United States v. Milken

780 F. Supp. 123, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1824, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17117, 1991 WL 268747
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 26, 1991
DocketSS 89 Cr. 41 (KMW)
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 780 F. Supp. 123 (United States v. Milken) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Milken, 780 F. Supp. 123, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1824, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17117, 1991 WL 268747 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KIMBA M. WOOD, District Judge.

Defendant Michael R. Milken moved to seal an affidavit and portions of a memorandum in support of his Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence. (October 16,1991 Letter from Arthur J. Liman, Esq. to the Court, treated by the Court as a motion to seal [hereinafter “Liman Letter”].) At an October 17, 1991 hearing, the Government joined in defendant’s motion to seal portions of both defendant’s and the Government’s moving papers. The Court heard arguments from various members of the press in opposition to the motion to seal. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

On April 24, 1990, defendant pled guilty to a six-count felony information charging him with conspiracy, securities fraud, mail *125 fraud, market manipulation, and tax fraud. United States v. Michael Milken, 759 F.Supp. 109, 110-11 (S.D.N.Y.1990). Before sentencing, defendant requested leniency on the ground that although he had not yet cooperated with the prosecutors, he intended to do so in the future. Rather than giving defendant credit for future, possible cooperation, the Court followed the traditional path of waiting until the cooperation had taken place before evaluating it. After conducting a Fatico hearing, the Court sentenced defendant to ten years in prison and three years probation.

Defendant was sentenced for crimes that took place before the Sentencing Guidelines became effective, and thus he was eligible to be released on parole after serving a period of time to be determined by the Parole Commission pursuant to their guidelines and other procedures. Defendant has now served over eight months of his prison term. During that time, the Parole Commission has considered when defendant will be released on parole. In August 1991 the National Commissioners of the Parole Commission rendered an initial decision that defendant will be paroled after 44 months. Assuming that defendant receives five months’ credit for Superior Program Achievement for such activities as teaching, he would be paroled after serving 39 months, rather than 44 months. Defendant has appealed the National Commissioners’ decision to the full Commission, which is expected to hear the appeal in December 1991. The Parole Commission did not consider whether defendant’s period of incarceration should be shortened because of his cooperation.

Defendant’s motion for a reduction in his sentence is based principally on his post-sentence cooperation with the Government. (Def.’s Mem. Rule 35, Redacted Pursuant to Court Order of 10/17/91, at 1 [hereinafter “Def. Mem.”].) The Government responded by saying that it does not “formally oppose” reduction of the sentence (Transcript of October 17, 1991 Hearing, at 51, lines 3-4 [hereinafter “Tr.”]), but stated in its affidavit that “Mr. Milken’s cooperation has been of limited value to criminal investigations.” (Gov.’s Response to Def.’s Mem. Rule 35, Redacted Pursuant to Court Order of 10/17/91, at 5 [hereinafter “Gov. Res.”].) Both defendant and the Government submitted to Chambers redacted and unredacted versions of their motion papers, and defendant simultaneously moved to seal defendant’s unredacted memorandum and an accompanying affidavit, which discuss the subject matter of defendant’s interviews with the Government. (Liman Letter at 1). In compliance with the Court’s instruction, the parties filed the redacted versions of their submissions with the clerk’s office.

After advising the press of the motion to seal, the Court held a hearing on October 17, 1991, to hear argument relating to the motion to seal. The Government argued that the subject matter of defendant’s interviews with the Government should remain confidential in the interest of protecting ongoing and future grand jury investigations and encouraging future cooperators to come forward. Defendant took the position that, with one exception, defendant sought sealing only to protect the Government’s interests; the only exception was defendant’s privacy interest in sealing a description of certain medical conditions relating to defendant’s family.

Members of the press asserted a Constitutional right of access to the information regarding defendant’s discussions with the Government. In particular, the press requested access to the name of the defendant’s affiant, to information about conduct that could not be prosecuted because of the statute of limitations, to references to defendant’s own criminal conduct, and to defendant’s cooperation regarding his former employer, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. Members of the press stated that any interest in confidentiality asserted by the parties was outweighed by the public’s First Amendment right to be fully informed of the details of this prominent defendant’s willingness or unwillingness to cooperate with the Government. The press also asserted the right of the public to this information in order to allow it to evaluate how well the Government is doing its job. Finally, the press pointed out that any indi *126 vidual who cooperates with the Government has a reasonable expectation that he may be called upon to state that information publicly.

DISCUSSION

I.

The public has a First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508, 104 S.Ct. 819, 823, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (“Press-Enterprise I”). Judicial proceedings may be closed only upon a showing that closure is necessary to protect higher values and that the closure is narrowly tailored to the individual circumstances:

The presumption of openness [in a criminal trial] may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.

Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 824.

The Second Circuit has adopted this standard. See e.g., Matter of New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir.1987), appeal after remand, Matter of New York Times, 834 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir.), appeal after remand, Matter of New York Times, 837 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Esposito v. New York Times Co., 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 99 L.Ed.2d 483 (1988), citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2742-43, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (“Press-Enterprise II”), citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 824.

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Bluebook (online)
780 F. Supp. 123, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1824, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17117, 1991 WL 268747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-milken-nysd-1991.