United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1651
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
WILLIE RICHARD MINOR,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Jon D. Levy, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Rikelman and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Karen A. Pickett, with whom Pickett Law Offices, P.C., was on brief, for appellant.
Lindsay B. Feinberg, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Craig M. Wolff, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
January 27, 2026 BARRON, Chief Judge. In this appeal, Willie Richard
Minor challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2) and
922(g)(9).1 Section 924(a)(2) provides that whoever "knowingly
violates" § 922(g)(9) is subject to a maximum term of imprisonment
of ten years. Section 922(g)(9) makes it "unlawful" for a person
convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to possess
a firearm.
At the time of Minor's charged conduct, 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(33)(A) defined a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"
as an offense that "is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or
Tribal law" and "has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed
by a current or former spouse" or other intimate or familial
relation.2 The predicate misdemeanor for Minor was his 2010
conviction under Maine law for simple assault of his then-wife.
1 We refer to and cite § 924(a)(2) in this opinion as it existed at the time of Minor's charged conduct. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act relocated the relevant portion of that provision to § 924(a)(8) and increased the maximum term of imprisonment for its violation. Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004, 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022).
2 We refer to and cite § 921(a)(33)(A) in this opinion as it existed at the time of Minor's charged conduct. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act amended the definition of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to include offenses by "a person who has a current or recent former dating relationship with the victim." Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12005, 136 Stat. 1313, 1332 (2022).
- 2 - Minor bases his challenge to his federal conviction in
part on the ground that, under the Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied to him. He also contends, however, that even if
§ 922(g)(9) does not violate the Second Amendment, his conviction
cannot stand because evidence that he wanted to introduce at his
criminal trial in the United States District Court for the District
of Maine was wrongly excluded. We affirm.
I.
The path to this appeal is quite lengthy. In 2009, Minor
was charged under Maine law with "Domestic Violence Assault."
United States v. Minor (Minor II), 63 F.4th 112, 115 (1st Cir.
2023). The alleged victim of the assault was Minor's then-wife.
Id.
After watching an advice-of-rights video that stated
that an individual could lose their right to possess firearms if
they were convicted of certain offenses -- including offenses
"that involve the use of force" against a spouse -- "Minor refused
to plead guilty to the domestic violence charge." Id. The state
prosecutor thereafter agreed to reduce the charge to a simple
assault charge and strike any reference in it to either the alleged
victim or domestic violence. Id. Minor pleaded no contest to the
simple assault charge in 2010. Id.
- 3 - Seven years later, after revealing in an interview with
local police that he owned a gun, Minor was charged under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2) with having "knowingly violate[d]" § 922(g)(9) based
on his prior Maine-law conviction for simple assault. Id. at 114.
Minor pleaded not guilty to this federal charge but was convicted
of it following a jury trial in December 2017. He then appealed
the conviction to our Court.
While Minor's appeal was pending in our Court, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Rehaif v. United States,
588 U.S. 225 (2019). The defendant there had been charged under
§ 924(a)(2) with "knowingly violat[ing]" § 922(g)(5), which makes
it unlawful for a person who is an "alien" "illegally or unlawfully
in the United States" to possess a firearm. Id. at 227-28 (first
quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2); and then quoting id. § 922(g)(5)).
The Court interpreted the word "knowingly" in § 924(a)(2) to mean
that, to secure a conviction under §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g), the
government had to prove that the defendant "knew he belonged to
the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm."
Id. at 237.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling, the parties
agreed that Minor's 2017 conviction under §§ 924(a)(2) and
922(g)(9) should be vacated and remanded, and we disposed of the
appeal by doing so. Minor II, 63 F.4th at 115. The government
then sought and secured a superseding indictment, this time
- 4 - alleging that Minor "knew that he had been previously convicted of
[a] misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Id.
Minor moved to dismiss the superseding indictment, but
the District Court denied his motion. Minor was then tried before
a jury under the new indictment. See id.
Minor had stipulated to most of the elements of
§§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9), including that the gun had been moved
in interstate commerce, that he "knowingly possessed" it, and that
the victim named in his original state-law assault complaint was
his spouse at the time. Id. He testified at his federal criminal
trial in the District of Maine, however, that he understood that
in the state proceedings in 2010 he had been "convicted of a simple
assault," not "a domestic." Id.
Minor also sought to introduce evidence that,
notwithstanding his 2010 state-law conviction for simple assault,
he believed that he could possess a firearm as a result of his
plea arrangement in that state criminal case. Id. at 115-16. That
evidence included proffered testimony from George Hess, the
attorney who had represented him during the state criminal
proceedings. Id. at 116. In that testimony, Hess purportedly
would have averred that the assistant district attorney who had
prosecuted Minor's state-law assault charge told Hess that "Minor
would still be able to possess a firearm if he pled guilty to
the . . . simple assault." Id. at 116.
- 5 - The District Court excluded the proffered testimony, and
the jury found Minor guilty, resulting in him again being convicted
under §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9) based on his having possessed a
gun after having been convicted in 2010 under state law for a
simple assault in which his then-wife was the victim. Id. at
116-17. He then appealed the new federal conviction.
A divided panel of this Court vacated the conviction
based on perceived errors in the jury instructions that were
related to how the panel determined Rehaif applied to Minor's case.
See United States v. Minor (Minor I), 31 F.4th 9, 20-21 (1st Cir.
2022). However, the government petitioned for rehearing en banc,
and the petition was granted. See Minor II, 63 F.4th at 117.
In our en banc ruling, we clarified the type of knowledge
that is sufficient under §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9) to establish
that a defendant knew "that he was in the category of persons
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Id. at
114. In doing so, we rejected Minor's argument that, under Rehaif,
the word "knowingly" in § 924(a)(2) required the government to
prove that he knew that the simple assault offense for which he
had been convicted was classified as a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence under federal law. Id. at 120. We held instead
that, in accord with Rehaif, a defendant's knowledge that he
"belonged to the relevant category of persons" is established if
his "knowledge about his prior conviction included everything
- 6 - necessary to satisfy" the statutory definition of that term. Id.
at 120-21; see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (defining
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence").
In other words, we explained that "knowingly" in
§ 924(a)(2) requires only, as to the "category of persons"
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, that the
defendant knew the characteristics of his previous offense that
brought it within the statutory definition of a "misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence." See Minor II, 63 F.4th at 121.
"Knowingly," we explained, did not require the defendant also to
know that his prior offense was so defined under federal law. See
id. at 124.
Drawing on Congress's definition of "misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), we then
explained that the District Court may
instruct the jury that the Government must prove that Minor knew, at the time he possessed a gun, that: (i) he had been previously convicted of an offense that "is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law"; (ii) in order for him to have been convicted of the prior offense at a trial, the government would have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he "use[d] or attempted [to] use . . . physical force"; and (iii) the victim of that offense was, at the time of the offense, his "current or former spouse."
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)).
- 7 - We concluded, however, that the instructions used in
Minor's trial in the District of Maine failed to properly describe
those elements of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Id.
at 121. We further concluded that the government had not made an
argument that this instructional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 124. Accordingly, we vacated Minor's
conviction under §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9) and remanded the case
for further proceedings consistent with our decision. Id. at
125-26.
On remand, Minor renewed his effort to dismiss the
superseding indictment, arguing that under New York State Rifle &
Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), § 922(g)(9) is "facially
invalid in defining prohibited persons and as applied to him in
violation of the Second Amendment of the United States
Constitution[]." The District Court denied his motion, concluding
that § 922(g)(9) was sufficiently analogous to the "historical
tradition of restricting persons considered to be untrustworthy or
dangerous, including persons convicted of violent offenses, such
as an assault, from possessing firearms."
A two-day jury trial was held in April 2024. Prior to
the trial's start, the government filed a motion in limine to
exclude any evidence or argument that, notwithstanding his 2010
state-law conviction for simple assault, Minor thought that he
legally was allowed to possess firearms. Such evidence, the
- 8 - government argued, was irrelevant under Minor II and unfairly
prejudicial because it would confuse the issues and mislead the
jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 401-03. Minor opposed the motion,
contending that he was entitled, under Rehaif, to testify as to
"whether he had knowledge that he belonged to a category of persons
and why he held that belief."
Relying on our holding in Minor II that the "knowingly"
element of the offense did not require the government to prove
"that the defendant knew that he could not possess a gun," 63 F.4th
at 126, the District Court granted the government's motion in
limine and barred Minor from presenting argument or evidence that
he "believed he was allowed to possess a firearm." The trial
ensued, and the jury again returned a guilty verdict against Minor.
Minor was thus convicted for the third time of knowingly possessing
a firearm as a domestic violence misdemeanant in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) and was sentenced to time served.
He then timely filed this appeal.
II.
We begin with Minor's challenge to the District Court's
denial of his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on the
ground that, under the Second Amendment, § 922(g)(9) is "facially
invalid" and unconstitutional "as applied to him." Our review is
de novo. United States v. Castillo, 158 F.4th 257, 271 (1st Cir.
2025).
- 9 - A.
When an individual's conduct falls within the "plain
text" of the Second Amendment, "the Constitution presumptively
protects that conduct." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. To show that a
gun regulation is nonetheless lawful under the Second Amendment,
the government bears the burden of "demonstrat[ing] that [the
challenged] regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical
tradition of firearm regulation." Id.3
Following Bruen, but after the District Court issued its
decision in this case rejecting Minor's Second Amendment
challenge, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602
U.S. 680 (2024). The case concerned a defendant's challenge under
the Second Amendment to his conviction under § 924(a)(2) for
knowingly violating § 922(g)(8)(C)(i). Id. at 684-86. That
provision makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm who
is subject to a domestic violence restraining order that "includes
a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the
3 We previously upheld § 922(g)(9) against a facial Second Amendment challenge under our then-prevailing means-ends framework. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 22-26 (1st Cir. 2011). Due to the Supreme Court's explicit abrogation of that approach, see Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18-19, our analysis here is not controlled by that prior decision. See United States v. Perez, 89 F.4th 247, 250 (1st Cir. 2023) (recognizing an exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine "when an existing panel decision is undermined by controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion of the Supreme Court" (citation modified)).
- 10 - physical safety of [an] intimate partner" or a child of an intimate
partner. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i).
The parties have fully briefed how Rahimi bears on this
case, including its instruction that "central to" the inquiry into
whether a firearms regulation "is consistent with the principles
that underpin our regulatory tradition" is "[w]hy and how the
regulation burdens the right." 602 U.S. at 692. We thus see no
need to remand the purely legal question before us for further
consideration in light of Rahimi.
B.
The District Court assumed, without deciding, that
Minor's conduct fell within the Second Amendment's plain text,
which states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II. The
government does not contend otherwise on appeal. We thus proceed
to address whether the government has met its burden to show that
the restriction on firearm possession set forth in § 922(g)(9)
fits within "our 'historical tradition of firearm regulation,'"
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17), while
focusing, as Rahimi requires, on why and how the restriction
burdens the right, id. at 692.
The government contends that the Supreme Court's
decision in Rahimi makes clear that § 922(g)(9) does fit within
- 11 - that tradition. The Court explained that the Second Amendment
permitted Congress to bar a person from possessing a firearm when
subject to a domestic violence restraining order that found that
person to "represent[] a credible threat" to the physical safety
of an "intimate partner or child." Id. at 693-700; 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8)(C)(i).
The Court relied principally on "two distinct legal
regimes . . . that specifically addressed firearms
violence": surety and "going armed" laws. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at
693-98. Surety laws, the Court summarized, were "[a] form of
'preventative justice'" that "authorized magistrates to require
individuals suspected of future misbehavior," including spousal
abuse, "to post a bond" which would be forfeit if the individual
later broke the peace. Id. at 695 (quoting 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 251 (10th ed. 1787)). Going
armed laws, the Court explained, "prohibited riding or going armed,
with dangerous or unusual weapons, to terrify the good people of
the land." Id. at 697 (citation modified).
"Taken together," the Court reasoned, these founding-era
measures revealed a tradition of disarming individuals who "pose[]
a clear threat of physical violence to another." Id. at 698. The
Court then determined that § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) "fit[] neatly" within
that tradition. Id.
- 12 - The Court held that § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) was "relevantly
similar" to surety and going armed laws "in both why and how it
burdens the Second Amendment right." Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S.
at 29). It explained that the measure "restrict[ed] gun use to
mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence," id., but
"only once a court has found that the defendant 'represents a
credible threat to the physical safety' of another," id. at 699
(quoting § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)). It further noted that, like the
surety laws, the disability on firearm possession that
§ 922(g)(8)(C)(i) imposed was temporary. Id. And it observed
that the going armed laws were not meaningfully different in that
durational regard, given that they permitted imprisonment, which
is a more onerous punishment than disarmament. Id. The Court
therefore held that the defendant's Second Amendment-based
challenge to § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) failed because "[a]n individual
found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety
of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second
Amendment." Id. at 702.
Our sister circuits have been unanimous thus far in
concluding that, given Rahimi, the measure at issue here also fits
within our nation's tradition of firearm regulation. See United
States v. Simmons, 150 F.4th 126, 132-34 (2d Cir. 2025); United
States v. Nutter, 137 F.4th 224, 231-32 (4th Cir. 2025); United
States v. Bernard, 136 F.4th 762, 765-66 (8th Cir. 2025); United
- 13 - States v. Jackson, 138 F.4th 1244, 1253-55 (10th Cir. 2025); United
States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822, 827-28 (6th Cir. 2024). We agree.
In attempting to make the contrary case, Minor
emphasizes that, unlike the defendant in Rahimi, he "has never
been found by a court to present a 'clear threat of physical
violence to another,'" as his 2010 conviction for simple assault
"required no such finding." He thus takes issue with the
government's contention that, under Rahimi, this measure (whether
on its face or in application to his case) accords with the Second
Amendment. As he sees things, unlike the law at issue in Rahimi,
§ 922(g)(9) disarms individuals based on their past criminal
conduct rather than any finding by a court that they present a
current threat.4
But Minor's conviction for simple assault means that he
was found beyond a reasonable doubt to have "intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury or offensive
physical contact to another person." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
4The government urges us to decline to consider Minor's as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(9); it argues that "a case-by-case approach in assessing the relative danger posed by every domestic violence misdemeanant" under that provision is "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." In the government's view, § 922(g)(9) is constitutional in "all applications . . . based on Congress's reasoned determination that a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence indicates a danger to the physical safety of others or a special danger of firearm misuse." Because we conclude that the basis for Minor's as-applied challenge fails anyway, we reserve that question for another day.
- 14 - 17-a, § 207(1)(A). There also is no dispute that the victim in
that criminal offense was his spouse at the time. It is therefore
significant that, in enacting this measure, Congress sought, as
the Supreme Court has explained, "to 'close [a] dangerous loophole'
in the gun control laws," Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686,
689 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 160 (2014)) (emphasis added), precisely
due to the danger that it determined was posed by those who had
committed a past misdemeanor offense of domestic violence
possessing a firearm. The "[e]xisting felon-in-possession laws,
Congress recognized, were not keeping firearms out of the hands of
domestic abusers" because many perpetrators of domestic violence
are charged with and convicted of misdemeanors, not felonies.
United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009); accord Voisine,
579 U.S. at 689; see also Tom Lininger, An Ethical Duty to Charge
Batterers Appropriately, 22 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 173, 191-93
(2015) (observing common practice of undercharging domestic
violence offenses). So, through § 922(g)(9), Congress "extended"
the federal felon-disarmament statute to a specific "class of
criminals" who it determined "posed a significant and
particularized danger to those around them," United States v.
Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 24 n.16 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Simmons,
150 F.4th at 133 (explaining that § 922(g)(9) "disarms people
deemed dangerous to the physical safety of others"), as the
- 15 - provision is aimed at "preventing gun violence in the home" by
limiting gun possession by persons "who have been proven to engage
in violence with those with whom they share a domestically intimate
or familial relationship," Booker, 644 F.3d at 25; see also Hayes,
555 U.S. at 427 ("Firearms and domestic strife are a potentially
deadly combination nationwide.").
Of course, Minor is right that, unlike the provision at
issue in Rahimi, the one at issue here is not dependent on there
having been a judicial finding that the person subject to the
firearms restriction poses a threat to anyone. But if Minor means
to argue that Rahimi itself held that the Second Amendment permits
Congress to disarm an individual based on dangerousness only if a
court had found that person posed a forward-looking threat of
physical violence to another, we cannot agree.
Rahimi did note that under the statute at issue there,
a court had to find that the defendant posed a current credible
threat to the physical safety of others. But it is clear that the
Court was not holding that a judicial finding of a forward-looking
threat is required as a constitutional matter for other subsections
of 922(g). See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693 ("Our analysis starts and
stops with Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) . . . ."). Rather, the Court
reiterated that, to satisfy the Second Amendment, a gun regulation
need only be "'relevantly similar' to laws that our tradition is
- 16 - understood to permit." Id. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at
29).
Moreover, Rahimi made clear that the modern firearms
regulation need not be a "dead ringer" for its historical
forebearers "to pass constitutional muster." Id. at 692 (quoting
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30). And we see no impermissible departure
from the historical tradition recognized in Rahimi in a measure
that treats past criminal domestic abuse as a basis for disarmament
due to the threat that the abuse will recur.
Congress acted with the understanding in passing this
firearms restriction that "[t]he recidivism rate for domestic
violence is high," Booker, 644 F.3d at 26; see also Gailes, 118
F.4th at 829 (surveying scholarship), as the Supreme Court itself
has recognized: "Domestic violence often escalates in severity
over time," Castleman, 572 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added). And Minor
does not himself dispute that factual predicate for Congress's
determination about the danger posed by a person possessing a
firearm who had been convicted of a misdemeanor offense of domestic
violence. This measure thus accords with our tradition of enacting
measures -- like the surety and going armed laws -- that
"restrict[] gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical
violence." Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698.
We note, too, that the restriction on firearm possession
imposed by § 922(g)(9) applies only once a defendant has been
- 17 - convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of a misdemeanor crime that
"has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force,
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon" committed against a
person with whom they share a familial or intimate relationship.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). In that respect, the
disqualification at issue aligns with the surety and going armed
laws even more closely than § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) did. The relevant
judicial determination requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
as opposed to the lesser quantum of evidence often used in civil
restraining orders. Cf. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing § 922(g)(8) is not consistent with our
historical tradition of firearm regulation because it "does not
require a finding that a person has ever committed a crime of
domestic violence" and "is not triggered by a criminal conviction
or a person's criminal history, unlike other § 922(g) subsections"
(citing § 922(g)(9))).
In addition, like the historical measures that the Court
looked to in Rahimi (the surety and going armed laws), § 922(g)(9)
does not impose a permanent prohibition on firearm possession. A
person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence may
possess guns "if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or
is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had
civil rights restored," provided that such "pardon, expungement,
or restoration of civil rights" does not "expressly provide[] that
- 18 - the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms."
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). By comparison,
going armed laws permitted forfeiture for a potentially indefinite
period, as individuals could be disarmed for the duration of their
imprisonment -- a term that was subject to "the king's pleasure."
4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 149 (12th
ed. 1795); see also Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699 (explaining that,
because "imprisonment was permissible [under the going armed laws]
to respond to the use of guns to threaten the physical safety of
others, then the lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that
Section 922(g)(8) imposes is also permissible").5
We recognize that, in many circumstances, the duration
of the disarmament under § 922(g)(9) may be longer than that under
§ 922(g)(8), which was the measure at issue in Rahimi. But
Rahimi's reasoning still applies to § 922(g)(9) because the
regulation before us is subject to a restoration of rights.6
5 We need not decide here whether our conclusion would change if § 922(g)(9) had no provision permitting restoration of gun rights under some circumstances.
6 We do not find meaningfully different, for the purposes of this facial constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(9), the fact that the disability in § 922(g)(8) ceases automatically upon the expiration of the predicate court order. Sureties, in the founding era, could be discharged automatically upon the conclusion of a specified term (such as a limited term "for one or more years, or for life") or by an order of the court upon a finding of "sufficient cause." 4 Blackstone (12th ed.), supra, at 253-54.
- 19 - Minor also appears to argue that § 922(g)(9) is
unconstitutional as applied to him because "[t]here was no evidence
that [he] had used the gun outside of his home," which is a place
that he asserts is "a sacrosanct area for protection under the
Second Amendment." But the Supreme Court rejected this very
argument in Rahimi. It observed that its decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller does not "establish[] a categorical
rule . . . prohibit[ing] regulations that forbid firearm
possession in the home" and in fact recognized that "many"
prohibitions that forbid such possession, "like those on the
possession of firearms by 'felons and the mentally ill . . .' are
'presumptively lawful.'" Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699 (quoting Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 626, 627 n.26 (2008)).
For these reasons, we conclude, based on Rahimi, that
§ 922(g)(9) "fits within our regulatory tradition." Id. at 698.
Accordingly, we reject Minor's Second Amendment-based challenge to
his conviction.
III.
Minor separately argues that we must vacate his
conviction because the District Court improperly excluded evidence
"concerning his belief that he was allowed to possess a firearm."
We review a district court's decision to "exclude evidence,
including rulings on motions in limine, for abuse of discretion."
United States v. Coleman, 149 F.4th 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting
- 20 - United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2007)). In the
event there was an abuse of discretion, the conviction must be
vacated "unless the error was harmless." Castillo, 158 F.4th at
272 (quoting United States v. García-Sierra, 994 F.3d 17, 26 (1st
Cir. 2021)). We review de novo whether the exclusion of evidence
violated a defendant's federal constitutional right to present a
defense. Coleman, 149 F.4th at 28.
A.
In Minor II, "we eschew[ed] opining preemptively on" the
admissibility of testimony by Minor regarding his subjective
belief of whether he could lawfully possess a gun. 63 F.4th at
126. But, we observed, to prove that the defendant acted
"knowingly" under § 924(a)(2), the government need not prove "that
the defendant knew that he could not possess a gun," because, "[a]s
to the alleged lack of that knowledge, ignorance of the law is no
defense." Id.
Before trial, the government filed a motion in limine to
exclude any evidence or argument that Minor thought that,
notwithstanding his 2010 state-law conviction for simple assault,
he legally was allowed to possess firearms. The District Court
conditionally granted the government's motion in limine at the
outset of the two-day trial held in April 2024 by ordering Minor's
attorney not to mention in his opening statement or during
cross-examination of the government's witnesses whether Minor
- 21 - "believed he could possess a firearm in November 2016 or why Minor
held that belief." Then, before Minor took the stand to testify,
the District Court unconditionally granted the government's motion
in limine and excluded "any evidence and argument that [Minor]
believed he was allowed to possess a firearm."
Minor argues that, in granting the government's motion
in limine, the District Court "contravene[d] the requirements of
Rehaif" by excluding evidence "that he did not have the requisite
'knowledge' of his status as having been convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence" due to an "innocent mistake." Our
decision in Minor II, he argues, "did not eliminate the concept of
a defendant's 'innocent mistake' as it affects mens rea." Minor
maintains that his belief that his 2010 Maine-law conviction for
simple assault "did not constitute a domestic assault on his former
wife" was an "innocent mistake" and thus that this belief provides
the basis for "a valid defense" that he lacked "knowledge of his
status as a domestic violence misdemeanant." For that reason, he
argues, the "severe limitations" on his testimony "violated his
Sixth Amendment right to present a full and fair defense" and
"completely vitiated [his] defense."
Minor's argument fails to appreciate the difference
between two related but "quite different situations" in which a
misunderstanding of the law leads to a mistaken view that one's
- 22 - conduct is not unlawful. Rehaif, 588 U.S. at 234. The first of
these situations is when "a defendant 'has a mistaken impression
concerning the legal effect of some collateral matter and that
mistake results in his misunderstanding the full significance of
his conduct,' thereby negating an element of the offense." Id.
(quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal
Law, § 5.1(a) at 575 (2d ed. 1986)). The second is when a defendant
has the requisite mental state for the commission of the offense
but, based on a misunderstanding of the law, "claims that he was
unaware that such conduct was proscribed by the criminal law."
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 5.6(d) at 545-46
(3d ed. 2018).
In each situation, the defendant claims a mistake of
law. Only in the first situation, however, does the "knowingly"
element of the offense give the defendant a valid defense based on
the misunderstanding. The reason is that, in the second situation,
the defendant cannot overcome the reality that -- as the familiar
saying goes -- ignorance of the law is no excuse. As the Supreme
Court explained in Bryan v. United States, "unless the text of the
statute dictates a different result, the term 'knowingly' merely
requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense." 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998) (footnote omitted). That is
because "the background presumption that every citizen knows the
- 23 - law makes it unnecessary to adduce specific evidence to prove that
'an evil-meaning mind' directed the 'evil-doing hand.'" Id.
It is usually an "easy task" to identify the type of
situation a defendant is in based on their asserted mistaken
understanding, 1 LaFave, supra, § 5.6(d) at 546, though, we
recognize, "[d]ifficulties" may "arise when [a] statute is unclear
as to the extent of the mental state requirement," id. at 546 n.64.
There is no such difficulty here, however, because we clarified
the scope of the mens rea requirement under §§ 924(a)(2) and
922(g)(9) in Minor II in a way that makes Minor's position
untenable.7
To that point, as we explained in Minor II, a defendant
knows that he is in the "category of persons convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" when his "knowledge about
his prior conviction included everything necessary to satisfy" the
definition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under
§ 921(a)(33)(A). 63 F.4th at 121. Thus, the requirement that a
defendant know that he bore the status of a person convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, for purposes of
7 For similar reasons, Minor's argument that the District Court's ruling "contravenes the requirements of Rehaif and other federal courts" is unpersuasive. His claim essentially repackages the argument that we rejected in Minor II. See 63 F.4th at 120 (holding Rehaif does not require the government to prove that a defendant "knew that the assault crime of which he had been convicted was classified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence").
- 24 - §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9), can be established by knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense labeled a "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence." It follows that the word "knowingly" in
§ 924(a)(2) does not require the government to prove, with respect
to § 922(g)(9), that the defendant knew that his prior offense was
labeled a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" or qualified as
one under federal law. Id. at 124; see also McFadden v. United
States, 576 U.S. 186, 194 (2015) (stating that the knowledge that
a substance is a "controlled substance" necessary for a conviction
under the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986
may be "established by evidence that the defendant knew the
specific analogue he was dealing with, even if he did not know its
legal status as an analogue"); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 602 (1994) (holding that conviction for possession of
unregistered machinegun required proof "beyond a reasonable doubt
that [the defendant] knew the weapon he possessed had the
characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of
a machinegun").
Moreover, at trial, the government's case-in-chief
relied on our conclusions in Minor II. The government's theory of
liability was that Minor knew the characteristics of his 2010
Maine-law conviction for simple assault that qualified it as a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal
law -- namely, that it involved the use of force and the victim
- 25 - was his then-wife. It did not attempt to prove -- because it had
no need to prove -- that Minor also actually knew that offense was
so classified under federal law. See Minor II, 63 F.4th at 120;
cf. id. at 121 n.6 (noting that proof that a defendant knew his
status as a domestic violence misdemeanant could be established by
evidence "that a defendant knew that a previous conviction was
classified under federal law as a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence"). Indeed, Minor agreed that he knew his simple assault
conviction involved, as an element, the use of force, and he also
agreed that he knew the assault, at the time it was committed, was
committed against his spouse.
Accordingly, Minor has not shown that the District Court
abused its discretion or otherwise erred by excluding Minor's
proffered testimony regarding his belief that he lawfully could
possess firearms. Contrary to his contention, Rehaif does not
demonstrate that such testimony was relevant to counter the
government's theory of mens rea for Minor's knowledge that he
belonged to the relevant category of persons -- that Minor knew
the characteristics of his predicate offense that brought it within
the definition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. And,
Minor II makes clear, the word "knowingly" in the statutory
provision setting forth the offense at issue does not support
Minor's contention that the government was required to prove that
Minor "knew that he could not possess a gun." Id. at 126.
- 26 - We note that in excluding the testimony at issue the
District Court determined that the testimony was likely to confuse
the issues and mislead the jury precisely because it was not
relevant. See id. at 124 ("Congress's attempt to tailor
prohibitions on gun possession by providing what laypersons might
regard as unclear categories while simultaneously requiring that
violations of the prohibitions must be knowing creates great
opportunities for confusion . . . ."); Fed. R. Evid. 403. But, as
we have explained, Minor fails to show that the District Court
erred in determining that the testimony regarding his belief that
he could possess a firearm was not relevant. We thus discern no
basis for concluding that the District Court abused its discretion
in making this determination about the need to exclude the evidence
to avoid confusion. And for this reason, too, we see no basis for
finding in the exclusion of such evidence any violation of Minor's
constitutional right to present a defense. See Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006) ("[T]he Constitution permits
judges to exclude evidence" when "its probative value is outweighed
by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.").
C.
Minor also takes issue with the District Court's
decision to exclude evidence about his "understanding of the impact
of the charge of simple assault on his ability to possess a
- 27 - firearm." Specifically, he sought to introduce testimony from
George Hess, the attorney who represented him during the 2010 state
proceedings. As proffered, Hess would have testified that the
state assistant district attorney who prosecuted Minor's
misdemeanor made representations that assured Hess that Minor
would be able to possess a firearm if he pleaded guilty to the
simple assault charge. In addition, Minor sought to introduce
evidence that, as arranged by his plea, he would be able to possess
firearms lawfully.
Minor argues that he was entitled to present this
evidence to show that his "good faith reliance on counsel" negated
the required mens rea, citing several out-of-circuit decisions for
support. See United States v. Scully, 877 F.3d 464, 475-76 (2d
Cir. 2017); United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d
1181, 1193 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Miller, 658 F.2d 235,
237 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Painter, 314 F.2d 939, 943
(4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Ray, No. 20-cr-110, 2022 WL
1004961, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2022). Good faith reliance on
counsel, however, typically has been considered to negate the
requisite state of mind for offenses requiring specific intent.
See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 195, 201-02 (1991)
(holding good faith reliance on advice of counsel may negate
willfulness for purposes of criminal tax offense). The cases cited
by Minor are not to the contrary; each concerns a statute involving
- 28 - specific intent. See Scully, 877 F.3d at 475 (fraudulent intent);
Beech-Nut Nutrition, 871 F.2d at 1191 (same); Miller, 658 F.2d at
237 (same); Painter, 314 F.2d at 940, 943 (same); Ray, 2022 WL
1004961, at *2 (willful attempt to evade taxes).
The word "knowingly" in the statute at issue in this
case, however, permits the knowledge-of-status requirement here to
be established by evidence that the defendant knew the
characteristics of his prior offense that brought it within the
definition of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." In other
words, that term does not require the defendant to know that the
offense was classified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
for the purposes of § 922(g)(9) or that he would be violating that
law if he possessed a firearm. As a result, Minor has not shown
that his attorney having advised him that, despite
§ 921(a)(33)(A), his prior offense did not qualify as a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence provided him with a defense to the
federal crime for which he was charged. Accordingly, Minor has
not shown that the District Court abused its discretion by
excluding the evidence about what Minor and his counsel in the
2010 state-court proceedings understood about the effect of
Minor's simple assault conviction on his right to possess firearms
under federal law.
- 29 - D.
Minor advances one other ground for claiming evidentiary
error. Here, he argues that the District Court erred by refusing
to permit Hess to provide testimony that Minor contends would have
impeached the credibility of another witness whom the government
called and the District Court allowed to testify. That witness,
Nicholas Worden, was the assistant district attorney for the State
of Maine who prosecuted Minor's simple assault charge. Worden
testified that it was "commonly known" that the conviction Minor
faced in his state proceedings would subject him to a federal
firearm ban.
The problem for Minor here is that he did not base his
objection to the exclusion of Hess's testimony in the District
Court on the ground that the testimony was relevant to impeach
Worden. Minor argued below only that Hess should be allowed to
testify as to Minor's understanding of the collateral consequences
of his simple assault conviction because Worden's testimony
regarding the widespread knowledge that an offense of simple
assault committed against a spouse qualified as a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence "opened the door" to a defense of "entrapment
by estoppel."
The District Court rejected that argument for permitting
Hess to testify. It determined that the circumstances under which
Minor entered his guilty plea were not relevant to the elements of
- 30 - the offense of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as
defined in § 921(a)(33)(A) and that the present prosecution was
not a forum for Minor to collaterally attack the prior conviction.
Minor does not on appeal dispute that ground for denying his
attempt to introduce the Hess testimony. He instead seeks to
challenge the denial of his attempt to introduce that testimony on
his newly minted impeachment-based ground. As a result, our review
is only for plain error. See United States v. Rasberry, 882 F.3d
241, 250 (1st Cir. 2018). But, as Minor has failed to make any
argument on appeal that he can meet that demanding standard, we
must reject the challenge as waived. See United States v.
Benjamin-Hernandez, 49 F.4th 580, 585 (1st Cir. 2022) (defendant
whose brief "fails to even mention plain error, let alone argue
for its application here," "waives [his] arguments" (quoting
United States v. Cruz-Ramos, 987 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2021))).
IV.
For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Minor's motion
to dismiss the indictment and Minor's conviction.
- 31 -