United States v. Michel

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 23, 2022
DocketCriminal No. 2019-0148
StatusPublished

This text of United States v. Michel (United States v. Michel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Michel, (D.D.C. 2022).

Opinion

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) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ). Criminal No. 19-148-1 (CKK) v. ) ) ; j Jerosos$) PRAKAZREL MICHEL (1) ) ) QF ) adsas ) Soe CK Ba eby MEMORANDUM OPINION (April 4, 2022)

(AT This matter comes before the Court on the Government’s Classified Ex Parte, In Camera, Under Seal Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Protective Order Pursuant

to Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act and Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure (“Motion” or “Mot.”). [SSS

fan) For the reasons that follow, and upon consideration of the briefing, the relevant authorities, and the entire record, the Court shall GRANT the Motion. I. (U) Background (U) On May 2, 2019, a grand jury retumed an eleven-count indictment against Michel and his co-Defendant, Malaysian national Low Taek Jho (“Low”). Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 85 at 1. The charges in the Superseding Indictment arise from an alleged scheme between

Michel and Low to funnel money from Low and other straw donors into the 2012 Presidential C. PAE A LS 7

Election and to conceal the true contributions from the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).

Id Beginning at some time in 2017, Michel and Low conspired with at least three other individuals, Elliott Broidy, Nickie Lum Davis (“Davis”), and George Higginbotham—who have all since either been charged or convicted in this Court or, in Davis’ case, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii—“to wage an illegal, back-channel lobbying campaign to: (1) convince the Administration of the President of the. United States (‘Administration’) and the United States Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) to drop forfeiture proceedings and related investigations into Low for the embezzlement of billions of dollars from 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (‘1 MDB’), a strategic investment and development company wholly owned by the Government of Malaysia; and (2) convince the Administration and DOJ to send a high-profile dissident of the [People’s Republic of China] living in the United States back to the PRC.” /@. at 2.

(U) Davis has since pled guilty to one count of aiding and abetting violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Mem. Of Plea Agreement, ECF No. 15, Case No. 20-cr-68- LEK (D. Haw. Aug 31, 2020). The Government represents that she continues to cooperate with the Government in this case and others and appears to suggest that, should this case go to trial, the Government would call Lum as a witness in its case-in-chief. See Mot. at 4. In the meantime, the Court has held successive status conferences in this case, most recently on January 11, 2022. At that status conference, the Government, rather cryptically, discussed the possibility of a discovery dispute that the parties would attempt to resolve prior to the next status conférence, currently set for April 4, 2022. It appears that the Government intends to resolve the

discovery dispute by this pending Motion. Il. (U) Legal Standards

(U) In general, the Government must provide a defendant with all exculpatory “material” relevant to the guilt or punishment of the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Evidence is “material” where, if not disclosed, “there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United Staies v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). “Material” evidence includes that which a defendant could use to impeach a government witness. United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S, 150 (1972), Additionally, by statute, the government must disclose pretrial statements made by a witness that is related to the subject matter of their testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). Local Rule 5.1 further requires the government to disclose various categories of information, including Brady material, “regardless of whether the information would itself constitution admissible evidence” and “in a reasonably usable form unless that is impracticable.” LCrR 5.1{a). That said, “[a]t any time the [C]ourt may, for good

cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery for inspection.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1). (U) Where, however, such material has been classified, the Court looks to CIPA. United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 (D.D.C. 2006) (RBW). CIPA “does not expand or restrict established principles of discovery and does not have a substantive impact on the admissibility of probative evidence.” United States v. Sedaghty, 728 F.3d 885, 903 (9th Cir. 2013). Indeed, CIPA stands at equal stature with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing criminal discovery, and “contemplates an application of the general law of discovery in criminal cases to the classified information area with limitations imposed based on the sensitive nature of the classified information.” United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 622 (D.C.

Cir. 1989). In relevant part, CIPA permits

{t]he court, upon a sufficient showing, [to] authorize the United States to delete specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant to the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.

CIPA § 4. To do so, the government must first move for ex parte review and, upon granting such relief, “the entire text of the statement of the United States shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of appeal.” Jd.

(U) For a substitute summary of information, the Court has wide discretion to approve suitable substitutions. See Sedaghary, 728 F.3d at 905. These unclassified substitutions “need not be of ‘precise, concrete equivalence,’ and the ‘fact that insignificant tactical advantages could accrue to the defendant by use of the specified classified information should not preclude the court from ordering alternative disclosure.” Jd.

(U) As for deletions, if the information to be deleted is irrelevant or unhelpful to the defense, the Court’s inquiry is over. Afeija, 448 F.3d at 455. If, however, the information is

relevant, the Court must determine if the privilege claimed by the Government “is at least a cere uve vurriroce Pouayge wows ee

colorable one.” Yurtis, 867 F.2d at 623. Ifso, then the Court must balance the Government’s (and public’s) interest in national security against the defendant’s need for the information. Meija, 448 F.3d at 445 (citation omitted). Special attention must be paid to whether producing the classified material would implicate the sources and methods used to collect the material. Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623 (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985)).

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Related

Brady v. Maryland
373 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1963)
Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims
471 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
United States v. Bagley
473 U.S. 667 (Supreme Court, 1985)
United States v. Fawaz Yunis
867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Pirouz Sedaghaty
728 F.3d 885 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Libby
429 F. Supp. 2d 46 (District of Columbia, 2006)

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