United States v. Mitchell McNeil

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: 25-4224
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4224 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/27/2026 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4224

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MITCHELL MCNEIL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:23-cr-00065-D-RJ-2)

Submitted: April 23, 2026 Decided: April 27, 2026

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Joshua B. Carpenter, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. W. Ellis Boyle, United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, Sarah E. Nokes, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4224 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/27/2026 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Mitchell McNeil appeals the 300-month sentence imposed after he pled guilty,

pursuant to a plea agreement (“the Agreement”), to conspiracy to distribute and possession

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 50 grams or more of

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846; distribution of 50 grams

or more of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 2; and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). On appeal, McNeil

asserts that the Government breached the Agreement by seeking, and ultimately receiving,

an enhancement to his offense level based on McNeil’s possession of a dangerous weapon,

in accordance with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2024). McNeil

contends that the Government was barred from seeking this enhancement because this was

not a stipulated sentencing factor in the Agreement. Upon review, we conclude that there

was no breach of the plea agreement and therefore affirm.

“Because [McNeil] did not challenge the government’s purported breach of the plea

agreement before the district court, we review his claim for plain error.” United States v.

Edgell, 914 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2019). “Under that standard, [McNeil] must show that

the government plainly breached its plea agreement with him and that the breach both

affected his substantial rights and called into question the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 286-87.

“Plea agreements are grounded in contract law, and both parties to a plea agreement

should receive the benefit of their bargain.” United States v. Tate, 845 F.3d 571, 575 (4th

2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4224 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/27/2026 Pg: 3 of 3

Cir. 2017). Thus, “[t]he government breaches a plea agreement when a promise it made to

induce the plea goes unfulfilled.” Id. “However, a central tenet of contract law is that no

party is obligated to provide more than is specified in the agreement itself. Accordingly,

in enforcing plea agreements, the government is held only to those promises that it actually

made to the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

In this case, the Agreement provided that it contained the entirety of the agreement

between the parties and that there existed no other agreements or terms. The Agreement

also listed the only sentencing factors to which the parties stipulated, and indicated that the

Government reserved its right to present any evidence and information at sentencing and

to make a sentence recommendation. However, nothing in the Agreement limited the

parties from arguing about the applicability of other sentencing factors. We therefore reject

McNeil’s argument that the Government breached the Agreement by seeking application

of the dangerous weapons enhancement to his offense level. See, e.g., United States v.

Johnson, 119 F.4th 343, 351 (4th Cir. 2024) (finding that similar provisions undermined

defendant’s argument that government agreed not to argue for a sentence above the

applicable Sentencing Guidelines range).

Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED