. § 3B1.1(c). The Guidelines do not define “organizer,” “leader,” “man- ager,” or “supervisor,” but they provide factors to consider such as: 10 No. 24-2298

The exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. Id. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. No one factor is necessary. For instance, it can be enough that a defendant “orchestrat[ed] or coordi- nat[ed] activities performed by others” without giving direct orders. United States v. Barnes, 141 F.4th 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). We have emphasized that “commonsense judg- ment[s] about the defendant’s relative culpability” should drive the application of a § 3B1.1 enhancement. Id. (cleaned up). The district court did not err in applying the two-level en- hancement to Melega. After hearing about his emails to Sean Young and Kim Thomspon, the court found that he had su- pervised a participant. It did not specify who, but since the district court stood on firm ground in finding that Melega sent the email to Young, it is easy to conclude that Melega super- vised or managed him. And Young was a participant because he knowingly assisted the fraud. See United States v. Cooper, 767 F.3d 721, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he district court is not required to explicitly name the participant the defendant con- trolled so long as it is clear from its findings and the evidence that the defendant actually did manage or supervise a partic- ipant.”). This suffices for a § 3B1.1(c) role enhancement. But there is more. Factors that supported the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) enhancement also apply and merit brief No. 24-2298 11

mention. See United States v. Robinson, 538 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven if there is significant overlap, the same facts can serve as a foundation for both [sophisticated means and role enhancements].”). Melega actively planned, coordinated, and concealed the fraud. He was more than a conduit or middleman. Cf. Colon, 919 F.3d at 518 (“[M]iddleman status alone cannot support a [§ 3B1.1 enhancement].” (cleaned up)). Melega’s directive to Young is one illustration. See id. at 519 (“[F]or any leadership enhancement to apply, the district court must identify in- stances where the defendant orchestrated or oversaw [a par- ticipant].”). He also directed I-80 employees to lie to bank in- spectors to conceal the loan diversion. Overall, the record shows that Melega exercised enough influence over other par- ticipants to warrant a two-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) as a manager or supervisor. C Finally, Melega contends that his sentence was procedur- ally unreasonable because the district court based it on unre- liable facts and failed to avoid an unwarranted disparity with his co-defendant’s sentence. Neither position holds up. A court “procedurally errs when it relies on unreliable or inaccurate information in making its sentencing deci- sion.” United States v. Campbell, 99 F.4th 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). Melega highlights three points that the district court should not have relied on: that he was more culpable than Jones, that he was the “brains of [the] operation,” and that he had stolen from a prior employer. The district court never made the first two of these conclu- sions, however. After hearing from both parties, the court 12 No. 24-2298

determined that Melega and Jones’s roles were on par and that their level of culpability was “very similar.” Melega likely waived his right to challenge the last point— that he stole from a prior employer—by not doing so before or during sentencing. See United States v. Propst, 959 F.3d 298, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2020). Regardless, he has not shown that the information is inaccurate. See United States v. Harris, 118 F.4th 875, 887 (7th Cir. 2024). The PSR explained that Melega was a finance specialist for Full Circle Services, Inc. before joining I- 80. Full Circle informed the Probation Office that it fired Melega after he used a company credit card for personal use and attributed over 100 employees’ state and federal tax with- holdings towards his own. Melega observes that this infor- mation contains hearsay. Perhaps, but hearsay alone does not render the evidence unreliable. See United States v. Mitchell, 635 F.3d 990, 993–94 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] district court may consider hearsay at sentencing unless it is devoid of any indi- cia of reliability.” (cleaned up)). Next, Melega lodges a procedural challenge to the 21- month gap between his and Jones’s sentences. “[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(6) requires district courts to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities ….” United States v. Brooks, 100 F.4th 825, 840 (7th Cir. 2024). That includes a dis- parity with similar sentences imposed nationwide and with a co-defendant. See United States v. Moore, 50 F.4th 597, 604 (7th Cir. 2022). But the district court explained why it sentenced Jones and Melega differently. While they pleaded guilty to the same charges and exhibited similar culpability, Melega had stolen before and did not accept responsibility as fully as Jones. Those differences created a greater need for deterrence. No. 24-2298 13

Although not framed this way, Melega’s challenge is also substantive because he contests the weight the district court gave to his prior conduct and acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Jerry, 55 F.4th 1124, 1132 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[W]hen evaluating the procedural soundness of a sentence, we do not explore its reasonableness; that inquiry is reserved for a substantive challenge.” (cleaned up)). Melega faces an uphill battle because a sentence below the Guidelines is pre- sumptively reasonable. See United States v. Seymour, 94 F.4th 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2024); id. at 687–88 (“[W]e have never held that a below-Guidelines sentence is unreasonably high.”). He cannot rebut that presumption. First, Melega’s theft from his prior employer is relevant to his sentence even though it did not result in a criminal con- viction because the misconduct is similar. See United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[C]onduct relevant to the crime of conviction can be considered in calculating a sentence even if that conduct did not result in a conviction.”). Jones, by contrast, did not have any criminal history. Second, Melega took less accountability than Jones. Unlike Jones, Melega downplayed his role and misconduct in a letter to the district court. He cast himself as “ignorant and passive to the things going on around [him],” in stark contrast to the record evidence. Again, this difference is relevant to the need for deterrence and may pertain to other § 3353(a) factors such as the need to promote respect for the rule of law. See, e.g., United States v. Travis, 294 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2002) (ex- plaining that acceptance of responsibility considers the “re- duced rate of recidivism among defendants who admit the wrongfulness of their actions”). 14 No. 24-2298

It does seem true that Melega and Jones received the same two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) as a matter of calculating their sentencing ranges. But a district court may consider the same conduct in calculating the guidelines range and in its § 3553(a) analysis. See United States v. Gonzalez, 3 F.4th 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Even if the Guidelines and § 3553(a) sometimes overlap, we have never held that a judge must … articulate why specific Guidelines factors inadequately account for the nature of the crime … or any other statutory factor.” (quoting United States v. Kuczora, 910 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2018))). And that may lead to a reasonable and warranted sentencing disparity be- tween co-defendants when their accountability differs, even if they both have done enough to receive acceptance-of-re- sponsibility credit under § 3E1.1(a). The district court could not, as Melega suggests, have given Jones a greater offense-level reduction under § 3E1.1 because he took more accountability than Melega. The Guide- lines provide a base deduction of two points for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). A defendant may only receive a three-point reduction under § 3E1.1(b) if the govern- ment files a motion stating that the defendant has timely as- sisted authorities to warrant the reduction. See id. § 3E1.1(b) & cmt. n.6. Here, it did not. So the district court could only account for the difference in Melega’s and Jones’s relative ac- countability by considering it in its § 3553(a) analysis. And we are not aware of case law preventing a district court from cal- ibrating a defendant’s sentence in this way. In the end, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Melega to 21 months more than Erik Jones. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.