United States v. Michael Windom

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4217 Doc: 42 Filed: 06/17/2026 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4217

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL WINDOM,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, Senior District Judge. (1:23-cr-00096-JKB-1)

Submitted: April 29, 2026 Decided: June 17, 2026

Before THACKER, HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Daniel Woofter, RUSSELL & WOOFTER LLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Kelly O. Hayes, United States Attorney, David C. Bornstein, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4217 Doc: 42 Filed: 06/17/2026 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Michael Windom pled guilty under a written plea agreement to being a felon in

possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His plea agreement contained an

appellate waiver in which Windom waived his right to appeal whatever sentence imposed

for any reason. The district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 63 months’

imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release.

Windom now seeks to appeal his sentence, raising two primary arguments. 1 First,

Windom argues that the district court procedurally erred because it summarily rejected the

parties’ coordinated below-Guidelines sentencing recommendation and failed to provide

an individualized explanation for the sentence imposed. Second, Windom argues the

district court’s judgment contains an error under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th

Cir. 2020). In response, the government argues Windom’s first argument is precluded by

his valid appeal waiver. And on his second argument, the government argues there is no

material discrepancy as between his oral and written sentence. We affirm in part and

dismiss in part.

To start, an appeal waiver “preclude[s] a defendant from appealing a specific issue

if the record establishes that the waiver is valid and that the issue being appealed is within

the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012)

(quoting United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005)). “We review the validity

of an appeal waiver de novo by considering whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary

1 We have jurisdiction to consider Windom’s appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4217 Doc: 42 Filed: 06/17/2026 Pg: 3 of 4

based on the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Smith, 134 F.4th 248, 255 (4th

Cir. 2025). “In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, a properly conducted Rule 11

colloquy establishes the validity of the waiver.” United States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182

(4th Cir. 2016). Based upon our review of the transcript of the Rule 11 colloquy, we

conclude Windom’s appeal waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily. And Windom’s

argument regarding procedural error here falls squarely within the scope of his waiver of

appellate rights. See United States v. Siddiqui, 850 Fed. App’x 854, 855 (4th Cir. June 28,

2021) (holding defendant’s “challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence

falls within the scope of the waiver”); United States v. Camp, 716 Fed. App’x 229, 230

(4th Cir. Mar. 29, 2018) (holding defendant’s argument that the district court’s sentencing

explanation was insufficient was “squarely with the scope of his valid appeal waiver”);

United States v. Oxendine, 631 Fed. App’x 190, 191 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2016) (finding

defendant’s argument that the district court committed procedural error in calculating

guidelines range was “within the scope of the waiver and [could] not be reviewed by this

court”). Therefore, we dismiss Windom’s appeal in part.

Turning next to whether the district court’s judgment contains a Rogers error, we

review the consistency between an “oral sentence and the written judgment de novo.”

Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296.2 As a starting point, a defendant has a right to be present at

sentencing, and, therefore, “all non-mandatory conditions of supervised release must be

2 And under our current precedent, we are constrained to find that the appellate waiver here would not apply to the extent there are “null supervised release conditions.” See United States v. McLaurin, 168 F.4th 693, 704 (4th Cir. 2026). 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4217 Doc: 42 Filed: 06/17/2026 Pg: 4 of 4

announced at a defendant’s sentencing hearing.” Id. Here, at sentencing, the district court

orally incorporated by reference the Maryland Standard Conditions of Supervision set forth

in the PSR. One of those conditions was that Windom had to report to the probation office

where he was “authorized to reside within 72 hours of . . . release from imprisonment . . . .”

J.A. 137 (emphasis added). But his written judgment said Windom would report to the

probation office in the district to which he was “released within 72 hours of release from

the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.” J.A. 69 (emphasis added). And beneath that, the

judgment also said Windom had to report to probation in the district where he was

“authorized to reside within 72 hours . . .” of release. J.A. 69 (emphasis added). Our recent

decision in United States v. Aborisade, 163 F.4th 856 (4th Cir. 2026) considered precisely

the same discrepancy between an oral sentence and written judgment in the same judicial

district. Following Aborisade, we conclude “the contested inconsistency between the oral

pronouncement and written judgment is not material and thus full resentencing is not

warranted.” Id. at 868. Therefore, we affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment

and Windom’s sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART