United States v. Michael Williams

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: 16-56640
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 3 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-56640

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos. 2:16-cv-02569-RSWL v. 2:05-cr-00920-RSWL-1

MICHAEL DENNIS WILLIAMS, AKA Baby Treystone, AKA Treystone, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 19, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, CHRISTEN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Michael Williams appeals from the district court’s order denying his 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his conviction of the use and discharge of a

firearm during a crime of violence causing death in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), (j)(1). We review a denial of a § 2255 motion de novo, United

States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004). We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. under § 2255, and we affirm.

1. Our opinion issued today in Johnson v. United States, ___ F.4th ____, No.

19-5517 (9th Cir. June 3, 2025) controls the outcome of this appeal. Willams was

tried alongside co-defendant Antoine Johnson, and the court gave the jury identical

instructions for both defendants. Therefore, like Johnson’s § 924(c) conviction,

Williams’ § 924(c) conviction remains lawful because it was based on one of two

valid predicate offenses: Hobbs Act robbery or Hobbs Act robbery under a

Pinkerton theory of liability.1

2. In the alternative, even if the jury could have interpreted the district

court’s instructions to mean that the § 924(c) charge could be predicated on the

conspiracy charged in Count One of the indictment, we affirm the district court’s

order that any such error in the jury instructions would have been harmless. See

United States v. Reed, 48 F.4th 1082, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Hedgpeth v.

Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58 (2008) (per curiam)). The evidence presented against

Williams demonstrated his participation in the robbery, and the robbery itself

involved extensive advance planning and coordination, demonstrating the

existence of a conspiracy. In Johnson’s case, we held that the jury could not have

reasonably concluded that Johnson used a firearm in the course of the conspiracy

1 We expand Williams’ Certificate of Appealability (Dkt. #3) to include whether Hobbs Act robbery under a Pinkerton theory of liability qualifies as a crime of violence. See Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 311 (9th Cir. 2010).

2 but not in the course of the Hobbs Act robbery. Unlike Johnson, no evidence

placed Williams at the alleged planning meeting, making it even less likely that the

jury could have premised Williams’ § 924(c) conviction solely on the Count One

conspiracy. See United States v. Johnson, 767 F.3d 815, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2014).

We agree with the district court that the evidence supporting the Hobbs Act

robbery and conspiracy charges was so coextensive and “inextricably intertwined”

that no rational juror could have found that Williams carried a firearm in relation to

the conspiracy charge and not in relation to the robbery charge. Reed, 48 F.4th at

1090.

AFFIRMED.