United States v. Miguel Medina

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 20, 2023
• Docket: 22-30206
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-30206

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 9:22-cr-00013-DLC-2 v.

MIGUEL ANGEL MEDINA, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 8, 2023 Portland, Oregon

Before: BERZON, NGUYEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Defendant Miguel Medina appeals his conviction for transportation of illegal

aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

1. The evidence was sufficient to sustain Medina’s conviction. We

review questions of sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Tuan

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Ngoc Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2020). “[T]he relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alarcon-Simi, 300 F.3d 1172, 1176

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 70 F.3d 1071, 1072-73

(9th Cir. 1995)). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), the government must prove

that the defendant, (1) “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien

ha[d] come to, entered, or remain[ed] in the United States in violation of law,” (2)

“transport[ed], or move[d] or attempt[ed] to transport or move such alien within

the United States . . . .” A conviction under a theory of aiding and abetting

additionally requires proof that the defendant had the specific intent to facilitate the

commission of the crime and that he assisted or participated in the commission of

the crime. United States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2014).

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, a rational jury

could find that Medina knew that co-defendant Leslie Rivera planned to transport

illegal aliens and that he assisted her in the commission of that crime. Rivera

testified that she wanted Medina to accompany her on the trip to Montana because

she was a woman traveling alone, and if something went wrong with the car, he

could fix it. Although Rivera drove the entire trip, the government presented

evidence that she originally intended for Medina to assist her in driving and that

2 she “offered him an opportunity to make $1,000” if he came with her. The

prosecution also introduced evidence that Medina told Border Patrol agents that he

had received a text message from Rivera “telling him that . . . she ha[d] an

opportunity to make some money” and “that he need[ed] the money.” This

evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Medina committed an

affirmative act of assistance by providing protection and security to Rivera while

she transported the aliens. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 484 F.2d 165, 168 (9th

Cir. 1973) (holding that where the defendant had walked around a parking lot “in

the manner of a lookout” during a drug transaction, there was sufficient evidence

to support aiding and abetting liability for “serving as the lookout”); 1 Wharton’s

Criminal Law § 10:11 (16th ed., 2023 update) (explaining that to establish

accomplish liability, “[i]t can be enough . . . to serve as a lookout for a criminal

endeavor, even if no police arrive on the scene and the role of the lookout turns out

to be unnecessary”).

As to knowledge and intent, the jury was entitled to reject as implausible

Medina’s post-arrest statement that he was unaware of the plan to drive to

Montana. Rivera asked him to travel with her to Yakima, but when the plan

changed to drive an additional seven hours to Montana, Medina told officers he did

not ask her any questions. Medina’s statement was contradicted by Rivera, who

testified that she asked Medina to ride with her to Montana, not Yakima. The

3 record thus provided sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer Medina’s

advance knowledge and specific intent.

2. The district court did not violate Medina’s rights under the

Confrontation Clause. Because Medina failed to preserve this argument below, we

review for plain error. United States v. Macias, 789 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir.

2015). The record belies Medina’s argument that the district court improperly

limited his cross-examination of Rivera. While the district court expressed

concern that Rivera was close to “unraveling” her plea agreement due to her

“pattern of minimiz[ing]” her knowledge of the offense, and stated that it “w[ould]

declare a mistrial” if she continued in the same vein, the court in no way restricted

Medina’s ability to cross-examine Rivera. Counsel could have (as Medina does in

his appellate briefing) questioned the need for a mistrial if Rivera reneged but did

not do so. That counsel chose not to cross-examine Rivera further appears to have

been a strategic choice, rather than a result of any prohibition imposed by the

district court.

3. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Medina a minor or minimal role adjustment. We review the district court’s

identification of the legal standard de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and

its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, the

4 district court applied the correct legal standard, specifically referencing the minor

role guideline provision and relevant application note describing the factors to

consider. The district court then concluded that Medina was not “substantially less

culpable” than Rivera. United States v. Diaz, 884 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2018).

The district court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion—the defendants

traveled together to pick up the illegal aliens, both were to be paid, and the original

plan was for them to share the burden of driving.

AFFIRMED.