United States v. Milton A. Hunter

485 F.2d 1035, 158 U.S. App. D.C. 256

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: September 20, 1973
• Docket: 71-1980
• Status: Published

Opinion

PER CURIAM;

By indictment filed September 21, 1970, appellant was charged in three counts with violations of the Federal and local narcotics laws. On Count I, which charged that Hunter had, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a), “purchased, dispensed and distributed ... a narcotic drug”, there was an acquittal. Conviction was had only under Count II, a Jones-Miller Act offense, 21 U.S.C. § 174, which charged that Hunter had “received, concealed and facilitated the concealment of a narcotic drug” and Count III, 33 D.C.Code § 402, alleging that Hunter knowingly possessed a narcotic drug. On November 18, 1971, appellant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years on Count II and one year on Count III. Appeal has been taken from both the conviction and sentence. On January 17, 1972, the District Court granted a conditional release pending appeal.

We reject appellant’s contentions on the merits, and affirm the conviction. As to the attack on the sentence, predicated on the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, 1 we follow our ruling in United States v. Harrison & Lightfoot, 158 U.S.App.D.C. _, 485 F.2d 1008 (1973). 2 The conviction is affirmed, the sentence vacated and the case remanded to permit full consideration of disposition under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, Title II.

So ordered.

1 . The Supreme Court decision in Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 93 S.Ct. 1151, 35 L.Ed.2d 528 (1973) is a dispositive answer to appellant’s contention that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act should be applied retroactively to his case.

2 . Although appellant denied at trial that he was a narcotics user (Tr. at 143), which was consistent with his principal defense of misidentification, we think the question of addiction should be explored in the context of sentencing. Our remand is to permit consideration of NABA disposition if requested by appellant.