United States v. Miller

200 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6414, 2002 WL 548841
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedApril 12, 2002
DocketCR. 2:02-00010
StatusPublished

This text of 200 F. Supp. 2d 616 (United States v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Miller, 200 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6414, 2002 WL 548841 (S.D.W. Va. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REQUIRE ELECTION

HADEN, Chief Judge.

Pending is Defendant’s motion to require election and for a bill of particulars. For reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES both demands of the motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 8, 2002 a Grand Jury returned a one-count 1 indictment against Defendant charging:

*617 From in or about October 1996 through in or about May 2001, at or near Chapmanville, Logan County, West Virginia, and within the Southern District of West Virginia, defendant Madonna Miller did knowingly embezzle, steal, purloin and convert to her own use and the use of another money and things of value of the United States, that is, United States Treasury checks, totaling more than $1,000.00.
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 641.

Under Section 641, if the value of the stolen property is over $1,000.00, the violation is a felony, carrying a maximum ten year term of imprisonment. If the property value is under $1,000.00, the violation is a misdemeanor with a term of imprisonment not to exceed one year. 2

Based on discovery provided to Defendant, Defendant believes the Government will attempt to establish the following facts:

Prior to October, 1996, the defendant’s mother, Ruth Howard, was a recipient of Social Security Administration Auxiliary Benefits. Ms. Howard’s benefits were sent by United States Treasury checks to P.O. Box 1078 at the Chapmanville, West Virginia, Post Office. P.O. Box 1078 was also held by Harlen L. Miller and the defendant, Madonna Miller. Ruth Howard died on September 19, 1996. However, SSA benefits continued to be sent monthly by United States Treasury checks to Ms. Howard at P.O. Box 1078 through May, 2001.
In or about May, 2001, through a national project, information was developed which showed that the benefits continued to be paid after Ms. Howard’s death. Investigation agents'later questioned the defendant. The defendant admitted to the agents that, following her mother’s death, she would take her mother’s SSA benefit checks, cash them, and use the money to support- herself and her son. From the period of October, 1996, through April, 2001, the defendant negotiated 55 United States Treasury checks payable to Ruth Howard. While the amounts of the checks varied over the time period, all of the checks were for between $542.00 and $580.00, with the exception of one check in the amount of $448.40. None of the checks were for $1,000.00 or more. It would further appear that each check was cashed during the month it was issued and prior to the issuance of the check for the following month. A check issued for the month of May, 2001, in the amount of $573.00, was turned over to agents following their questioning of the defendant.

(Def. Mem. at 1-2).

According to Defendant, the Government is attempting to aggregate 55 misde *618 meanor offenses into one felonious violation of Section 641. She asserts such a charge is impermissibly duplicitous and that Congress did not contemplate prosecution of a “course of conduct” under Section 641. Defendant requests the Court require the Government to elect which misdemeanor offenses it wishes to pursue and submits such election can be noticed through a bill of particulars.

II. DISCUSSION

In determining whether the Government can charge a course of conduct violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, the Court is guided by the continuing offense doctrine articulated in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970). Under Toussie, an offense may be characterized as continuing if “the specific language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.” Toussie at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858 (emphasis supplied).

Here, the Court believes the nature of Defendant’s offense is such that Congress must have intended it be treated as a continuing one. Defendant allegedly stole her deceased mother’s social security check each and every month for a period of five years. Each affirmative act of theft furthered an overall scheme to deprive the United States of these funds permanently. In other words, by endorsing the checks in her mother’s name, Defendant gave the United States a basis to assume Ruth Howard was alive and therefore, the Government continued without suspicion to mail the checks to the joint post office box. 3 Because each fraudulent endorsement perpetuated the overall ruse, the offense properly is charged as a single, continuing offense. C.f. United States v. Blizzard, 27 F.3d 100 (4th Cir.1994) (violation of the retaining and concealing stolen Government property section 641 qualifies as a “continuing offense.”); United States v. Shorter, 608 F.Supp., 871, 875 (D.D.C.1985), aff 'd, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987), abrogated on other grounds by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (“It is well established that two or more acts, each of which would constitute an offense standing alone and which therefore could be charged as a separate counts of an indictment, may instead by charged in a single count if those acts could be characterized as part of a single continuing scheme.”); contra United States v. Beard, 713 F.Supp. 285 (S.D.Ind.l989)(embezzling, stealing and purloining Government property under 18 U.S.C. § 641 not a continuing offense).

Further, the Court holds it is lawful to aggregate the checks pursuant to the continuing offense doctrine to satisfy the jurisdictional minimum for a felony violation. In United States v. Gill, 193 F.3d 802 (4th Cir.1999), the Fourth Circuit upheld a felony conviction under Section 641 based on the very same conduct and it appears amounts were aggregated to meet the statutory minimum, although the issue was not specifically addressed. Moreover, other courts that have specifically considered aggregation permit it. In United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Toussie v. United States
397 U.S. 112 (Supreme Court, 1970)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1993)
United States v. Allen Ray Johnson
612 F.2d 843 (Fourth Circuit, 1979)
United States v. John A. Shorter, Jr.
809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Circuit, 1987)
United States v. George William Sanderson
966 F.2d 184 (Sixth Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Judy Arrington Gill
193 F.3d 802 (Fourth Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Shorter
608 F. Supp. 871 (District of Columbia, 1985)
United States v. Beard
713 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Indiana, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
200 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6414, 2002 WL 548841, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-miller-wvsd-2002.